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Abstract
In most bicameral systems, both legislative chambers must agree on a bill before it may
become law. In the United States Congress, agreement often comes during negotiations
which occur after each chamber has passed an initial version of the bill. Our under-
standing of the post-passage resolution process is very limited and has traditionally been
limited to question of “who wins” in conference committees. The post-passage bargaining
process is more complex and more important than this work suggests. For example, it is
not well understood why the House and Senate must sometimes bargain and why they
can sometimes agree on legislation without having to bargain and why the two chambers
sometimes use conference committees to settle their differences but other times use the
amendment trading process. Likewise, the relationship between post-passage bargaining
and policy outcomes or legislative productivity is more nuanced than current literature
on parties and member preferences suggests. In this dissertation, I take the strategic
interaction of the coalitions in each chamber seriously by treating them as two actors
pursuing electoral and policy goals within the constraints of the institution. I use a non-
cooperative bargaining model to find the conditions under which post-passage bargaining
occurs, why chambers choose between a conference committee and amendment trading,
why the chambers sometimes fail to reach agreement, the ways in which bicameral bar-
gaining can increase legislative productivity even when the chambers are controlled by
different parties, and how post-passage bargaining affects policy. Each chamber faces a
iii
risk-return tradeoff during the passage and post-passage bargaining stages, and it is this
tradeoff which leads to successful reconciliation or failure. The results have implications
not just for post-passage bargaining, but also for theories of legislative organization, coali-
tion building within Congress, and the effect of partisanship on institutional procedures
and outcomes.
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Chapter 1: An Introduction to Bicameral Bargaining
Introduction
In 2008, large Democratic majorities in both the House and Senate were swept into office by
voters. The Democrats had an ambitious agenda. Members of Congress, along with President
Obama, promised to overhaul the health care system, reform rules governing Wall Street and the
banking system, and impose tough standards on emissions and pollutants to reduce greenhouse gases.
Despite their numbers, and widespread ideological agreement, relations between the chambers were
contentious, almost from the start of the 111th Congress.
Democratic House member Jerrold Nadler said, “There’s a lot of anger toward the Senate. We
pass a lot of good things, and it goes over there to die.”1 On the other hand, a senior Democratic aide
in the Senate characterized the Senate’s frustration with the public statements of House members:
“It’s like none of these guys ever took a civics class, they get to ram stuff down the throats of the
minority; we do not. We are as frustrated as they are.”2
Compared to the 112th Congress, the 111th was a model of productivity and good will between
the branches. While the Democrats remained in control of the Senate, Republicans took over the
House and promptly called for policy changes that neither the Senate nor the president was likely
to approve. The first big test for both chambers came during negotiations over the budget. The
1Mike Madden, “‘There’s a lot of anger at the Senate.’: House Democrats think they’ve figured out the problem
with healthcare reform: The Senate.” Salon.com, January 21, 2010.
2Ibid.
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Republicans demanded large spending cuts and policy changes to the tax code, health care rules, and
environmental regulations. As of April 1, 2011, the chambers could only agree to pass short-term
continuing resolutions in order to avoid a government shutdown.
Both the 111th Congress, which had a large party majority in both chambers, and the 112th
Congress, which has divided party control, demonstrate why understanding the bicameral bargaining
process is important for scholars and policymakers. The resolution of legislation is not only a
necessary Constitutional step in the lawmaking process, but it also has an important effect on
the quantity, type, and substance of legislation. We cannot understand the lawmaking process in
Congress without an understanding of how the House and Senate resolve their differences. This
dissertation uses the rules and procedures of the two chambers, and the incentives of members, to
explain how the bicameral resolution process operates and how it affects what gets passed and when,
and why.
The theoretical basis of the dissertation is based on the claim that the interchamber resolution
process is a non-cooperative bargaining game where the chambers compete over the division of
benefits in the form of policy. When chambers are able to reach agreement, both are strictly better
off than they would have been had the policy in question not been passed. Exactly how much
better off each chamber is depends on the bargaining process itself. The dissertation focuses on how
information, patience, and costs, as translated through institutions and procedural rules, affect the
bargaining process and resulting outcomes. Sometimes bargains are struck which surprise observers,
and sometimes, despite both chambers’ incentives to resolve their differences, the chambers are
unable to agree and policy fails. The dissertation explains these outcomes by using insights from
within chamber negotiations and between chamber negotiations.
In this chapter, I first give a brief introduction of bicameral systems and their affect on policy-
making across countries and contexts. The chapter then explores how some theories of bicameralism
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have been studied and empirically tested in the United States, and which aspects of post-passage
resolution remain unclear. The following section lays the factual groundwork necessary for under-
standing the rest of the dissertation by briefly describing the rules and procedures used in Congress
to resolve differences between the chambers. The four substantive chapters are described in the next
section, and the introduction concludes with a brief discussion of the importance of the dissertation
and the insights it offers into our understanding of congressional lawmaking.
Bicameral Effects in a Comparative Perspective
Political scientists generally agree that bicameralism is a conservative legislative institution; as
compared to a unicameral system, it promotes the status quo and makes policy action slower and
more difficult to accomplish (Muthoo & Shepsle 2008, Tsebelis & Money 1997). The logic behind this
claim is simple. In bicameral systems, instead of one chamber agreeing to policy change, two must
agree. While it is difficult to show empirically that bicameralism reduces legislative productivity,
some indirect evidence has been found. In the American context, there is evidence that gridlock is
more likely as the preferences of the two chambers diverge (Binder 2003) (though Chapter 2 of the
dissertation suggests the effects of preference divergence can be mitigated.)
As Riker (1992) points out, bicameralism is often criticized on normative grounds. Populists
condemn the system because it is not as responsive to public demands as a unicameral system.
Additionally, most bicameral systems include an “upper” chamber that is not proportionally repre-
sentative and therefore magnifies the power of the minority (Heller 2007). Minority coalitions which
are over-represented may have a disproportionate influence on policy and, in many cases, allow the
minority a veto over a policy change supported by the other chamber (Cutrone & McCarty 2006).
Riker (1992), in finding that bicameralism prevents lawmaking in the absence of a stable majority
(as opposed to unicameralism), says that bicameralism is, “now, unfortunately, often regarded as a
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rather old-fashioned constitutional structure.”
Bicameralism not only affects the likelihood of passage, but also the content of the legislation,
even when the same party controls both chambers (Tsebelis & Money 1997). Much of the re-
search which addresses this question is based on, or extends, the “divide-the-dollar” game (Baron
& Ferejohn 1989). Ansolabehere, Snyder Jr. & Ting (2003) use one such extension to show malap-
portionment in a bicameral legislature can affect the distribution of goods given a specific set of
rules in the malapportioned chamber interacting with other conditions. The unequal weighting of
some citizens’ votes suggests that in a bicameral system, voters sacrifice their own representation
for moderated policy (Cremer & Palfrey 1999). Evidence for this theoretical claim has been found
in the states—those that are under-represented in the Senate (more populous states) receive less
federal spending per capita (Atlas, Gilligan, Hendershott & Zupan 1995).
The malapportionment result is robust in both formal and empirical models, but the exact causal
mechanism is unclear. Lee (1998) claims the two are connected through the process of coalition
building in the chambers, but these effects might be mitigated when the chambers bargain with each
other during the resolution process. With respect to Congress, Shepsle, Van Houweling, Abrams
& Hanson (2009) find the House modifies Senate spending on distributive goods, though only to
a small degree. How the interaction between the chambers affects the distribution of public goods
remains an open question.
Bicameral Origins and Effects in the United States
The bicameral legislature in the United States is the result of a compromise between the Founding
Fathers. Those from states with small populations favored equal representation in the legislative
body, while those from states with large populations favored proportional representation. Much of
the schism between large and small states was driven not just by representation concerns in the
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new government, but also by concerns about the relative power of the new federal government vis-
a-vis the states. Jillson & Eubanks (1984, 443-444) characterize the “character” of the discussion
as one of “interest-laced...(who gets what, when, and how),” once the debate turned to “the lower
level of constitutional choice.” The debate was not only about power in the legislature, but about
federalism as a whole—small states were afraid the federal government would not only become
powerful, but would be dominated by the large states which would pose a threat to small state
self-governance. The bicameral compromise, which was also linked to the debate over slavery for
purposes of apportionment, was largely an attempt to satisfy the small states who steadfastly refused
to agree to a proportional representation system.
Although the compromise which created a two-chambered Congress was one of political expe-
diency, it also served the values of the Framers. They wanted to create a legislative system where
policy was relatively stable by balancing democratic responsiveness with a system of government that
would not be subject to the whims of a temporary majority (Hammond & Miller 1987). Madison
says in Federalist 51, “In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.
The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render
them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each
other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will
admit” (Madison 1788).
Whether or not the lawmaking system was intentionally “broken” by the Framers is still a matter
for debate. It is often claimed the Senate was designed as a mechanism for tempering the House’s
preferences, but it is also an institution with enough agency to outright block legislation. Madison
makes the case that the Senate was meant to serve both purposes in Federalist 62, saying, “Another
advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the Senate is, the additional imped-
iment it must prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed
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without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the States.”
As Binder points out, it is possible the Framers did not envision the bicameral Congress as creating
a substantially more difficult path to policy change. She claims that the “unintended consequences
of institutional design” may have more to do with our current views of American bicameralism than
anything the Framers explicitly designed (Binder 2003, 13-14).
The United States bicameral legislature differs from most other countries in some important ways.
Terms of service for each of the chambers are fixed (and are different for each chamber), and the
executive is not a member of the legislature. Parliamentary governments are more likely to fail if the
winning coalition does not control both the upper and lower chambers because the upper chamber
effectively holds a veto over legislation (Druckman, Martin & Thies 2005). There is no such risk in
Congress, and because of this, there may be fewer incentives for the chambers to work together.
We know surprisingly little about how the chambers resolve their differences, despite the ques-
tion’s obvious importance to policy substance and legislative productivity. Much of the research
on gridlock in American politics focuses on interbranch rather than interchamber conflict (Cameron
2000, Howell, Adler, Cameron & Riemann 2000, Krehbiel 1998, Mayhew 1991). There is however,
some evidence that preference divergence between the two bodies, interacting with other factors
including political polarization, can reduce legislative productivity (Binder 1999, Binder 2003).3
However, the conclusion that it is harder to make new policy in a bicameral system relative to
a unicameral one has come under increased scrutiny recently.4 It may be that bicameralism is only
more conservative given certain conditions. American bicameralism differs from most because both
chambers have equal powers when legislating. In many other systems, the upper chamber is only
able to slow down or veto legislation and does not have proposal rights (Tsebelis & Money 1997).
3See Chiou & Rothenberg (2008) for a critique of this claim.
4See Levmore (1992) and Tsebelis & Money (1997) for evidence that bicameralism reduces legislative output; see
Rogers (2003) and Chiou & Rothenberg (2003) for an alternative view.
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The ability of both chambers to propose legislation may mitigate the status quo bias present in some
bicameral systems (Rogers 2003).
Some important unanswered questions about interchamber relations and legislative productivity
remain. Does preference or ideological divergence affect the likelihood of passage for all legislation or
just discretionary bills?5 Do chambers act on legislation they know they can agree on, or does each
chamber pursue its own agenda with the hope of convincing the other chamber? And, why does the
post-passage bargaining process nearly always seem to be successful, despite the large differences
that often exist between the chambers and the heated rhetoric used by both Representatives and
Senators during the resolution process?6 Research on interchamber relationships and gridlock focuses
exclusively on ideological and preference considerations, but does not consider how interchamber
bargaining institutional procedures and constraints may change the ability of the chambers to come
to agreement, especially under different political conditions.
There is also uncertainty about the procedures used to resolve interchamber differences in the
United States, their effect on bicameral success, and why different post-passage bargaining mecha-
nisms are used for different bills (Ferejohn 1975, Longley & Oleszek 1989). Most research focuses on
conference committees as the main resolution mechanism and has been limited to the “who wins?”
question. The conventional wisdom claims that conferences are primarily used to settle chamber
differences on important or complicated legislation (Longley & Oleszek 1989), while another mech-
anism, amendment trading, is used to settle differences on unimportant legislation. As Chapter 2
demonstrates, this is no longer the case for a variety of reasons. Importantly, understanding why
conferences are not frequently used in the modern Congress has important implications for theories
of party influence and ideology.
5Non-discretionary legislation is legislation on which Congress is required to take action on during the year, like
budget bills and appropriation bills. Most scholars also consider reauthorization bills non-discretionary.
6Conference committees come to agreement about 95% of the time, even when different parties control each
chamber.
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The dissertation answers these questions using rational choice institutionalism, an approach which
assumes actors are goal-oriented and seek to achieve those goals within the constraints imposed by
institutions. While most other research in the congressional literature also uses this perspective,
bicameral bargaining lacks a coherent theoretical framework which contributes to the confusion
regarding post-passage bargaining and its effects. Research on the procedures used, the productivity
of the chambers, and the policy changes which result are often independent of other processes and
institutions, and do not clearly connect outcomes and implications to other research in American
politics. The lack of a theoretical framework also limits the types of questions political scientists
can ask about interchamber resolution. This dissertation develops a general theory of interchamber
bargaining that explains conference committees and other reconciliation tools, includes all legislation
rather than just important bills, and answers many of the key questions regarding policy output.
In the following section, I explain how the interchamber bargaining process works in Congress,
describing both the formal processes as required by the rules of the House and the Senate, and
alternatives to these processes, if any. An explanation of the formal rules is necessary to understand
the research questions and empirical tests in the rest of the dissertation. The following section
outlines the structure of the dissertation, explaining how it informs our understanding of post-
passage resolution and the substantive importance of each chapter’s contribution.
An Overview of the Bicameral Resolution Process
The Constitution requires an identical version of every bill to pass both the House and the Senate
before it is presented to the president. For most legislation, the House and the Senate agree on the
content and wording of the legislation. A single version, after being approved by one chamber, is sent
to, and approved by the second chamber. In fact, only a small percentage of legislation is passed
in different versions by both chambers, though this fact is somewhat misleading since almost all
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substantively important legislation is amended by one chamber.
Most legislation starts in the House and is given an H.R. number (Longley & Oleszek 1989,
Rogers 1998, Strom & Rundquist 1977) and then modified in the Senate. The Senate either amends
the original House bill or, instead of amending the existing bill, substitutes its own version of the
law-to-be into the House bill. This is done by striking the entire wording of the House bill after the
title and inserting the Senate’s version of the legislation. This version is also subject to additional
amendments made on the floor. In practice, this process means that most legislation has an H.R.
number, but after going to the Senate it is either a modified version of the bill that passed the House,
or is the Senate’s version of the proposed law with an H.R. number instead of an S. number.
At this stage, the chambers must reconcile the two different versions of the legislation before it
can be sent to the president. While the Constitution does not prescribe a specific mechanism for
Congress to reconcile the chambers’ differing versions, the conference committee quickly developed
as one of the main vehicles for reaching agreement on a particular bill. Conference committees are
ad hoc committees created after the passage of a bill, and consist of members from each chamber.
They were used in colonial legislatures as early as the 17th Century (Longley & Oleszek 1989), and
members of the first Congresses almost immediately began using them as a way for the House and
Senate to reach agreement. Historically, only about 20% of all bills are sent to conference, but
virtually everything sent to conference is considered “major” or important legislation. The choice
by early members to use conference committees seems to be a good one because they are highly
successful in reaching agreement. Approximately 97% of measures sent to conference are eventually
reported back to both chambers for final approval (Rybicki 2003). Once the conference report is sent
back to each chamber, a take-it-or-leave-it vote is held in both the House and Senate. Amendments
are not allowed to the bill at this stage.7
7The House recently adopted a rule to allow it to delete Senate provisions if the provision violates the House’s
germaneness requirement. If it is used and the House deletes something from the conference report, the process reverts
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The rules of selecting conferees varies by chamber, but the members selected for the conference
committee are typically both majority and minority party members from the relevant standing
committee. If more than one standing committee has jurisdiction over the bill, members from each of
the committees will be appointed. Occasionally, the Speaker will appoint members from committees
other than the one with jurisdiction, or will appoint committee members who more closely match
the Speaker’s preferences. This is done to ensure dominance of the majority party’s position on
the conference rather than the standing committee’s position, though the rules require any conferee
appointed be in agreement with the legislation (Krehbiel, Shepsle & Weingast 1987, Lazarus &
Monroe 2007, McQuillan & Ortega 1992).8 The selection of conferees in the Senate is a debatable
motion in the Senate (see Riddick (1992, 449-493); Also see Riddick (1992, 731-733)).
Typically, a particular conferee or set of conferees is authorized to bargain with the other chamber
only on specific titles or provisions within the bill, and conferees are limited to the “scope of the
differences.”9 Bills which were referred to multiple committees in the chamber may have hundreds
of House members on the conference committee, with each set of members bargaining on their
jurisdictional slice of the bill. It should also be noted that multiple referrals have become more
common recently, perhaps because of the increase in omnibus legislation.
If the conference committee does return an unsatisfactory bill to either chamber, it can either
reject the bill outright, pass a concurrent resolution changing parts of the bill which both chambers
find offensive, or vote to recommit to conference. Rejecting or recommitting legislation after a
conference committee is exceedingly rare. Almost anything offered will improve on the status quo
to amendment exchanges. The House and Senate can also pass a concurrent resolution which modifies the conference
report.
8Determining which legislators are in agreement with the legislation has been an issue both chambers have struggled
with. Various reforms have been proposed to address exactly how the presiding officer or committee-chair determines
which legislators are in agreement with the bill. The standard most commonly used is whether or not the legislator
voted in favor of the bill on final passage (Oleszek 1874).
9I was told by a former Member that conferees interpret this restriction very loosely. He said, “‘within the scope
of the differences’ is kind of lip service in the House.” Personal conversation with the author, May 22, 2009, Boulder,
CO. This presents interesting possibilities for analysis.
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for a majority of members because the conferees are selected from among the members who agreed
with the first version of the bill passed. In other words, it is unlikely members selected to the
conference committee would attempt to sabotage the negotiations or present a bill which moves
policy in the opposite direction from the preferences of the chamber coalition. It is also highly
unlikely the majority party would allow conferees to report a bill which does not have the support
of a majority if the chamber members.
Despite the focus on conference committees, they are rarely used as the exclusive bargaining
venue, especially in recent Congresses. The rest of the time, chambers use a procedure known as
amendment trading or they use some combination of the two. This is also true when chambers must
reconcile important, complicated legislation. The 110th Congress (2007-2008) used the conference
committee exclusively only 24 times out of 106 bills subject to chamber reconciliation, or about 23%.
Ten years ago, the 104th Congress used conference committees on 50% of the legislation it reconciled
differences on, and in the 93rd Congress, there were 201 conferences used out of 426 bills passed by
both chambers (about 47%.)
Amendment trading differs from conference committees in some important ways. Instead of
delegating negotiations to a particular group of legislators, amendment exchange takes place on
the floors of both chambers. The chambers sequentially pass amendments which bring their own
version of the legislation one step closer to the other chamber’s version. At some point, by using
complementary amendment procedures, both chambers reach a version of the bill which is identical.
Often this means that one chamber passes only one amendment to change their version so that it
matches the other chamber’s version. Sometimes however, the amendment exchange process requires
a number of amendments by both chambers before a compromise is reached.
Amendment trading and conference committees are sometimes both used. This occurs in two
different ways. The first way is when the initial bargaining venue used, either amendment trading or
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conferencing, is unsuccessfully at resolving all the differences between the chambers. If the chambers
are having difficulty in one venue, then they may decide to switch to the other in order to facilitate
agreement. Alternatively, conferees can file conference reports in disagreement, where sections on
which the conferees could not agree are left to the chambers to resolve. The chambers may use
amendment trading, or they may convene another conference. The chambers may then switch
venues and use the other and in theory, chambers may switch bargaining venues at any time if they
both agree.
More commonly, both venues can be used when the Senate violates the House germaneness
requirement. Because the House has strict germaneness requirements and the Senate does not, occa-
sionally, the House will be confronted with a conference report which includes Senate amendments
that would not have been germane had they been included in the House bill.10 In these cases, the
House has a rules mechanism, adopted in 1970, which allows a member to make a motion that the
provision is out-of-order, and gives the House the opportunity to reject the provision by majority
vote without rejecting the entire conference report.11 If the House does reject the particular provi-
sion, the bill is sent back to the Senate as amended, and the Senate may amend the bill in turn, or
may request another conference.
Though almost all important legislation is reconciled by the chambers using one of the two
bargaining venues, legislation is occasionally passed which is not amended by the second-acting
chamber. This occurs because the chambers agree on the legislation, or because one chamber is
constrained by time limitations or the perceived costliness of amending the bill. For example, the
extension to the “Cash-for-Clunkers” bill in 2009 passed without amendment in the Senate, even
10The House has a more strict germaneness requirement for a number of reasons. See Bach (1982) for additional
information about the germaneness requirement and the adoption of the 1970 reform which allowed the House to
reject non-germane Senate amendments without rejecting the entire conference report.
11A similar provision, adopted in 1920, allowed the House to reject appropriation provisions dropped into House
bills by requiring conferees to report the provisions as amendments in technical disagreement. See (Bach 1982).
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though many senators were unhappy with the specific provisions contained in the legislation. The
popular legislation was due to expire shortly before the Senate received the bill from the House, and
many senators feared political repercussions if the Senate moved too slowly and allowed the program
to lapse.
Overview of the Dissertation
The Theoretical Framework
As mentioned above, previous research has not developed a coherent theoretical framework for
studying the post-passage bargaining process. The theory I develop in the dissertation characterizes
post-passage bargaining as a non-cooperative bargaining game. Non-cooperative, in this context, is
not related to how well parties or members get along with each other. Regardless of the distribution
of member preferences or unified and divided party control of chambers, non-cooperative bargaining
characterizes a situation in which delay is costly and actors make a strategic offer from a continuously
divisible set of benefits. Cooperative bargaining is usually thought of as a normative solution (i.e.
what is the fairest outcome?) rather than a method of analysis (McCarty & Mierowitz 2007).
The theory assumes each chamber is uncertain about what the other chamber will accept (in
terms of policy) and each chamber faces costs for engaging in post-passage bargaining and for not
reaching an agreement. Chambers may make a more aggressive offer if they believe the other chamber
is irresolute, or has high costs of bargaining and rejection. However, increasingly aggressive offers
make the other chamber more likely to reject an offer, forcing both chambers to pay costs.
The tradeoff between receiving a larger share of the benefits from bargaining and risking the
rejection of an offer, is common in non-cooperative bargaining games, especially in the international
relations literature which calls it a “risk-return” tradeoff (Fearon 1995). This theoretical setup
is appealing for a number of reasons. First, it assumes bargaining and rejection is inefficient ex
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post—chambers do not engage in post-passage bargaining for its own sake. Instead, it is a means to
an end, where the goal of the chambers is to enact policy change.
The non-cooperative bargaining framework is also appealing because it moves past the one-
dimensional spatial model common in the congressional literature. Chambers can bargain over
multiple issues at once, and all issues contribute to the total amount of benefits received from a
compromise. This also allows for the incorporation of costs, patience, and the status quo into the
game which generates more robust empirical predictions. While spatial models describe the set of
possible outcomes, a bargaining model with a continuously divisible set of benefits can describe the
precise outcome under different sets of conditions.
Chapter 2 develops the formal model and uses the non-cooperative bargaining framework to
answer a number of questions about the post-passage resolution process. In the game, chamber 1
makes an offer to chamber 2 which can be accepted or rejected. This represents the initial passage
of a bill by one chamber. If the bill is not amended, chamber 2 accepts the offer and the bill can
be sent to the president. Amending the legislation constitutes a rejection of the legislation and may
reveal information about chamber 2’s preferences. At this stage of the game, chamber 1 selects a
bargaining venue. If the chamber chooses to use a conference committee, it does not get to make
another offer but allows the conferees to submit a proposal. The comparative statics demonstrate
one condition necessary for the chambers to use a conference committee. The chambers must believe
there is a sufficiently high probability the conferees will offer an acceptable proposal. Put another
way, each chamber has some prior beliefs the conferees will construct a compromise which will be
satisfactory to both chambers.
If the chamber chooses to use amendment trading rather than conferencing, it makes another offer
using its updated beliefs. The chamber chooses amendment trading when it is insufficiently confident
the conferees will propose a satisfactory offer, or when it believes the other chamber is irresolute and
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will accept a small share of the benefits. Recall that because chamber 1 can sometimes update its
beliefs after the first offer is rejected, it may risk rejection and make an aggressive offer in the second
round as well.
A number of the results derived from the formal model are tested in each of the three empirical
chapters. The first chapter largely focuses on costs and explains the choice between conferencing
and amendment trading. Costs play an important role in this choice, and because conferencing
is often considered a more efficient resolution mechanism, understanding its decline represents an
important substantive contribution. The second empirical chapter focuses on the role of patience.
It leverages the bargaining game to extrapolate to repeated interactions between stable coalitions
in the chambers. The chapter has implications for theories of legislative gridlock and describes how
members can mitigate their ideological differences through learning. The final chapter focuses on
policy outcomes, and how uncertainty surrounding the delegation to a conference committee can
change legislation. Significant policy change by conferees is policy, but under conditions which
are counterintuitive. Situations when the chambers have a strong preference to change policy and
situations when there is a lot of agreement between the chambers are those most likely to promote
conferee discretion.
Conference Committees and Interchamber Resolution
The first empirical chapter examines the reasons behind the increased use of amendment trading
and the decline of the conference committee. The chapter focuses on how the costs of post-passage
bargaining play an important role in determining the bargaining venue. Conferences are an efficient
and effective way of resolving differences between the chambers. The majority in each chamber can
delegate to a small group of legislators which increases the likelihood a compromise will be reached,
and neither chamber has to use valuable floor time to reach an agreement. Amendment trading, on
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the other hand, is often a more time and energy intensive process, and because it is completed on the
floor of each chamber, it is often more contentious and makes the resolution process more uncertain.
Minority coalitions recognize the advantages conferences have in reconciling legislation. In chap-
ter, I argue that minorities are exploiting the chamber rules, especially in the Senate, to prevent
conferencing. This explains why amendment trading is increasingly prevalent. Minority coalitions
are more willing to use the Senate’s rules, which allow for votes on three different motions required
to use a conference committee, to force both chambers into amendment trading.
This theory was tested empirically using vote totals and party vote breakdowns on final passage.
The choice about whether to use a conference or amendment trading is a selection process. First, the
chambers must select the legislation into post-passage bargaining or not, and second they must select
a conference committee or amendment trading. A Sartori selection model (Sartori 2003), commonly
used to test formal models because it does not have an exclusion restriction and assumes rational
actors make a nearly simultaneous decision on the selection process and outcome, is used to test the
hypotheses.
This research represents a departure from previous work by focusing on the actual process of
resolving differences rather than the policy outcomes which result from the use of a conference.
As mentioned, most of the historical research on conference committees focuses on “who wins.”
Generally, this means that for a given proposal from both chambers, researchers try to determine
which chamber receives more of what it asks for when the conference committee presents its report to
each chamber. Typically, proposals are measured empirically by examining dollar amounts requested
for authorizations or appropriations (Fenno 1966, Ferejohn 1975, Strom & Rundquist 1977, Volger
1970). Most research finds the Senate wins, a finding that has also been shown at the state level
(Grossman 1980). This chapter is a new way of looking at the role of conferences in the resolution
process and, importantly, suggests one way in which increased party unity and polarization has a
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substantive effect on legislation outcomes. There is no evidence that amendment trading increases
the number of failed bills, but it seems likely that the opportunity cost of negotiating legislation on
the floor of each chamber reduces the relative productivity of each chamber.
Post-Passage Bargaining and Legislative Gridlock
The second empirical chapter focuses on how chambers learn over time. Much of the theoretical
leverage from the bargaining game is based on the chambers’ incomplete information about the policy
provisions acceptable to the other chamber. However, in Congress, bargaining can occur multiple
times over the same issue within a term. Majority coalitions, the bargainers in each chamber, do not
change within a Congress so each chamber is able to update its beliefs about the policy preferences
of their counterparts in the other chamber. That is, once the chambers successfully bargain over an
issue at time t, they will have updated beliefs about the other chamber’s preferences on that same
issue at time t+ 1.
Chambers can use their updated information to avoid paying the costs associated with difficult
bargaining situations, when costs will be relatively high, and avoid the costs associated with rejection,
which may occur if each chamber has a very high demand or if there is no mutual benefit on that
particular policy issue. Instead, the chambers will seek out issue areas and legislation on which they
will be able to agree, reducing both the rejection and opportunity costs of bargaining, and ensuring
each chamber receives a larger share of the benefits and surplus.
The theory posits a specific role for chamber interactions and updated information over time.
This requires empirical tests which determine the effect of successful resolution and updating across
the term of a Congress. The chapter uses time-series-cross-sectional data, much of it collected by
the author, and error correction models to demonstrate how the legislative relationship between
the chambers changes over time. The results support the theory and imply there is a long-term
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equilibrium between what the House passes and what the Senate passes.
The result that chambers learn over time and find issue areas on which they can agree has
important implications for theories of legislative gridlock and divided chambers. Research on party
control of the House and Senate finds that when they are controlled by different parties, the amount
of productivity decreases (Binder 1999, Binder 2003). The evidence in Chapter 4 suggests that this
relationship is limited to certain policy areas where the House and Senate cannot agree. In those
areas on which they can agree, productivity should actually increase as the chambers repeatedly
legislate in that area in order to satisfy constituent demands.
Conferencing and Legislative Outcomes
Most of the recent work on post-passage bargaining has focused on how the conference committee
changes policy. There is broad agreement that conferencing produces new policies not originally
passed by either chamber, and this insight has driven literature on distributive theory (Shepsle &
Weingast 1987, Shepsle & Weingast 1994, Krehbiel, Shepsle & Weingast 1987). When two different
versions of a bill are sent to conference for reconciliation, at least one version must be changed in
order to reach agreement. And while conferences are theoretically constrained to the scope of the
differences, in truth, entirely new policy often comes out of the committee. The conference system
puts the conferees in a powerful position. Legislation sent back to the chambers for approval is
subject to a take-it-or-leave-it vote, seemingly making chambers virtually powerless to reject the bill
in all but the most exceptional cases.
Scholars have focused on the process by which the party or its leadership controls the conference
committee and its policy goals by changing the preferences of the conference committee itself through
the appointment process. I characterize this as ex ante control, and focus instead on the institutional
rule which allows the chambers to reject the conference report, or ex post control. While this rule
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apparently gives conferees enormous power, the amount of power varies with the willingness of
the chambers to reject the conference report. There is a substantial amount of variance which
alternatively constrains the conferees or gives them enormous discretion.
The empirical tests use differences in vote totals to determine how much policy change occurs.
Two interesting results emerge. First, as expected, conferees can change policy more when the
chambers are unwilling to reject a conference report. This is more likely to be the case when the
chamber views the status quo as very unfavorable or when the costs of rejection are high. Empirically,
required legislation such as appropriations bills and very salient legislation should allow for more
discretion because the costs of rejection are very high. Conferees have less discretion when the
chambers are ideologically far apart from each other because one chamber by definition, must value
the status quo relatively highly.
The other important result to emerge is that conference committees tend to moderate legislation.
This is increasingly true as the size of the majority party increases, especially in the House. The
result is robust under a number of different conditions and shows how the conference improves the
chances of agreement by promoting bipartisanship and consensus. While the reason for conferees’
moderation behavior is not entirely clear, it is an important finding and the first I am aware of which
demonstrates how conferees change policy in addition to when they change policy.
Contributions and Discussion
The dissertation makes important contributions to the study of Congress. It develops a coherent
theoretical framework for explaining post-passage bargaining, and finds substantively important
results which explain when certain bargaining procedures are used, how costs affect policy outcomes,
and how time mitigates ideological or procedural barriers. Each of the empirical chapters answers
an important question about interchamber bargaining by using a theoretical insight derived from
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the formal model, and by testing that insight using theory developed using the formal model
Much of the data used in the dissertation was collected by the author and combined with other
congressional datasets. For the first time, to the author’s knowledge, data on post-passage bargain-
ing outcomes, including the frequency of amendment trading and conferencing, is now available to
congressional researchers. The author has also collected data on roll call numbers for votes related
to post-passage bargaining, as well as other data not used in the dissertation (such as motions to
instruct conferees, and the frequency of bargaining failures). The data alone represents an important
contribution to the study of Congress.
Broadly, the dissertation demonstrates how rational actors exploit the institutional rules under
which they operate, and adapt to different types of political conditions in order to pursue their
goals. Legislators have strong incentives to pursue their policy preferences and use strategies, within
the confines of the institution, to maximize their benefits. While a bicameral system may not be
the easiest way of achieving policy change, members of Congress adapt to the rules, the ideological
makeup of both chambers, and the demands of their constituents. Majorities find ways to maximize
their ability to legislative, while minorities attempt to exploit the constraining effects of congressional
rules and procedures.
The dissertation also demonstrates how each chamber and its members interact with the other
chamber. Action in each chamber is intertwined, and what happens in one affects the actions of
the other immediately and in the future. Both chambers act on the same sets of policies at the
same time, the chambers directly respond to the other, and the chambers actively seek out ways to
facilitate agreement and find policy areas where change is likely. Future research needs to account for
action in both chambers simultaneously because policy outcomes in one are endogenous to outcomes
in the other.
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Chapter 2: A Formal Model of Bill Failure in Post-Passage
Bargaining
Abstract
When the House and Senate pass different versions of a bill, they must agree on the language
before the bill can be sent to the president. Despite having incentives to reach agreement, on
average, in any particular Congress about 3% of legislation fails during the post-passage bargaining
process; usually those that fail tend to be among the most important and salient pieces of legislation.
This chapter develops the non-cooperative bargaining model used in the dissertation to explain why
legislation fails under each of the two possible bargaining venues: conferencing and amendment
trading. I show that first, the costs associated with post-passage bargaining affect the ability of
each of the chambers to reconcile its differences with the other. Chambers which are resolute, either
because they have low costs or a high utility for the status quo, are able to reject policy offers made
by other chambers if those offers are not sufficiently moderate.
“People are trying to remain open for negotiation, but I don’t really know how we ever reconcile
where the House is and where the Senate is.” - Sen. Mary Landrieu, speaking about climate change
legislation, June 23rd, 2009.
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Introduction
Legislation passed by both the House and the Senate sometimes fails during the post-passage
reconciliation process. This occurs because the majority coalitions from each chamber cannot find
an acceptable compromise, the conference committee is unable to reach agreement, or because the
conference bill is rejected by a chamber.
Bills which fail during post-passage bargaining are often among the most important and con-
tentious. In the 110th Congress, the House rejected the Economic Emergency Stabilization Act
(the first TARP bill) despite agreement by House and Senate conferees. In the same Congress, the
chambers, after months of painstaking negotiations, failed to reach agreement on H.R. 3773, the
FISA Amendments Act of 2008. Though a modified bill was later passed and signed into law by
President Bush, the failure of the original version, despite agreement by the chambers on a variety of
controversial issues, surprised many observers. Other examples of important legislation failing during
the post-passage bargaining process abound. The Lobbying Accountability and Transparency Act of
2006 (S. 2349) failed because the House and Senate could not agree on limits to 527 organizations.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 (H.R. 3150) failed after the Senate did not pass the conference
report, despite overwhelming support for the report in the House.
Even with strong incentives to reach agreement, legislation often fails because of disagreements
over one particular provision or set of provisions of a bill, rather than disagreement on the entirety
of the legislation. Consider the 2006 Lobbying Accountability and Transparency Act. Though the
House and Senate could not agree on limits to 527 organizations, why would the House refuse to
strip the provision from its version of the bill? If the Senate would not pass the legislation with
that provision, the House and Senate would have both been better off passing a bill without the
offending language in order to receive benefits for all the aspects of the bill on which the chambers
did agree—after all, the language on which the chambers did agree constituted the vast majority
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of the bill. When a bill fails because of a disputed provision or set of provisions, neither chamber
receives any benefits from the other legislative components on which they agree, and they suffer
costs from using time, energy, and political capital on legislation which is not sent to the president
and fails to become law.
This chapter asks why chambers are unable to reach agreement on compromise legislation after
it has been passed by both chambers in different forms. More specifically, if both chambers generally
agree on how to change policy, any compromise which moves the policy away from the status quo
and toward the ideal points of both chambers is an absolute improvement over the status quo and
always makes the chambers better off. Their inability to resolve their differences is an artifact of the
bargaining situation in which they find themselves, and each chamber’s attempt to secure the most
favorable compromise.
I use a formal model to find the conditions under which legislation will fail during the post-
passage bargaining process despite general agreement on policy change. The model, and its attendant
conditions which explain why legislation fails during the post-passage bargaining process, are unique
for three reasons. First and most importantly, the model is able to explain why legislation fails during
the post-passage bargaining process. Second, the model is able to account for every bill passed by
both chambers, rather than limiting the legislative scope to an arbitrary definition of “important”
or controversial legislation. Third, the model incorporates both types of post-passage bargaining
scenarios the chambers may find themselves in after passage: conferencing and amendment trading
(sometimes called “ping-ponging”.) Current research on post-passage bargaining overwhelmingly
emphasizes conference committees to the exclusion of amendment trading.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The puzzle of post-passage failure and current explanations
of the bicameral resolution process are discussed. I then develop the structure of the model and
explain the payoffs to each of the chambers. The model is solved using perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
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Each of the various equilibria demonstrate different conditions under which legislation will either be
accepted by both chambers or will fail during conferencing or amendment trading. The empirical
implications of these conditions are explicated, and the conclusion follows.
Post-passage Failure
The ability (or inability) of chambers to resolve their differences has important policy implica-
tions. As the examples above illustrate, if the House and Senate are not able to reach agreement, legis-
lation dies and the status quo prevails. Yet, despite the policy implications of post-passage bargaining
and the puzzle of bargaining failure, very little research has attempted to explain why the chambers
have trouble agreeing after having passed similar versions of a bill. Most research on policy change or
legislative gridlock has focused on the effects of divided government or ideological differences between
the chambers (Brady & Volden 1998, Binder 1999, Binder 2003, Krehbiel 1998, Mayhew 1991). But,
the specifics of how chambers resolve their differences and how the resolution process translates to
legislative success or failure remains unclear. Understanding this process is important because the
inability of the chambers to resolve their differences is another potential source of gridlock.
Figure 1 shows the percentage of legislation on which the chambers failed to reach agreement
out of the total number of bills bargained on after passage. In any particular Congress, about 2-6%
of legislation is passed by both chambers but is not sent to the president for his approval. Divided
party control of the chambers seems to be weakly correlated with the percentage of bills that fail.
In the sample, the 97th-99th Congresses and the 107th Congress (for part of the term after Sen.
Jeffords switched) were all Congresses with divided party control of the chambers. And while the
99th and 107th Congresses had the highest percentage of failures, the 98th and 97th Congresses were
unexceptional in terms of post-passage bargaining failure.
Most research suggests having a bicameral legislature, relative to a unicameral one, increases the
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Figure 1: Percentage of Legislation Which Failed During the Post-Passage Bargaining Process
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chances legislation will fail for the simple reason that in bicameral legislatures two different coalitions
must agree on any policy change (See Rogers (2003) for a review of this literature). Although bicam-
eralism may be a more conservative institution and may make it more difficult to reach agreement
(Riker 1992), its limiting effects on legislative productivity may be mitigated by the ability of both
chambers to propose and pass legislation, as is the case in the United States Congress (Rogers 2003).
There is also substantial evidence, both formal and empirical, that agreement becomes more
difficult as the ideological or policy preferences of the chambers diverge (Tsebelis & Money 1997).
As the chambers become more dissimilar in their policy preferences, the fewer agenda items they
will be able to agree on. In a one-dimensional policy space, both chambers must prefer movement
away from the status quo in the same direction, either to the left or right, if any compromise is to
be reached. In Congress, there is some evidence ideological or policy divergence by the chambers
reduces the number of important legislation enactments. In fact, intrabranch conflict may be more
important than interbranch conflict for explaining policy gridlock (Binder 1999, Binder 2003). If
bicameralism itself is enough to reduce legislative productivity, its effect may be enhanced when the
majority coalitions in each chamber have very different preferences.
Differences in House and Senate preferences are the result of different constituencies, different
electoral time horizons, and different institutional rules (Smith 1989a). The result is that even
during unified party control of the House and Senate, when one would expect resolution between
the chambers to be the easiest, reaching a compromise on legislative differences can still be difficult,
time consuming, and contentious as debates over health care reform, financial reform, and climate
change in the 111th Congress demonstrated. While divergent preferences may explain a decrease
in the total amount of legislation or the amount of important legislation passed by each chamber
within a Congress, it is largely unable to explain why chambers fail to reach agreement during the
post-passage bargaining process. As the formal model demonstrates, ideological differences between
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the chambers cannot, by itself, explain the chamber’s failure to reach agreement on a bill.
There are two possible reasons for legislative breakdown during the post-passage bargaining pro-
cess. The first is that chambers cannot reach agreement because their ideal points are incompatible
and there is no possible bargain which makes both better off. The second explanation suggests the
dynamics of bargaining itself, through the give-and-take of offers, may lead to bargaining collapse.
I take each of these possibilities in turn.
In situations where both chambers pass different versions of a bill on the same issue, it may be
the case that each chamber prefers a new policy on opposite sides of the status quo. For example, in
a one-dimensional policy space, the House may pass a liberal version of the bill where the new policy
is located to the left of the status quo, while the Senate passes a more conservative bill where the
new policy is to the right of the status quo. In cases such as this, there is no possible compromise
which satisfies both chambers. Any movement from the status quo to the House’s ideal point results
in a loss for the Senate, and vice-versa. The consequence is a stalemate and the eventual failure of
the legislation.
These types of situations are likely to be rare. Each chamber will be reluctant to waste precious
floor time and energy on passing legislation which has no chance of being sent to the president. For
example, if the House knows the Senate will never agree to the provisions in the bill, there is no
incentive for the House to pursue the legislation. In most of these cases, one chamber will not act,
despite passage in the other chamber (as is the case for a large number of bills every Congress).
There is also ample evidence that chambers go into the post-passage bargaining process with the
intention of reaching agreement on the bill (Longley & Oleszek 1989). That is, most post-passage
bargaining, especially when conferences are used, are legitimate attempts to find an acceptable
compromise. Further, almost all legislation passed by both chambers has some post-passage action
taken on it—bills are usually either sent to a conference committee or amended at least once using
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the amendment trading or ping-ponging process. These actions require an even greater cost to the
chambers, and these investments of time and energy that would be meaningless if the chambers had
no hope of reconciling their differences.
Even if incompatible preferences account for a few instances of post-passage bargaining break-
down, there are undoubtedly a large number of cases where the chambers cannot agree because of
actions each take during the post-passage bargaining process. Most accounts of bargaining break-
down emphasize the role of commitment strategies, an unwillingness on the part of one chamber to
concede to the other chamber, and the costliness of negotiating with the other chamber (Longley
& Oleszek 1989, Oleszek 2007). “...[T]he threat of failure is an inherent element of bicameral ne-
gotiations,” (Rybicki 2007, 33), because the House and Senate try to maximize their own benefits
from the compromise. Oleszek (2007, 270) describes three “objectives” conferees undertake: they
must sustain the position of their respective chamber on the bill, find a compromise the chamber
will accept, and find a compromise acceptable to the other chamber and the president. Achieving
each of these three objectives at the same time may prove difficult in many cases and may lead to
the inability of the conferees to resolve the chambers’ differences.
That the tactics of the chambers and conferees alone should produce failure even in cases when
the chambers apparently agree is not surprising to most observers of Congress, but the claim seems
logically intractable. Why should the chambers ever fail to reach agreement on a bill if they only
disagree on a few provisions and agree on most of it? In fact, after both chambers have passed leg-
islation, anything on which there is no possible compromise could be dropped from the bill in order
to facilitate agreement. For other provisions, where large disagreements exist between the chambers,
the chambers may engage in bluffing and commitment strategies, but given the choice between failure
and compromise, agreement should always win out. Any bill, with any provision which the chambers
agree on and have passed, is strictly better for both chambers than allowing the entire bill to die.
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The fact that post-passage bargaining failure is ever observed is an empirical puzzle, especially for
large, complicated, or important legislation where the chambers have even higher incentives to reach
a compromise.
The formal theory developed here provides a concise and logically coherent model of the post-
passage bargaining process. I characterize post-passage bargaining between the chambers as a non-
cooperative bargaining game with incomplete information. The model, like all formal models, is a
simplification of the post-passage resolution process. It does not describe every possible procedu-
ral maneuver or action during the process, but it does capture the basic structure of post-passage
bargaining and produces empirically testable implications.
Non-cooperative Bargaining in Congress
I characterize the post-passage resolution process as a non-cooperative bargaining game. Each
chamber tries to maximize its share of the benefits which the chambers must divide between them-
selves. While the interchamber bargaining process is sometimes characterized as a cooperative
process, especially in distributive politics research (Shepsle & Weingast 1987), I follow most re-
cent literature which treats the process not as a mutually agreeable way for public good distri-
bution, but as a non-cooperative exercise where chambers protect their preferences and try to in-
duce acquiescence by the other chamber (Ansolabehere, Snyder Jr. & Ting 2003, McQuillan &
Ortega 1992, Rogers 1998).12
The model is a straightforward extension of a Rubenstein bargaining model (Rubenstein 1982)
where one chamber receives some benefit equal to b, while the other chamber receives 1− b from any
agreement. Similar games to the one developed here are common in international relations and are
used to model crisis bargaining (Fearon 1995, Powell 1999). Legislative offers made by a chamber
12See Tsebelis & Money (1997) for a detailed discussion about whether interchamber bargaining is best characterized
as a cooperative or non-cooperative process. Generally, cooperative bargaining situations are viewed as a normative
outcome rather than a theoretical framework for analyzing bargaining.
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are functions of the beliefs each chamber has about the other’s costs and whether or not it believes
it will receive a better deal from using a conference or engaging in the amendment trading process.
Bargaining models require no assumptions about the number of dimensions chambers bargain
over. Demands made by a chamber encompass all the issues or provisions within a bill. The players
of the game are characterized as chamber 1 and chamber 2. In practice, one may think of the cham-
bers as represented by a majority coalition, usually the majority party, which as a stable, durable
coalition, coordinates members, solves collective action problems, and tries to pass legislation which
benefits the party (Aldrich 1995, Rohde 1991). Passage of the majority party’s preferred policies
benefits all party members, maximizes the probability of reelection for the most amount of members,
and ensures future party majorities (Cox & McCubbins 1993, Cox & McCubbins 2005). One may
also view the chambers as being represented by the pivotal actor in each chamber, either the median
in the House or the 60th Senator. In either case, each chamber attempts to garner a larger share of
the surplus, the total benefits available from the bargain.
I analyze a simple bargaining model with incomplete information where an uninformed chamber
chooses how much to demand from the other chamber. If the demand is rejected, post-passage bar-
gaining becomes necessary and the uninformed chamber must decide which post-passage bargaining
venue to use. One venue, amendment trading, is represented as a take-it-or-leave-it game with in-
complete information where the uninformed chamber is able to update its beliefs about the other
chamber if its initial offer is rejected. The other possible venue, conferencing, requires delegation
to a conference committee where there is some exogenous probability the conference committee will
make an offer acceptable to both chambers, though the exact terms of the offer are unknown to
both players. As previously explained, substantively interesting bargaining situations are limited to
legislation where a bargaining surplus exists. This is equivalent to assuming both chambers agree
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on a policy change in the same direction from the status quo in a one-dimensional policy space.13
Modeling Post-Passage Bargaining
Two chambers, 1 and 2, dispute the division of benefits worth 1 to each. The distinction between
the House and Senate is irrelevant.14 Nature randomly draws 2’s costs for engaging in amendment
trading, a2, from a normal distribution which ranges from 0 to 1 − s.15 As a2 increases, the costs
2 must sink to engage in post-passage bargaining increase. A chamber which has low costs is
increasingly resolute, while a chamber with high costs is more irresolute. 1’s costs of amendment
trading are a1 and are revealed to both chambers. Each chamber also has costs for engaging in
conferencing, where, again, 1’s costs are equal to c1 and are revealed to both chambers, while 2’s
costs, c2 are unknown to chamber 1 and is drawn from a normal distribution. As before, assume 2’s
costs are bounded between 0 and 1− s, and higher costs imply 2 is increasingly irresolute.
In the first stage of the game, 1 proposes a division of the surplus, b, which 2 can accept, and
receive 1 − b, or 2 can reject the offer and allow 1 to select a bargaining venue. Substantively, this
initial offer by 1 corresponds to the passage of a bill by one chamber. If 2 accepts the offer, the bill
is passed within the chamber, as is and without amendment, and is sent directly to the president.
If 2 rejects the offer, 1 chooses from two different bargaining sub-games, amendment trading or
conferencing. However, no matter the venue, 1 is uncertain about how resolute 2 is, and therefore is
uncertain about how large a share of the surplus it should allocate to 2.
I allow 1 to select the bargaining venue because the selection is a common expectation among
both chambers. Because both are fully informed about which post-passage bargaining venue will be
used, there is no strategic interaction between the players about the choice of the venue. Additionally,
13Though chambers could engage in bargaining when no benefits from agreement exist, the result is trivial. The
status quo is always preferred to any offer made by the other chamber. See Muthoo (2000) for a straightforward
explanation.
14In the game, 1 moves first, and although the Constitution specifies that bills raising revenue must originate in the
House, in practice the Senate is able to get around this requirement.
15Assume a2 < 1− s to ensure chamber 2 can credibly threaten rejection.
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introducing strategic choices over the selection of the venue would needlessly complicate the game
for the sake of modeling a process tangential to the question examined here.
The last stage of the game is either a conference committee or amendment trading. In a conference
committee, each chamber delegates negotiations to a group of legislators, usually selected from the
standing committees which marked up the bill (Lazarus & Monroe 2007). Conference committees
include members of both the majority and minority coalitions, although the majority coalition nearly
always has a majority on the conference committee. While conferees, according to the rules of each
chamber must be in agreement with the bill (Longley & Oleszek 1989, Oleszek 2007), there is some
chance the bill sent back to each chamber is unacceptable for one chamber and is rejected. Therefore,
I characterize the payoff to each chamber after a conference as the result of some probability, p that
an acceptable offer, bf , is made to the chambers by the conferees. Once an offer is made, 2 may
accept the offer and receive 1− bf , or it may reject the offer and receive its benefit from the status
quo minus its costs for engaging in conferencing, 1 − s − c2. Likewise, 1 receives the remainder of
the bargaining surplus, bf for agreement by 2 after an offer is proposed by the conference, and s− c1
for disagreement by 2. After acceptance or rejection in conference, the game ends.
While both chambers have an expectation the conferees will make an acceptable offer, the game
also captures the autonomy with which the conferees operate. During the conferencing process,
chambers have a relatively difficult time controlling what the conferees offer. The main tool the
House has to control its conferees, according to Lazarus & Monroe (2007), is through the appointment
process.16 The majority party leadership uses its ability to appoint conferees to ensure the conference
report represents the preferences of the majority party. When the majority coalition leadership in
both chambers is able ensure the conferees will propose an agreement acceptable to the chamber,
the value of p will be high. In the model, while the majority coalitions within each chamber have
16The chambers can also offer conferee instructions, but these are non-binding and there is no evidence they constrain
the conference committee.
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beliefs over p, they have very no ability to change the offer made by the conference committee nor
can they change the value of p.
Should 2 reject the offer in the first stage and 1 chooses to go to amendment trading instead
of conferencing, the next stage of the game represents a simple take-it-or-leave-it offer made by 1.
While amendment trading is a back-and-forth process, modeling each step is unnecessary. Assume
the chambers are constrained by time and opportunity, and that a chamber must make a final offer
at some point. Though 1 is uncertain about 2’s costs of amendment trading, it is able to update its
beliefs about 2’s type based on its offer in the first stage of the game and 2’s rejection of this offer.
In the last stage of the game, if the chambers agree after using the amendment trading process,
each chamber receives a share of the surplus, bt for 1 and 1 − bt for 2. As with conferencing, the
disagreement value for each chamber is equal to the utility it receives for the status quo minus the
costs of engaging in conference or amendment trading without reaching an agreement such that
1’s payoff for no agreement after using the amendment trading process is s − a1 and 2’s payoff is
1− s− a2. As with conferencing, after 2 has accepted or rejected an offer, the game ends.
Finally, chamber 1 may make an acceptable offer in the first round of the game. An acceptable
offer is one made by 1 that induces acceptance from 2 and does not require a post-passage bargaining
venue. This occurs because a chamber may be unwilling to pay additional costs if, for example, its
costs of post-passage bargaining are very high, or if the chambers are running out of time to resolve
their differences, such as at the end of a session. The payoffs for each chamber for accepting an offer
in the first stage of the game are b for 1 and 1− b for 2. Should 2 reject the offer in the first round,
it suffers a cost of −a2, while 1 suffers −a1, if amendment trading is the bargaining venue used, or
−c2 and −c1 for chambers 2 and 1 respectively, if conferencing is used. Figure 2 is a game tree which
shows each chambers’ moves.
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Figure 2: Interchamber Bargaining Game Tree
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The Costs of Bargaining in Congress
The costs accrued to each chamber represent the opportunity costs and procedural or institutional
costs paid by the majority coalition or median member. Resolving bicameral differences requires
an investment of time and energy (Adler & Wilkerson 2007, Cox 2006), especially when the two
chambers have very different ideal points and are highly committed to their legislative preferences.
Some conference committees take weeks or months to resolve issues, while others are unable to reach
agreement at all.
While conferencing has low opportunity costs because the bargaining is delegated to a set of
conferees, it requires the actors in each chamber to pay procedural or monitoring costs. Conferees
have the ability to propose a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the chamber, a powerful tool that may
result in agency loss (Krehbiel, Shepsle & Weingast 1987, Shepsle & Weingast 1987). This loss may
encourage the use of amendment trading as a way of circumventing uncooperative conferees and deny
them the power to exercise an ex post veto (Krehbiel, Shepsle & Weingast 1987). Using a conference
is also more difficult, procedurally, than using amendment trading, especially in the Senate. The
three separate motions required to use a conference can each be objected to and filibustered by the
minority (Oleszek 2007). Recently, the number of conferences has been declining, though the reason
for the decline is unclear. Theriault (2008) shows how minority party members increasingly refuse
to vote for procedural motions even when they agree with the legislation and this is one potential
reason for the decline in conference committees.
When amendment trading is used as the reconciliation venue, the chambers must allocate floor
time to resolve their differences and they do not have the power to make take-it-or-leave-it offers to the
members. During the process, each chamber sequentially passes amendments designed to bring the
bill closer to the other chamber’s version. The process may be coordinated by committee members or
the party leadership, but as in regular amending procedures, any amendment can itself be amended,
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and the introduction of “poison-pill” amendments may make the process substantially more difficult
and time-consuming. Further, the opportunity costs of amendment trading are likely to be high
because of the value of floor time, especially in the Senate (Koger 2010, Smith & Flathman 1989).
In both cases, costs may also be accrued to the majority coalition through the payment of in-
ducements or goods designed to keep party members in line (Snyder & Groseclose 2000).17 The
resources the party or coalition leadership must spend may be tangible ones, like promises of addi-
tional particularized benefits to a member’s district, or they may be less concrete like the additional
time and effort required of party leaders to convince recalcitrant members to support the legislation.
The leadership must use these benefits to hold together a majority of its party often made up of
disparate factions and members with disparate policy preferences.
A second set of costs may arise from a chamber’s impatience. Post-passage bargaining takes longer
than acceptance, and this additional time may have negative consequences for the actors in each
congressional house. The additional time may give opponents more opportunities to publicize the
legislation, it may increase salience and public awareness of the legislation. A chamber’s impatience
is contained in the cost term for mathematical simplicity. While impatience is often modeled as a
discount term bound between zero and one, subtracting a cost as impatience has the same effect.
Post-passage bargaining costs such as those described above are sunk when the chambers decide to
go to one of the two bargaining venues and if no agreement is reached despite engaging in bargaining.
If the chambers do not reach agreement during the initial passage process, the chambers suffer costs
from not receiving any benefits from the legislation in the present period, and because after the
legislation is reconciled, either through conferencing or amendment trading, the majority coalition
will have to expend additional resources on maintaining coalition support for the revised policy
struck by the chambers as a result of the bargaining process. If the legislation is not reconciled, each
17Also see Schickler & Rich (1997a), Schickler & Rich (1997b) and Cox & McCubbins (1997)).
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chamber must pay these costs without receiving any benefit other than what it already receives from
the status quo. If the chambers do agree and send a bill to the president, the costs have already
been sunk and are not part of each chamber’s payoff. This structure is standard for bargaining
games within international relations and simply requires that post-passage bargaining is inefficient
ex post—chambers engage in post-passage bargaining as means to an end, not an end itself (Fearon
1995, Powell 1996, Powell 1999). For each chamber’s costs, assume c1 > 0, a1 > 0, 1 − s > a2, and
1− s > c2. The last conditions allow 2 to credibly threaten rejection of an offer in the last stage of
the game.
The basic tradeoff of the game is whether 1 should moderate its demand and accept a less
favorable deal (from its perspective), or whether it should make an aggressive offer which increases
the risk of using an inefficient bargaining venue. 1 faces a risk-return-tradeoff when it makes an offer.
If it thinks it will do well in post-passage bargaining, it is more likely to make an aggressive demand
of 2, but there is also an additional risk 2 will reject the second offer or the conferees will propose
an unacceptable compromise. Both scenarios result in the status quo and the costs of bargaining to
both chambers are sunk.
The result of the game is a screening equilibrium when amendment trading is used. Recall that
an infinite number of types exist for 2 based on its costs selected by nature. Some types of 2, those
with relatively higher costs of bargaining, will accept an offer in the first round of the game, based
on 1’s optimal offer. If 2 rejects the offer, 1 updates its beliefs about the type of 2 it faces and makes
another offer. Some types of 2 accept this offer, while others reject the offer which results in the
status quo. The propositions demonstrate the cutpoints over which acceptance and rejection occur
in each venue, and how changes in each chamber’s parameters affect the likelihood of rejection.
When conferencing is used, the chambers must be sufficiently confident an acceptable offer will
be made. Further, the fact that the chamber has little control over what the conferees propose leads
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to different offers in the first round of the game. 1’s costs and its likelihood of receiving the status
quo moderate its demand if it chooses a conference.
Equilibria
The equilibria discussed below are the Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of the game. PBE
requires each player adopt a sequentially rational strategy and hold weakly consistent beliefs updated
based on Bayes’ Rule on the equilibrium path. In the first stage of the game, 1 makes its optimal
offer based on its own costs, 2’s costs, and the offer it expects to make in the second round if 2
rejects the first offer.
Rejection and Acceptance within Amendment Trading
I begin by characterizing 2’s decision at the last stage of the game and working backward through
the solution. Regardless of the bargaining venue, 2 accepts an offer at least as good as its disagree-
ment value—a payoff equal to what it receives from the status quo minus its costs of post-passage
bargaining. In amendment trading, 2 will accept an offer of bt ≤ s+ a2, and in conferencing an offer
of bf ≤ s+ c2. Because 1 wants to maximize its share of the surplus and induce acceptance by 2, 1
will offer bt =
1+s−a1
2
in amendment trading. This cutpoint over 2’s costs means that some types of
2 will accept this offer, while other types of 2 will reject this offer. If s + a2 >
1+s−a1
2
, 2 will reject
because its costs are sufficiently low, while if the converse is true, 2 will accept the offer. In the
last stage, chamber 2 only accepts if its costs of rejection are sufficiently high—otherwise it rejects
the offer and the status quo prevails. In conferencing, 1 does not get to make a second offer and
instead receives bf as determined by the conferees only if 2 accepts the offer. As with amendment
trading, for 2 to accept the offer, its share of the surplus must be sufficiently high. In either venue,
conferencing or amendment trading, if 2 has very low costs, it will reject the offer, both chambers
will receive their utility from the status quo minus their costs, and the game ends.
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In the stage prior to the final offer, 1 chooses between amendment trading and conferencing. If
rejection occurs in the first stage, 1 selects amendment trading given a value of p∗ < p where p is
the probability the conferees send an acceptable agreement back to both chambers.
In the first stage of the game, 1 makes an initial offer by passing a bill which is then sent to the
other chamber for action. At this stage, the chamber (members of the majority coalition) may accept
the offer, which avoids sinking any costs, or they may reject the bill and move to a bargaining venue.
Recall that if 2 rejects 1’s initial offer, each chamber sinks costs for having to engage in post-passage
bargaining.
1 faces a risk-return tradeoff when it passes a bill in the first stage of the game, and when it makes
the second offer during the amendment trading process. It could choose to demand more from 2,
but the more it demands, the more likely 2 is to reject. For the purposes of illustration, consider the
following examples. A chamber could pass legislation which perfectly matches the other chamber’s
policy preferences. 2 will accept this offer, but 1 receives a relatively small benefit from this division
of the surplus. Alternatively, 1 could make a very demanding offer of 2 which only chambers with
very high costs will accept. While the probability 2 accepts this offer is very small, and those that
reject force 1 to sink additional costs through the post-passage bargaining process, in the unlikely
case 2 does accept, 1 receives nearly the entire share of the benefits.
Therefore, in equilibrium, 1 makes an optimal proposal which balances this risk-return tradeoff
by maximizing its share of the benefits it receives from the policy compromise. Proposition 1
characterizes a screening equilibrium where 1 makes its initial offer, it is rejected by some types
of 2 which prompts 1 to make another offer in amendment trading based on its updated beliefs, and
the second offer is rejected by some types of 2 and accepted by some types of 2. Each of the three
outcomes is possible in equilibrium. Some types of 2 accept in the first round, some types of 2 accept
in the second round, and some types of 2 reject in both rounds leading to bargaining breakdown.
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Proposition 1: Beliefs: 1 believes a2 ∼ U(0, 1− s) and c2 ∼ U(0, 1− s). Because both acceptance
and rejection of 1’s offer occur, there are no out-of-equilibrium actions by 2. 1’s posterior beliefs
are that a2 < b =
1−a1
2
− 1+s−a1
2
. Strategies: 1 offers b = 1−a1
2
in the first stage. 2 accepts if a2 ≥
1−a1
2
− 1+s−a1
2
. Otherwise 2 rejects, and 1 chooses amendment trading if p < 1−2s−3s
2+a1(−2+2s+a1)+4c1
4(b−s+c1) ,
or when p∗ < p. Given rejection, in the last stage, 1 offers bt = 1+s−a12 . 2 accepts if a2 ≥ 1+s−a12 − s.
Otherwise, 2 rejects the offer and receives 1− s− a2, while 1 receives s− a1.
In equilibrium, the chambers use amendment trading, and bargaining failure occurs in some cases.
If an unacceptable offer is made in the first round, 1 learns that it must make a more conciliatory
proposal to 2. As discussed above, the proposition also demonstrates that if 2 has high costs of
post-passage bargaining, the first proposal is accepted by 2 and no amendment trading is necessary.
In these cases, because 2’s costs of post-passage bargaining and resolution failure are so high, it
cannot receive a better offer in amendment trading and prefers to avoid it so as to not sink the
costs associated with engaging in post-passage bargaining. In Congress, this would be observed as a
chamber accepting the other’s bill, as submitted, without amendment.
1’s offer in the first stage allocates the smallest amount of the surplus it can to 2 while still
ensuring that the maximum number of 2’s lie below the cutpoint on bt and accept the offer (in a
uniform distribution.) When 1 chooses amendment trading, it offers b = 1−a1
2
in the first stage. Note
that 1’s own demand decreases as its costs of post-passage bargaining, a1, increase. Also, in this
stage, 1’s utility from the status quo has no effect on what if offers. Even if the offer is rejected at
this stage, because 1 is using amendment trading is still has a chance to make another offer. In fact,
the offer is solely a function of 1’s costs. Because 1 has no information about 2’s costs, its optimal
offer is simply half of the surplus minus its own costs.
As 1’s costs of bargaining increase, 1 must be more conciliatory to 2, and as a result, it makes
a more generous offer which moves the cutpoint up and leads to acceptance by types of 2 with
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relatively greater costs. 1 wants to avoid post-passage bargaining due to the high costs it must sink,
which means 2 can demand a very favorable offer from 1. Even if the chambers reach agreement
through amendment trading, the size of the benefits 1 receives are reduced due to the large costs it
had to sink in the first round from rejection. 2 exploits this by only accepting a relatively generous
offer from 1 in the first stage.
In the last stage of the game when the chambers engage in amendment trading, 1’s offer is
bt =
1+s−a1
2
. As before, an increase in 1’s costs leads to a more moderate offer to 2, while an increase
in its utility for the status quo leads to a more demanding offer. These results differ from those in the
first stage in that here, 1’s value for the status quo affects its offer. 1 receives only its value for the
status quo minus its costs if an agreement is not reached at this stage, so it becomes more willing to
compromise with 2 as it becomes increasingly costly not to reach agreement. And, because 1 receives
the status quo if no agreement is reached, it becomes more willing to risk bargaining breakdown by
making a demanding offer given an increase in its benefit from the status quo. Therefore, a chamber
nearly indifferent between the new policy and the status quo will demand something very close to
its ideal point.
An increase in 2’s costs always makes it less resolute and more willing to accept an offer. Types
of chamber 2 with very high costs accept the offer in the first round, while those with lower costs
accept the offer in the second round. Only highly resolved types of chamber 2 reject 1’s offer in the
last round. And, because there is an implicit tradeoff between each chamber’s value for the status
quo (i.e. as s goes up, 1− s goes down), an increase in 1’s value for s decreases 2’s utility from the
status quo. As with 1, an increasingly large benefit from the status quo for 2 makes it more resolute
and less willing to accept an offer.
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Rejection and Acceptance in Conferencing
I now turn to characterizing the equilibria possible when a conference, rather than amendment
trading, is used as the bargaining venue. There are some important differences between conferencing
and amendment trading. First, chamber 1 does not get to make a second offer if conferencing is
used. Instead, the conferees, propose a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The division of the surplus proposed
by the conferees, bf , cannot be modified by either chamber, consistent with the rules of the House
and Senate.18 While the offer made by the conferees is unknown to both chambers and is selected by
Nature, both chambers assign some probability based on their mutual prior beliefs, p, an acceptable
offer is made by the conferees to chamber 2. An acceptable offer is one that is at least as good
as 2’s disagreement value, 1 − s − c2, and when this offer is made, 2 accepts the offer and both
chambers receive the proposed division of the surplus. If 2 rejects the offer, the status quo prevails
and both chambers lose the costs of conferencing, −c1 and −c2 for chambers 1 and 2 respectively.
Like amendment trading, Nature selects 2’s costs for conferencing and reveals them only to 2. Again,
the tradeoff for 1 is between making a more moderate offer in the first stage and inducing acceptance
by chamber 2 with lower costs, or making a more aggressive offer in the first stage and which is only
accepted by chamber 2 if it has relatively high costs. If rejection of this offer occurs, the conferees
are empowered to propose some settlement which is accepted or rejected by 2.
Proposition 2: Beliefs: 1 believes c2 ∼ U(0, 1− s) and a2 ∼ U(0, 1− s). Because both acceptance
and rejection of 1’s offer occur, there are no out-of-equilibrium actions by 2. 1’s posterior beliefs
are c2 < (1 +
p(s+c1−1)−2c1
2
) − p(bf−s)
2−p . Strategies: 1 offers b = 1 +
p(s+c1−1)−2c1
2
in the first stage.
2 accepts if c2 ≥ (1 + p(s+c1−1)−2c12 ) −
p(bf−s)
2−p . Otherwise 2 rejects, and 1 chooses conferencing if
p ≥ 1−2s−3s2+a1(−2+2s+a1)+4c1
4(b−s+c1) , or when p∗ ≥ p. Given rejection and conferencing, the conferees then
18Chambers can amend the conference legislation under very specific circumstances. Usually the House invokes
rules which allow it amend a conference report without rejecting the entire report on appropriations bills. See Oleszek
(2007).
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offer bf which 2 accepts if c2 ≥ bf − s.
In the first stage of the game, 1’s offers b = 1+ p(s+c1−1)−2c1
2
. As before, a decrease in 1’s costs, c1,
or an increase in 1’s utility from the status quo, s, the more demanding an offer 1 can make. Unlike
amendment trading, 1’s first offer is partially dependent on its value for the status quo because it
does not get to make a second offer. If 2 rejects this offer, the status quo prevails with probability
1− p which is exogenously determined by the conferees. An increase in the probability the conferees
make an acceptable offer results in a linear reduction in the size of the surplus 1 can demand. If 2
is reasonably secure it will receive an acceptable offer in the conference, it is more likely to reject
a very demanding offer from 1 because it believes it can do better in the last round of the game.
However, if 2 is not very confident the conferees will make an acceptable offer, then it becomes more
willing to accept 1’s demand, even if it is not particularly favorable to 2.
In the last stage of the game, 2 accepts the compromise proposed by the conferees if c2 ≤ bf − s
where bf is the offer made by the conferees. As with amendment trading, 2 only accepts a bargain
at least as good as what it what get from the status quo minus its costs of rejection. As 2’s costs
of rejection go up, or as its utility from the status quo go down, the more willing it is to accept the
conferees offer.
While 1 selects amendment trading if the probability of the conferees making an acceptable
offer is low, it chooses conferencing when it believes the conferees will make an acceptable offer.
The conditions which characterize the probability, p, sufficiently high or low for selection of each
of the bargaining venues are as follows. First, an increase in the costs for either venue make the
other more likely. For example, as the costs of amendment trading increase, the cutpoint over p
which allows amendment trading moves down, making it harder to satisfy the inequality described
in Proposition 1. Substantively, if amendment trading is very costly, the chambers are more likely
to use conferencing, even if the value of p∗ is relatively low.
43
The relationship between an increase in 1’s utility for the status quo, and p is more complicated,
and depends on the difference between 1’s costs for each of the bargaining venues, a1 and c1. Figure
3 graphs the relationship between s and p∗ for two different values of 1’s costs.
Figure 3: Bargaining Venue Used Given an Increase in 1’s Value for the Status Quo, (s)
The graph plots the cutpoint over p, where conferencing occurs. Above the lines, when p∗ ≥ p,
chamber 1 chooses to use a conference committee, while below the line, the chambers use amendment
trading. The solid line is the value of p∗ when the costs to 1 of amendment trading and conferencing
are equal. The dashed line shows the value of p∗ when amendment trading is more costly than
conferencing. The offer the conferees make bf , is held constant. Both lines have a curvilinear
44
relationship. When 1 receives very high or low values from the status quo, it is more likely to use
amendment trading.
When there is a large asymmetry in how the chambers see the status quo (i.e. 1 receives a high
benefit for the status quo and 2 receives a low benefit, or vice versa), the chambers are less likely
to delegate negotiations to the conferees. In both cases, because the conferees make an acceptable
offer with some exogenous probability, each chamber has a lot to lose if the offer is rejected. Further,
when a chamber has a high value for the status quo, it prefers to use amendment trading because an
offer made by the conferees may be a much worse bargain than what it otherwise could have gotten.
The dashed line shows how the relationship shifts left when the costs of amendment trading begin
to diverge from conferencing. As amendment trading becomes more costly, 1’s value for the status
quo must increase to use amendment trading. Therefore, it becomes less likely 1 selects amendment
trading at low values of the status quo, but more likely 1 selects amendment trading at high values
of the status quo. Again, because each chamber will refuse to delegate negotiations to conferees
when the status quo is relatively favorable outcome, high costs of amendment trading must also be
associated with high values of the status quo for amendment trading to occur.
The next proposition characterizes an equilibrium where 1 makes an offer in order to induce
rejection by both types of 2 in order to go to amendment trading or conferencing. I call this an
“extreme” offer which 1 makes because it prefers to use a bargaining venue rather than have an offer
accepted in the first round. As the Proposition shows, this is never a rational strategy for 1.
Proposition 3: Beliefs: 1 believes c2 ∼ U(0, 1 − s) and a2 ∼ U(0, 1 − s). Because all types of 2
reject the offer, 1 does not update its beliefs. Strategies: 1 never makes an extreme offer if b > 0
and a1 > 0 or c1 > 0, which by definition must always be true. 1 never makes an offer less than the
optimal offers defined in Propositions 1 and 2 because those offers maximize 1’s expected utility, by
definition.
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When the extreme offer is made by 1, rejection by 2 always occurs on-path, regardless of 2’s
costs. When this offer is rejected, and 1 chooses amendment trading rather than conferencing, 1
is not able to update its beliefs and proposes its optimal offer in the last stage of the game. The
Proposition show that because post-passage bargaining is inherently inefficient, a chamber will never
deviate from its optimal offer. 1 never proposes an offer that induces rejection, therefore this offer
is off-path. The post-passage bargaining process is always costly, and chambers never use it unless
they must. It is never an end to itself, as no chamber can ever do better by engaging in post-passage
bargaining if it is costly, all else equal.
Empirical Implications
The paper has claimed that mere disagreement between the chambers is not enough to cause
post-passage bargaining failure. If the chambers pass similar forms of legislation or a bill with some
provisions which make the same type of change to the status quo, ideological or policy divergence
between the chambers cannot, by itself, cause legislative breakdown. The failure to reconcile differ-
ences is always costly and the chambers are always better off passing the items they agree on. The
theory developed here has suggested a number of ways the chambers can fail to reach agreement,
and a number of implications about the post-passage bargaining process as a whole. In this section,
I focus on the empirical implications of the model results.
Result 1: The Chamber Which Values the Status Quo More is a Stronger Bargainer
Propositions 1 and 2 offer confirmatory evidence for what scholars have long suspected. The
chamber which values the status quo more is usually stronger during the post-passage bargaining
process, all else equal. In practice, chambers which receive a greater benefit from the status quo can
credibly threaten rejection of an unreasonable offer in the last stage of the game. This also explains
why the Senate, because of its institutional rules, often seems to able to force the House to acquiesce.
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In a one-dimensional space, the 60th member of the Senate will usually be closer to the status quo
than the median member of the House (Krehbiel 1998), so the coalition receives a higher utility from
the status quo than her House counterpart.
The Senate has usually been the stronger bargainer, especially in recent Congresses. One likely
explanation is because the Senate’s pivotal member is the 60th Senator, rather than the 51st. Further,
because Senators have larger constituencies and represent more diverse interests, they tend to be more
moderate than their House counterparts (Theriault 2006). The Senate generally values the status
quo more, and therefore can credibly threaten rejection. The House should usually acquiesce if it
believes the Senate prefers a more conservative policy change. This is true when both conferencing
and amendment trading are used, though in a conference, the Senate receives a better deal because
the conferees must propose a bill it will accept, not because of the strategic interaction between the
two chambers.
Although the chamber which values the status quo is stronger during the post-passage bargaining
process, it is also the case that when amendment trading is used, the value of the first offer made
prior to the start of post-passage bargaining is independent of each chamber’s valuation of the status
quo. This is true because once the offer is made, even if it is rejected by chamber 2, 1 has the chance
to make a second offer, which if rejected, results in the status quo. 1’s offer at this stage is partially
a function of the status quo, as is 2’s willingness to accept or reject the offer.
Result 2: Conferencing is Most Likely When the Chambers Value the Status Quo
Similarly, But Strongly Disagree on the Proposed Legislation
The model offers insights into when conferencing and amendment trading will be used. The
choice between conferencing and amendment trading is driven by a tradeoff between each chamber’s
costs within each venue, the probability the conferees make an acceptable offer and how much benefit
each chamber receives from current policy. Using a conference committee involves some risk for both
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chambers. They have little control over what happens in the conference and an unacceptable offer
may be made by the conferees.
In the first stage of the game, prior to post-passage bargaining, the offer 1 makes is partially a
function of the likelihood the conferees propose an acceptable compromise. As the likelihood of 2
accepting the conference report increases, the more willing it is to reject 1’s initial offer and use a
conference to reconcile differences, all else equal. In short, chamber 2 becomes increasingly willing
to reject 1’s offer and take its chances in conference. This induces 1 to make a less demanding offer
because it prefers not to use post-passage bargaining, though this effect is mitigated by decreasing
costs of post-passage bargaining. Alternatively, if 1 believes the conference negotiations will be very
contentious and the conferees will have a hard time forging a compromise, it will make a more
aggressive demand because 2 is less likely to reject the offer. The demand made by 1 does not cause
the difficult negotiations, but is instead a symptom of them.
Amendment trading is most likely when there is a large disparity between how the chambers
value the status quo. In these cases, chambers are unwilling to delegate post-passage bargaining to
a set of conferees because the probability the conferees reach an acceptable compromise is low. Only
when each of the chambers receives about an equal amount from the status quo are the chambers
willing to use a conference committee. If a conference committee is used, the conferees have little
discretion when one chamber receives a larger share of benefits from the status quo. When the
chambers share the benefits from the status quo more evenly, the conferees have a larger amount of
discretion.
Result 3: High Costs of Post-Passage Bargaining for One or Both Chambers Promote
Resolution
For both chambers, an increase in costs always makes them a weaker bargainer. 2 is always
more willing to accept an offer in both the first and second stages when it has high costs, and 1
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is always more willing to make a more conciliatory offer in both stages when it has high costs. I
have characterized costs as originating from two sources: the first center around time limitations
and impatience, while the second source are the costs of coalition building and maintenance. As
suggested above, the costs associated with conferencing are more likely to be impatience, while those
associated with amendment trading may be more closely related to coalition building.
Low costs in amendment trading may be observed as situations in which a chamber has a large
and unified caucus over the legislation. In these instances, amendment trading is likely to be less
arduous, agreement on amendments less difficult, and there will be fewer attempts by a member or
set of members to derail the process with divisive amendments or other delaying tactics. Impor-
tantly, because these low cost situations should induce 1 to make a more demanding offer which is
accepted less frequently by 2, post-passage bargaining will be more common. The costs sunk by
both chambers when post-passage bargaining becomes necessary may also represent the chamber’s
impatience. Higher levels of impatience leads to moderate offers and early acceptance. For example,
at the end of a congressional term, or as an election nears, fewer post-passage bargaining situa-
tions should be observed as the chambers are less willing to spend their time negotiating legislation.
Impatience should also increase as the congressional agenda increases, because chambers have less
time to devote to any single piece of legislation. Empirically, one should observe fewer instances of
post-passage bargaining under conditions when impatience is highest.
The effect of patience is also important because the House and Senate have different time hori-
zons. While the House may usually be more willing to acquiesce because all members must run for
reelection every two years, one could imagine that the Senate may occasionally be the more impatient
if, for example, it is controlled by a different party than the House and that party is unpopular, or
if a number of Senators face difficult reelections.
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Result 4: Bargaining Failure Occurs When a Chamber’s Resoluteness is Underestimated
When does bargaining failure occur? In conferencing, failure occurs because the conferees propose
legislation which is unacceptable to the majority coalition in one chamber. This is characterized as
a situation when the surplus allocated to a chamber is so small, the chamber prefers to receive the
status quo minus any costs it accrues for rejecting the compromise legislation. As discussed above,
this is more likely if one chamber values the status quo very highly. In these cases, any conferee
discretion which awards the other chamber a large amount of the benefits will be rejected by the
chamber which values the status quo.
In amendment trading, chamber 1 is able to update its beliefs about what 2 is willing to accept.
Importantly however, even if 1 updates its beliefs about 2’s costs, it will not make an offer that
satisfies types of chamber 2 with very low costs. And, while for simplicity the game here is limited
to one offer after the initial offer prior to post-passage bargaining, 1 could theoretically make a
number of sequential offers which separate different types of 2 without satisfying all types. Even if
1 is sufficiently confident 2 is irresolute enough to accept its second offer, this confidence may be
misplaced. 1 could make a number of offers which are increasingly satisfactory to 2, but it is possible
some types of 2 will reject because the offer is not favorable enough.
Failure does not occur, as is commonly thought, because repeated iterations of bargaining become
increasingly costly or because 1 believes 2 will acquiesce. Once an offer is made and rejected, both
chambers sink costs—as the game demonstrates, the costs of rejection in prior stages of the game
cannot be a rational basis for rejecting an offer in the present period (independent of each chamber’s
growing impatience.) Nor is it the case that one chamber suffers such high costs that it withdraws
from the bargaining process. Instead, because 1 does not perfectly update its beliefs, it makes an offer
based on its posterior beliefs that 2 is sufficiently irresolute to accept. In practice, this implies that
chambers, despite making a series of offers, do not always learn what the other chamber will accept.
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The bargaining process is one of consistent, but imcomplete learning. For this reason, chambers may
fail to reach agreement despite an exchange of possible compromises.
Implications
To see how the model informs our understanding of post-passage bargaining failure, consider the
following example. H.R. 3773, the FISA Amendments Act of 2006 failed during the amendment
trading process. The bill was originally passed by the House 227-189, with nearly all Democrats in
favor of the bill, and nearly all Republicans opposed. The Senate then took up the bill and passed S.
2248, their version of the legislation, by a vote of 68-29.19 Unfortunately for the House, the Senate
had a relatively unified coalition, and because the legislation was in large part meant to codify and
formalize the ongoing practices of President Bush’s administration, the Senate undoubtedly valued
the status quo more than the House.
The chambers were far apart on issues such as immunity for private communications companies
and judicial oversight of warrantless wiretapping. After the Senate action, the House took up the bill
again and began to construct an offer it would send back to the Senate as part of the amendment
trading process. The House was faced with three options. It could have moderated its original
demand sufficiently that the Senate would accept, it could have insisted on its provisions and made
an offer that only an irresolute Senate would accept, or it could have acquiesced and accepted the
Senate bill without amendment, sending the bill to the president.
The Senate had a number of advantages during the bargaining process. First, its bill was more
conservative and thus much closer to the status quo, so if bargaining broke down, the Senate would
be relatively better off than the House. Second, the House coalition was smaller and made up almost
entirely of Democratic members—a number of conservative House Democrats probably preferred the
19The original House version of the bill passed by unanimous consent, after the Senate struck all language after the
enacting clause. The different versions of the bill were effectively H.R. 3773 and S. 2248.
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Senate’s version, but the Democratic leadership was successful in maintaining a unified, though very
tenuous coalition. This implies the House’s costs of bargaining were high. Not only did the Senate
reject the House’s offer, it made almost no concessions to the House in its version of the bill. Its bill
was more conservative and mostly ignored the House’s position on many issues.
Through its initial, rejected offer, the House learned the Senate was a much more resolute bar-
gainer than it originally thought. The House then moderated its offer, but even its moderated offer
over-estimated the size of the surplus it could take for itself. The Senate refused to even take up the
last version of the House’s bill. In fact, after being repeatedly warned by Republicans to modify the
bill, John Conyers of Michigan said, “Mr. Speaker, could I remind my two distinguished members of
Judiciary, Mike Pence of Indianapolis and Steve Chabot of Ohio, that the reason we are not taking
up the Senate provisions is that the House has a better idea, and we are coequal. They don’t give
us whatever they want.”20 Representative Conyers probably viewed senators’ public statements as
cheap talk during the bargaining process, but he should have taken the Senate’s resoluteness more
seriously. The Senate was unified behind its compromise and was much more willing it was to walk
away from the bargaining table. The House’s offer, unsurprisingly was not sufficiently moderate,
and the Senate balked, leading to bargaining breakdown.
Conclusion
The puzzle of post-passage bargaining failure is relevant to the study of policy agendas, and
legislative productivity. Chambers which cannot resolve their differences will be punished by voters
for their failure to enact meaningful policy change on high-profile legislation. And, it is usually
the case that only important or meaningful legislation, which is salient to voters, fails during the
post-passage resolution process.
I use a non-cooperative bargaining model to explain why legislation fails even if the chambers
20Congressional Record, Page H1746, March 14, 2008.
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generally agree. Broadly, failure occurs because a chamber’s beliefs about the other’s costs of bar-
gaining are too optimistic, or because the conferees propose an unacceptable offer. When a chamber
believes the other is less resolute, it is more willing to risk aggressive offers and counteroffers. How-
ever, more aggressive offers increase the risk of failure.
Different factors affect the resoluteness of a chamber. The chamber’s costs of engaging in post-
passage bargaining and its utility for the status quo are the primary determinants of how resolute a
chamber is. Costs are conceptualized as originating from two sources—a chamber’s impatience and
the costs of coalition building and maintenance. Second, the benefit a chamber receives from the
status quo makes it more or less resolute. Those chambers which value the status quo highly are
more resolute than those chambers for which the status quo is relatively unattractive.
Failure, it should be emphasized, is never an optimal outcome for the chambers. They always
prefer some bill to nothing. However, it occurs because the chambers engage in strategies which
attempt to maximize their share of the bargaining surplus. They overestimate what the other cham-
ber will accept and continue to make unreasonable demands, even if one chamber learns about the
preferences of the other.
The model also demonstrates the conditions under which each of the two bargaining venues will
be used. A necessary, but insufficient condition of post-passage bargaining is sufficient patience by
both chambers. The costs of engaging in conferencing must be sufficiently low, and the chambers
must manage their risk. A conference which is unlikely to result in a compromise will be avoided.
Not only will conferences only be used when there is a high probability they will reach agreement,
but conditions on the status quo must be met. If one chamber places a high value on the status quo,
amendment trading is more likely to be used.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Begin with 2’s decision in the last stage of the game to accept an arbi-
trary offer of bt. 2 accepts when U2(accept) ≥ U2(reject)↔
(1− bt) ≥ (1− s− a2)
bt ≤ s+ a2 or when a2 ≥ bt − s
1 sets its demand by maximizing:
EU1(bt) =
∫ bt−s
0
(s− a1)Uda2 +
∫ 1−s
bt−s(bt)Uda2
The first order conditions is equal to 1 − 2bt + s − a1 = 0 and solving for bt yields bt = 1+s−a12 . 1
makes an offer equal to this, and when a2 ≥ 1+s−a12 −s, 2 accepts the offer, otherwise 2 rejects the offer.
In the previous stage, 1 prefers amendment trading to conferencing when EU1(AT ) ≥ EU1(conference)↔∫ 1+s−a1
2
−s
0
(s− a1)Uda2 +
∫ 1−s
1+s−a1
2
−s(
1+s−a1
2
)Uda2 > p(bf ) + (1− p)(s− c1)
p < 1−2s−3s
2+a1(−2+2s+a1)+4c1
4(b−s+c1)
p∗ < p
Given amendment trading and the offer in the last stage of the game, what offer makes 2 indifferent
between accepting and rejecting in the first stage? Recall that 2 receives a payoff of 1 − 1+s−a1
2
if it accepts the offer in the last stage of the game. 2 also suffers −a2 from rejecting in the first
stage. I show that U2(accept) ≥ U2(reject) given 2 accepts the offer in the last stage. It is trivial to
show U2(accept) ≥ U2(reject) if 2 has such low costs of a2 that it rejects the offer in the last stage.
Therefore, for those types of 2 which accept in the last stage, U2(accept) ≥ U2(reject)↔
1− b ≥ 1− bt − a2 where bt = 1+s−a12
1− b ≥ 1− 1+s−a1
2
− a2
b ≤ 1+s−a1
2
+ a2 or when a2 ≥ b− 1+s−a12
1 sets its demand by maximizing:
EU1(bt) =
∫ 1+s−a1
2
0
(s− a1 − a1)Uda2 +
∫ b− 1+s−a1
2
1+s−a1
2
(1+s−a1
2
− a1)Uda2 +
∫ 1−s
b− 1+s−a1
2
(b)Uda2
b = 1−a1
2
Proof of Proposition 2. In conferencing, 2 accepts an offer made by the conferees at least as
good as its disagreement value. Or, 2 accepts when U2(accept) ≥ U2(reject)↔
(1− bf ) ≥ (1− s− c2)
bf ≤ s+ c2 or when c2 ≥ bf − s
1 does not make an offer, instead the conferees make a non-strategic, random offer of bf which can
be accepted or rejected by the chambers. Therefore, it is impossible to characterize 1’s offer at this
stage.
When does 1 prefer a conference committee to amendment trading?
EU1(AT ) ≥ EU1(conference)↔∫ bt−s
0
(s− a1)Uda2 +
∫ 1−s
bt−s(bt)Uda2 > p((bf )) + (1− p)((s− c1))
(bt − s)(s− a1) + ((1− s)− (bt − s))(bt) ≤ p(bf ) + (1− p)(s− c1)
p ≥ 1−2s−3s2+a1(−2+2s+a1)+4c1
4(b−s+c1)
p ≥ p∗
Given conferencing, what does 2 accept in the first stage of the game?
EU2(accept) ≥ EU2(reject)↔
1− b ≥ (p(1− bf ) + (1− p)(1− s− c2))− c2
b ≤ p(bf − s− c2) + s+ 2c2
or c2 ≥ b−p(bf−s)−s2−p
1 sets its demand by maximizing:
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EU1(bt) =
∫ b−p(s−bf )−s
2−p
0 ((p(b) + (1− p)(s− c1)− c1) +
∫ 1−s
b−p(s−bf )−s
2−p
(b)
−2+2b+p+ps−2py
−2+p − c1 = 0
b = 1 +
p(2bf+c1−s−1)−2c1
2
Proof of Proposition 3. Will 1 ever make an offer that induces rejection from all types of 2? Call
this an extreme offer be.
When amendment trading is the venue used, 1’s expected utility is
∫ 1+s−a1
2
0
(s − a1 − a1)Uda2 +∫ b− 1+s−a1
2
1+s−a1
2
(1+s−a1
2
− a1)Uda2 +
∫ 1−s
b− 1+s−a1
2
(b)Uda2
If 1 induces rejection, it receives
∫ 1+s−a1
2
0
(s− a1 − a1)Uda2 +
∫ 1−s
1+s−a1
2
(1+s−a1
2
− a1)Uda2.
Can EU1(be) > EU2(b)? If b > 0, or a1 > 0, this can never be the case. 1 will never induce rejection
given amendment trading in the last round.
When conferencing is the venue used, 1’s expected utility is
∫ b−p(s−bf )−s
2−p
0 ((p(b)+(1−p)(s− c1)− c1)+∫ 1−s
b−p(s−bf )−s
2−p
(b)
If 1 induces rejection, it receives ((p(b) + (1− p)(s− c1)− c1).
Can EU1(be) > EU2(b)? If b > 0, or c1 > 0, this can never be the case. 1 will never induce
rejection given conferencing in the last round. 1 never offers less than its optimal offers as defined
in Propositions 1 and 2 because they maximize 1’s utility, by definition. See Propositions 1 and 2
for details.
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Chapter 3: The Disappearing Conference Committee: The
Use of Procedures by Minority Coalitions to Prevent
Conferencing
Abstract
Despite the importance of post-passage bargaining for legislative outcomes, little is known about
the factors which lead to a conference committee. While the conventional wisdom claims conferences
are used to resolve differences on important or complicated legislation, the theory developed here
claims that coalition size and chamber rules are increasingly important determinants of conferencing.
The empirical results demonstrate that post-passage bargaining and conferencing depend on the
ability of the coalition within each chamber to overcome procedural hurdles. This has important
implications for post-passage bargaining in an age of narrow, partisan coalitions. While the chambers
may prefer conferencing to resolve their differences, minority coalitions are now willing to block the
motions necessary to conference, forcing amendment trading on many bills.
Introduction
President Obama and the congressional Democrats repeatedly called the health care reform bills
passed by the 110th Congress the most significant domestic legislation in decades. And, despite
the assertions of the media in the days leading up to final passage in the Senate, the leadership
from both chambers decided almost immediately to bypass a conference committee because, the
Democrats claimed, using a conference committee would give Republicans additional opportunities
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to slow down the bill’s progress.21 As further evidence of the congressional Democrats’ hesitance to
use a conference, later in the process, after the House accepted the Senate’s version of the bill, the
amendment trading process was used to pass the reconciliation bill of “fixes”.
Conference committees are among the areas of congressional action about which scholars know
the least (Ferejohn 1975, Longley & Oleszek 1989), a theoretical deficiency that has substantively
important implications for our understanding of policy outcomes. Every bill passed in different forms
by the chambers must be reconciled if it is to be sent to the president.
The conventional wisdom claims conferences are used primarily for important or complicated
legislation. In the modern Congress, this reasoning is problematic because conference use by the
chambers has declined substantially for unknown reasons. If the explanation that legislative im-
portance causes conferencing is true, then variation in the frequency of conference committees can
only be explained by a complementary change in the number of important bills passed by both the
House and Senate. But, as the role of the conference committee changes, a better explanation of
their use is needed, particularly given the increase in party differences within Congress (Poole &
Rosenthal 1997, Theriault 2008)—a factor which seems to be affecting the frequency of conference
committees.
This paper develops a theory of conference use which is not based on the importance of legislation,
but instead on the ability of each chamber’s majority coalition to engage in post-passage bargaining
and on the constraining effect of each chamber’s rules. In recent years, minority coalitions are willing
to exploit these rules to prevent conference committees. Conferences are an efficient and useful way
of resolving differences but they are also procedurally difficult. In many cases, amendment trading
is simply an easier venue to use because the procedural hurdles are lower, especially in the Senate.
The results indicate that in the Senate, the fewer majority party members in the winning coalition
21Shailagh Murray, “Democrats holding final intraparty talks on health-care reform.” Washington Post, January 6,
2010.
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the less likely any post-passage bargaining becomes and the less likely conferencing becomes. In the
House, previous Congresses required large coalitions with bipartisan or majority party support to
engage in post-passage bargaining. However, the House is becoming similar to the Senate in that
the total number of members who support the bill does not affect post-passage bargaining, while
the number of majority party members in the coalition is the critical factor for conferencing. These
findings explain why the use of conferences as a post-passage resolution mechanism is now the
exception rather than the rule.
The theory and empirical results have two implications. First, the institutional rules of both
chambers have a significant effect on the post-passage bargaining process. Second, the use of confer-
ences is changing because the ideological composition of members within each chamber is changing.
Increased polarization and intractability by minority coalitions are making it harder to use con-
ferences and may be making it harder for the majority coalitions within each chamber to resolve
their differences. Importantly, this paper demonstrates how the growing divide between liberal and
conservative members of Congress has an effect on policy outcomes.
Conferences and Interchamber Disagreement
The post-passage resolution process has been neglected in part because researchers cannot ob-
serve the horse-trading of different provisions by members of Congress, nor are they privy to the
conversations between chamber leaders or other important members that take place leading up
to the post-passage bargaining process.22 Despite the difficulty of studying post-passage bargain-
ing, an increasing interest in bicameralism has led to new examinations of the importance and
role of conference committees. This new research is moving away from the “who wins” question
(Fenno 1966, Ferejohn 1975, Ortega & McQuillan 1996, Strom & Rundquist 1977, Volger 1970) and
22Though conferences must now be conducted in public, Longley & Oleszek (1989) note the “growing tendency” of
deals being struck in pre-conferences, informal meetings, and caucuses (pg. 56).
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instead focuses on the role of conference committees as a way for conflicting chambers to engage in
non-cooperative bargaining with the purpose of resolving policy conflicts (Tsebelis & Money 1997).
In this framework, the House and Senate rely on their conferees, who are almost always members
from the relevant standing committees (Sinclair 1983, Smith 1988), to fight for the chamber or
party position (Lazarus & Monroe 2007, McQuillan & Ortega 1992, Oleszek 1996). The view of
post-passage bargaining as a non-cooperative process is consistent with the intentions of the framers
who believed a bicameral legislature would generate increased policy conflict and serve their goal
of creating policy stability (Hammond & Miller 1987). As the 111th Congress demonstrated, even
when the chambers are ideologically similar, there is no theoretical reason to expect them to have
the same preferences (Tsebelis & Money 1997).
Conferences provide an arena where delegates from each chamber are relatively free from limita-
tions—the only formal constraint conferees face is that they may not change provisions agreed to by
both chambers in the original bills, though they must be careful to satisfy their leadership, relevant
committee members, and a majority of members in their chamber. As Oleszek (2007) points out,
conferences are used to reconcile differences on important bills because they do not suffer from some
of the limitations of the other post-passage resolution mechanism, amendment trading. Conferences
allow the most knowledgeable members on a policy issue to negotiate over many issues at once and
free the chamber to take up other business.23
Amendment trading, on the other hand, requires each chamber to sequentially pass floor amend-
ments which bring each chamber’s version of the bill one step closer to the other chamber’s version.24
The exchange of amendments are usually coordinated by the leadership from both chambers or the
23An ongoing debate centers on the conferees’ ability to force the chamber to accept a take-it-or-leave-it offer when
the conference report is sent back to each chamber for approval (Krehbiel, Shepsle & Weingast 1987, Shepsle &
Weingast 1987)
24The back-and-forth is limited to three amendments. This rule can and has been ignored, but in general the
chambers follow it.
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committee members in charge of the bill though any amendment proposed can itself be amended
in accordance with the rules of the chamber. This may make it a riskier proposition for those who
support the bill because there is no take-it-or-leave-it offer. Most observers consider the amendment
trading process as too blunt a tool to resolve differences on complex legislation.
The chambers may avoid post-passage bargaining altogether by passing the other chamber’s bill
without amendment25, though this becomes more difficult as the number of provisions or dimen-
sions subject to within-chamber bargaining increases. In the House, the ability to control or limit
amendments gives the majority party more control over the bill, but in the Senate, the lack of a
germaneness requirement and Rules Committee make it much easier for a winning coalition to form
on any particular amendment, leading to changes to the bill (Smith & Flathman 1989, Smith 1989b).
Given the advantages conferences have in reconciling legislation, most scholars accept the idea
that difficult legislation is usually resolved through conferences (see for example, Lazarus & Mon-
roe (2007), Longley & Oleszek (1989), Oleszek (2007)). However, some recent high profile (and
complicated) bills have not gone to conference. For example, in addition to the legislation already
mentioned, comprehensive energy reform passed by the 110th Congress was reconciled using amend-
ment trading. Democrats blamed Republican Senators for blocking conferee appointments, but there
was evidence that Democrats preferred not to use a conference because of the difficulty the House
leadership had in holding together a coalition.26
Even outright acceptance of another chamber’s bill occurs for complex or politically divisive
legislation.27 For example, the August 2009 extension to the “Cash-for-Clunkers” bill passed easily
in the House, and the Senate seemed prepared to pass an identical bill, but some Senators began
25Passage without amendment does not require the ideal points or policy preferences of the two winning coalitions
within each chamber to be identical.
26Steve Mufson, “Democrats Lack Unity in House Over Energy Bill.” Washington Post, August 1, 2007.
27The complexity and political divisiveness of legislation are assumed to be highly correlated, and most authors
make no distinction between the two.
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Table 1: The Frequency of Post-Passage Action on Bills Passed by Both Chambers, 93rd-110th
Congresses
Type No Post-Passage Post-Passage Conference Amend. Total
Bargaining Bargaining Trading
Public Law 3,806 2,932 1,083 1,849 6,738
(56.5%) (43.5%) (16.1%) (27.4%) (94.2%)
Bills That Did Not 187 234 147 87 421
Become Law (44.5%) (55.5%) (34.9%) (20.6%) (5.8%)
Total 3,993 3,166 1,083 1,849 7,159
(55.8%) (44.2%) (15.2%) (25.8%) (100%)
voicing concerns about the lack of environmental restrictions on new cars eligible for the government
reimbursement.28 On final passage, there were 60 “yeas”, the minimum needed to overcome a
filibuster.
Table 1 shows post-passage actions for all non-commemorative, public bills passed by both cham-
bers between the 93rd and 110th Congresses.29 As the table shows, most bills are not bargained on
after being passed by both chambers. In these cases, legislation passes one chamber (about 68% of
bills originate from the House), and is then sent to the other which passes it without amendment.
Amendment trading is a more common post-passage bargaining venue for legislation which does
become law, but not for bills which fail. In general, when both chambers pass a version of a bill, the
legislation becomes law about 94% of the time.
Figure 4 shows post-passage bargaining, conferencing, and amendment trading trends over time.
The solid gray line is the percentage of all bills passed by both chambers that went to one of the
two post-passage bargaining venues, the dashed line is the percentage of post-passage bargained bills
where the chambers used amendment trading, and the solid black line is the percentage of post-
passage bargained bills reconciled in conference. In general, the chambers are avoiding post-passage
bargaining more often in recent Congresses. Amendment trading is almost always more commonly
28Corey Boyles, “‘Clunkers’ Rebates at Risk Unless Senate Acts.” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2009.
29Data available from the author upon request. Details on the collection of the data can be found in the “Data and
Methods” section.
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used than conferencing, but both have declined in recent years. In recent Congresses, conferences
have become very rare. For example, in the 93rd Congress, there were 143 conferences, while in the
110th, only 16 bills in the dataset were reconciled using conference committees.
Figure 4: The Frequency of Congressional Bargaining Venues, 93rd-110th Congresses
A Theory of Post-Passage Bargaining and Conferencing
Negotiations between the House and Senate are conducted by the winning coalition within each
chamber, usually made up of a majority of the majority party (though occasionally the majority party
is “rolled” (Cox & McCubbins 2005)). Parties, as stable, durable majorities, coordinate members,
solve collective action problems between members, and try to pass legislation which benefits the
party (Aldrich 1995, Rohde 1991).
Legislation passed by the coalition in one chamber acts as an offer or proposal to the other,
and on any given bill, the two winning coalitions only engage in post-passage bargaining if both
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coalitions agree on how to change policy but disagree on exactly what the new policy should be.
The disagreement on the specifics of the new policy ensures an offer will be rejected, but agreement
on the type of change (i.e. more liberal or conservative) means both chambers will ultimately be
better off from reaching a compromise than they would be with the status quo.30
The House and Senate will not bargain if they disagree on the type of policy that should be
implemented relative to the old status quo. If one chamber prefers to make the new policy more
conservative, and the other chamber prefers a more liberal policy, there is no possible compromise
the chambers can agree on which makes both better off relative to the status quo. In most cases, this
disagreement is unobservable. Either legislation on the public agenda is ignored by both chambers,
or one chamber passes legislation and the other chamber refuses to act. While these situations are
common, they fall outside of the scope of the theory and, for measurement purposes, any legislation
which is not passed by both chambers is not included in the dataset. Legislation is only eligible
for the post-passage bargaining process if it is passed by both chambers as these are bills where
agreement by the chambers on the new policy direction is most likely. It may also rarely be the case
that both chambers act on a policy agenda item, but because there is no possible compromise, the
chambers will be unable to reconcile their differences.
When will post-passage bargaining occur and which bargaining venue will be observed? The best
case scenario for the coalitions in each of the chambers is to agree on legislation during the process of
initial passage within the chamber. When this occurs the bargain is termed “efficient” (Muthoo 2000)
because neither party must engage in costly resolution activities. The more bargaining required by
the chambers to reach a satisfactory solution, the less efficient the bargain. As additional amounts
of time and energy are spent reaching an agreement, an increasing amount of costs are subtracted
30Even though both chambers prefer a resolution to bill failure, the process is still best characterized as non-
cooperative bargaining. See Tsebelis & Money (1997).
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from each chamber’s benefit derived from the agreement eventually reached.31
When a majority coalition decides to engage in post-passage bargaining, it must be cognizant
of the preferences of its members and the coalition. One of the reasons post-passage bargaining is
inefficient is because it complicates the coalition building process. Legislators may have a difficult
time initially supporting the bill, and they may not approve of changes made to the legislation as a
result of the bicameral compromise. Further, any changes made to the legislation during the post-
passage bargaining process may encourage members to leave the coalition. This is more likely when
the coalition contains members with preferences highly divergent from the median coalition member.
As the preference diversity of the coalition increases, the more difficult it is to hold the coalition
together and the more costly it becomes to buy-off legislators (Groseclose 1996).
The loss of members becomes increasingly destructive to the coalition when it is small. As
Groseclose & Snyder (1996) show, buying off larger coalitions is cheaper than buying off a minimal
winning coalition because the “first vote buyer can decrease the amount of the bribe paid to each
member of his or her original coalition, while keeping constant the amount the second vote buyer
must pay to invade successfully.” With each defection, the minority coalition can decrease the amount
it must spend to encourage the next defector to leave, and as the size of the winning coalition shrinks,
the more valuable each of these members becomes to the majority coalition. This does not include
other factors that play a role in coalition maintenance like the negative psychological effects which
contribute to coalition breakdown when defection momentum builds.
In short, majority coalitions that are unstable due to disparate preferences are more willing to
accept the other chamber’s proposed policy and prefer not to engage in post-passage bargaining in
either venue due to the complications it introduces. From the coalition’s perspective, there is often
31Efficiency also decreases because for each period of time during which the chambers are bargaining, they do not
accrue any benefits from the bargain. This point is not addressed further in this paper. In a perfectly efficient bargain
with complete information, agreement is reached in the first stage, see Rubenstein (1982).
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too much risk and too many ways in which a minority can exploit the resolution process to defeat the
bill. Importantly though, this relationship manifests itself differently in each of the two chambers due
to the rules and procedures of each. Because avoiding post-passage bargaining requires acceptance of
the other chamber’s bill, coalition constraints do not affect the probability of post-passage bargaining
or the type of bargaining, in each of the chambers in the same way.
Institutional Rules and Post-Passage Bargaining
The expectation is, all else equal, that large coalitions are more willing to engage in post-passage
bargaining than small coalitions are. This requires that small coalitions, if they are to avoid post-
passage bargaining, prevent a bill from being amended on the floor. Doing this is easier in the
House than in the Senate because of the House’s institutional limitations on the minority’s ability
to amend.
In the House, there are three ways a small majority is able to limit amendments to a bill: the
germaneness rule, a rule from the Rules Committee, and by marshalling support from members of
the majority party who help block troublesome amendments. The germaneness rule is not sensitive
to coalition size, while a rule from the Rules Committee requires only a simple majority. Therefore,
even if the House majority coalition is small, it can use its institutional power to head off difficult
amendments and accept the bill without amendment. If small majorities are able to block amend-
ments and accept legislation, then large majorities are more likely to use post-passage bargaining
because concerns about the coalition breaking down during the post-passage bargaining process are
reduced. Therefore,
Hypothesis 1: In the House, as the size of the winning coalition increases, the more likely the
chambers are to engage in post-passage bargaining, ceteris paribus.
The hypothesized relationship partly depends on members of the majority coalition supporting
restrictive rules. However, the recent increase in congressional polarization suggests some members
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of the House winning coalition, even if they support the bill, may not be willing to support the rules
necessary to limit amendments and promote acceptance, or to engage in “strategic disagreement”
(Rybicki 2003). As Theriault (2008) demonstrates, most of the votes which account for increasing
polarization have occurred on procedural votes rather than on substantive legislative issues. This
suggests that in the House, while minority party members may vote in favor of the bill on final
passage, votes by members of the majority party should also make the winning coalitions more stable.
Therefore, independent of the effect of the absolute size of the coalition, the number of majority party
members in the winning coalition should also have an effect on post-passage bargaining, and the effect
should be more robust more recently.
Hypothesis 2: In the House, as the number of majority party members in the winning coalition
increases in more recent Congresses, the more likely the chambers are to engage in post-passage
bargaining, ceteris paribus.
The Senate has no institutional tools which allow the majority to prevent modifying amendments
during the passage process and avoid post-passage bargaining when the winning coalition is tenuous.
Of course, these are the situations in which the minority is most likely to offer popular amendments
that force bargaining and increase the costs of final passage. The best a winning coalition in the
Senate can do is to appeal to members of its party. By using inducements given to party members to
“buy-off” members (Snyder & Groseclose 2000), a small majority coalition may be able to prevent
changes to the bill and avoid the post-passage resolution process.32 Of course, these inducements
are only relevant to members of the majority party. Further, because the Senate requires 60 votes
to proceed to a final passage vote, maintaining support from majority party members is even more
crucial, as it minimizes the number of minority party members that must be integrated into the
coalition. It may be the case that some minority party members will support post-passage bargaining
32Also see the response by Schickler & Rich (1997a), Schickler & Rich (1997b) and Cox & McCubbins (1997).
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and the motions necessary to use conferencing, but some will not; it is always better for the majority
party to maximize the number of its own members in the winning coalition.
Hypothesis 3: In the Senate, as the number of majority party members in the winning coalition
increases, the more likely the chambers are to engage in post-passage bargaining, ceteris paribus.
Like the House, this relationship should be exacerbated by increasing polarization and smaller
winning coalitions increasingly made up of majority party members in recent Congresses.
Hypothesis 4: In the Senate, as the number of majority party members in the winning coalition
increases in more recent Congresses, the more likely the chambers are to engage in post-passage
bargaining, ceteris paribus.
To see how the theory and hypotheses work within Congress, consider the final passage votes on
health care reform in 2010. In the Senate, Republicans proposed a number of amendments which
were attractive to some Democrats. The Democratic leadership asked its members to reject them
in order to avoid sending the bill back to the House. The Senate Democrats had no institutional
rules which allowed them to restrict the amendments being proposed, so their only recourse was to
appeal to members of the party. The Democrats realized that additional votes in either chamber
made passage a more difficult proposition. The Democrats used the power of the party to avoid most
additional post-passage bargaining by not substantially amending the House reconciliation bill.33
Institutional Rules and Conferencing
Should a bill be amended in either the House and Senate, the chambers must then decide on
whether to use the conference or amendment trading process. While private negotiations take place
between the leadership and committee members in each chamber, I focus here on the formal proce-
dures used to convene a conference or amendment trading. After passage, using a conference requires
additional steps which differ in each chamber. The ability of the majority coalition within each of
33One innocuous amendment was approved and the bill was sent back to the House.
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the chambers to overcome the procedural hurdles necessary for a conference will determine whether
or not it is used. If the majority coalition is unable to meet the requirements to use a conference,
both chambers will have to use amendment trading, a less efficient and more difficult process be-
cause no take-it-or-leave-it offer is made and because the chambers have to use valuable floor time to
reconcile the legislation. Further, if one chamber is unable to receive approval for a conference from
its members, both chambers will have to use amendment trading. Approval within each chamber is
a necessary but insufficient conditions for a conference. Both must agree or a conference will not
occur.
In the House, going to conference is a relatively straightforward process. There are three possible
ways a conference can occur once the bill is passed. A unanimous consent request can be made,
a provision allowing for an automatic conference “hookup” with the Senate can be included in the
bill’s rule, or the motion to use a conference can be debated for one hour after which a vote takes
place (Oleszek 2007).
There is no added procedural difficulty for using a conference as opposed to amendment trading
if post-passage bargaining occurs. Once enough members agree on the legislation and want to
reconcile it with the other chamber, going to conference requires a simple majority vote, after an
hour of debate, only if unanimous consent is not granted, nor an automatic conference be provided
for in the bill’s rule. Put differently, if the coalition leadership believes it has enough members to
engage in post-passage bargaining, it should usually prefer a conference because it requires no extra
effort. Therefore, no relationship is expected between coalition size and conferencing.
The Senate has institutional rules that makes coalition size particularly relevant to conference
committee occurrence. Going to conference in the Senate requires three different motions (usually
combined into one): a motion to insist on its amendments or disagree with the House’s amendments,
a motion to request a conference, and a motion to allow the majority leader to appoint conferees
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(Oleszek 2007). Each of these motions are debateable and can be filibustered if a minority chooses
to be obstructionist. If invoking cloture is necessary on any of the motions, it becomes much more
difficult to use a conference, and amendment trading becomes the preferred option. Even if the
Senate has the votes to invoke cloture on each of the amendments and pass the bill, the “ripening”
time required for a cloture amendment makes a conference more costly to the majority coalition.
While the Senate rarely holds a cloture and passage vote on these motions, they do present real
roadblocks to conferencing, a perspective that is consistent with the perception of members and their
staff. A former Senate staffer told me that, “the minority views these motions as the last opportunity
to kill a bill.” The motions to go to conference are usually part of a unanimous consent agreement
or are packaged into the manager’s amendment. The same staffer told me that recently, putting a
hold on the motion to allow the majority leader to appoint conferees has become a favored tool of a
determined, obstructionist minority.
Like the relationship between post-passage bargaining and the size of the majority coalition,
overcoming the constraints imposed by Senate procedures requires commitment from party members.
Even members of the minority party who support the bill on final passage may refuse to join the
majority party in its efforts to pass the necessary procedural motions to go to conference. Again,
procedural votes are less likely to be supported by members of the minority, even if they support
the bill (Theriault 2008). The motions necessary to go to conference are precisely these sorts of
procedural votes on which minority party members are unlikely to join with the majority. And
because the minority party leadership sees the motions to go to conference as a way to defeat the
legislation, one should expect minority party members to oppose the procedural motions.
Hypothesis 5: In the Senate, as the number of majority party members in the winning coalition
increases, the more likely the chambers are to engage in conferencing, ceteris paribus.
And, because polarization has increased in recent years, the effect should be greater in more
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recent Congresses.
Hypothesis 6: In the Senate, as the number of majority party members in the winning coalition
increases in more recent Congresses should increase the likelihood of conferencing, ceteris paribus.
To summarize, larger majority coalitions in the House will increase the probability of post-passage
bargaining but will have no effect on the bargaining venue used. Majority party support should also
have an independent, positive effect on post-passage bargaining, especially in more recent Congresses.
In the Senate, an increase in majority party support will increase the probability of post-passage
bargaining and the probability of using a conference, and these effects should be exacerbated by
the recent increase in party divisions. The hypotheses are based on the rules required to engage in
post-passage bargaining in general and conferencing specifically. The ability of the House to limit
changes to the bill makes it easier to accept legislation when the coalition is small, while the Senate
lacks similar institutional tools and needs majority party members to limit changes to a proposed
bill. The Senate’s rules also require substantial majority party support to use a conferences.
While I expect the importance of legislation to be a significant predictor of bargaining and
conferencing, I have also claimed it is an incomplete explanation of post-passage bargaining. The
above theory does not differentiate between important legislation and more mundane bills. The
relationships are expected to hold even for legislation classified as important.
Data and Methods
The sample of observations are all public, non-commemorative bills passed by both chambers in
the 93rd through 110th Congresses for the House and the 95th through 110th Congresses for the
Senate.34 As explained above, bills passed by only one chamber are not included in the dataset
because they are not eligible for post-passage bargaining, and because legislation not passed by both
34Non-commemorative bills are those defined as such by the Congressional Bills Project, and are excluded because
they recognize an individual, group, etc., and are not substantive in nature.
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chambers is an indication the chambers may lie on opposite sides of the status quo (making post-
passage resolution impossible). While the ideal points of the chambers are unobservable, and some
of these types of bills may be included in the dataset, their inclusion provides a harder test for the
theory.
Post-passage bargaining and the venue choice is best characterized as a selection process. Any
post-passage bargaining that occurs over a bill constitutes the selection, while the choice of the
venue—conferencing or amendment trading—constitutes the outcome. Bills which went to confer-
ence are coded in the Congressional Bills dataset, but bills that went to amendment trading are
not available in any dataset I am aware of. In addition, some bills, notably appropriation bills,
were subject to both amendment trading and a conference. This occurs because appropriations
conferees can file a “partial conference report,” where items disagreed on in conference are subject
to amendment trading (Oleszek 2007). Other bills go to both venues, especially when the Senate
adds provisions which violate the House’s germaneness requirement. The mechanisms of mixing the
two venues allows the House to adhere to its own rules while still being able to accept most of the
compromise bill and reject the objectionable parts without having to reject the entire conference
report (Oleszek 2007).35 Therefore, all bills were coded by the author for amendment trading using
the online congressional resource THOMAS. Any action characterized by THOMAS as “resolving
differences” after the passage of the bill by both chambers was coded as part of the amendment
trading process, unless THOMAS characterized resolving differences as the appointment of conferees
by both chambers or some other action directly related to a conference.
Additional data was taken from the Policy Agendas Project36, Rohde’s Roll Call Voting Data
35All bills which went to both venues were classified as going to conference. The House had long complained
about the Senate’s ability to force votes on conference reports which contained items that would have violated the
germaneness rules of the House. In 1972, the House adopted a rule which allowed it to reject these provisions without
rejecting the entire conference report. See Oleszek (1996) and Smith (1989a).
36Policy Agendas Project Citation Note: ”The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and
Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant number SBR 9320922, and were distributed
through the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin and/or the Department of Political
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(Rohde 2004, Rohde 2010), the Congressional Bills Dataset (Adler & Wilkerson 2008)37, and Poole
and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE scores (Poole & Rosenthal 2007). The final sample has 7,159 bills
passed by both chambers from 1973-2008.
The key independent variables measuring coalition size for each chamber are the log of the
proportion of “yea” votes on final passage (out of all votes cast), and the log of the proportion of
all “yea” votes cast from the majority party.38 High values indicate instances in which all or most
members of the majority supported the bill, while low values indicates instances in which support
from the majority party was relatively low. The log of each variable was used because an increase in
“yea” votes is more valuable at lower levels than at higher levels. For example, garnering the 60th
vote in the Senate is more valuable than garnering the 90th vote. The vote totals are taken from
final-passage roll call votes; bills which were passed by voice vote or through unanimous consent are
not included in the empirical models.39
A number of other factors may affect whether or not the chambers engage in post-passage bargain-
ing and whether or not a conference is used. I classify each of the variables as being a characteristic
of the bill itself and varying at the bill-level, or a characteristic of the Congress which passed the bill
and varying at the Congress-level.
Bill Characteristics
The Senate typically defers the writing of legislation to the House so most legislation first passes
the House and is sent to the Senate as a House bill. Most House legislation is routine and passed
by the Senate without amendment, so the expected relationship between a bill originating in the
Science at Penn State University. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the
analysis reported here.”
37Adler and Wilkerson data note: “The views expressed are those of the author and not the National Science
Foundation.”
38A proportion is used rather than the absolute number of “yea” and “nay” votes because not all members vote on
a given bill.
39Most bills passed through unanimous consent are much less likely to be post-passaged bargained on, primarily
because a large amount of these bills are trivial.
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House and post-passage bargaining is negative. Whether the bill was introduced by a member of
the standing committee to which the bill was referred is an important predictor of legislative suc-
cess. Legislation submitted by a member of the relevant committee is more likely to be substantive
in nature and more likely to be successful because committee members are expected to have more
expertise on the issue (Krehbiel 1992). The relationship between this variable and post-passage bar-
gaining and conferencing is expected to be positive. Whether or not a bill was referred to more than
one committee is also included in the analysis. Multiple referrals have become increasingly common
in the House (though not in the Senate) as more legislation overlaps committee jurisdictions. Im-
portantly for bargaining, an increasing number of committees with jurisdiction over the bill presents
a larger set of conferees from which the Speaker may choose to preserve the majority party’s prefer-
ences (Lazarus & Monroe 2007). All else constant, this may make conferencing more attractive. The
expected relationship for both bargaining and conferencing is expected to be positive. “Must pass”
legislation like appropriations should be more likely to be bargained on, and as discussed above,
more likely to go to a conference. Appropriations are among the most urgent legislation and failure
to pass them results in an extreme status quo (Adler & Wilkerson 2009). The final passage date of
the chamber which acted last is included in the models. It has been noted that amendment trading
tends to increase as the end of the session nears, so this variable should be negatively related to both
the selection and outcome variables (Longley & Oleszek 1989).
A continuous variable measures how many lines the legislation received in Congressional Quar-
terly’s discussion of the bill.40 Most legislation is not mentioned in CQ; only very noteworthy or
important legislation will have a value greater than zero. Approximately 33% of legislation is men-
tioned in CQ, and the mean number of lines for all legislation is 5.3 lines.
40The natural log of the number of lines is used in the models.
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Congress Characteristics
Besides characteristics of an individual bill, it is also important to control for factors the partisan
and institutional factors within a Congress which may affect the likelihood of any particular bill going
to post-passage bargaining and conferencing. Included among these variables are a dichotomous
variable measuring divided government, where divided government is equal to 1 if either of the
chambers are controlled by a party different from the president. Variables are also included for
divided party chamber control (where divided control equals 1), and the ideology of the median
member of both the House and Senate as measured by their DW-Nominate score. More conservative
chambers should pass less ambitious legislation and should be less likely to post-passage bargain and
conference.
The model also includes the absolute value of the difference between the chambers’ mean DW-
Nominate score. An increase in these partisan variables should have a positive effect on post-passage
bargaining because the chambers will more consistently have difficulty reconciling their differences
during the initial passage process and should be more likely to engage in post-passage bargaining
and conferencing. Finally, to control for the public’s demand for new legislation, demand which
could drive the chambers to work more diligently on reconciling their differences, Stimson’s policy
mood is included (Stimson 1999). Higher values of policy mood indicate a greater demand by the
public for government action. Also included is a variable measuring which Congress passed the bill.
A naive estimate of conferencing suggests the relationship should be negative because conferencing
has become more rare in recent Congresses as shown by Table 4.
A Sartori selection model is used to estimate the effect of a fixed set of independent variables on
both the selection and outcome equations (Sartori 2003). The same set of independent variables are
used to model both equations because the decision to use post-passage bargaining and a particular
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venue is an optimal strategy made by rational actors nearly simultaneously (Sartori 2003).41 In the
Sartori models used here, the base selection and outcome equations are:
Z1i = θ
′ + γixj (1)
and
Z2i = α
′ + βixj (2)
Where Z1i and Z2i are the observed values for the selection model, post-passage bargaining
(where bargaining=1), and the outcome model, conference committee or amendment trading (where
conferencing=1) for observation i.42 Each equation models unobserved variables Y1i and Y2i, a latent,
continuous selection and outcome value for observation i. The other parameters are θ′, the constant
for the selection model, α′, the constant for the outcome model, γi, a vector of covariates described
above used in the selection equation, and βi, the same vector of covariates used in the outcome
equation.
The Effect of “Yea” Votes and Majority Party “Yea” Votes on Bargaining
and Conferencing
Table 3 shows three Sartori selection models - two for the House and one for the Senate.43 The
first model in the table includes the control variables described above, the proportion of “yea” votes
on final passage out of all votes cast, and the proportion of majority party “yea” votes on final
41In these cases, specifying different variables for both equations in order to fulfill the exclusion restriction of the
usual Heckman probit model (Heckman 1976, Sartori 2003) would result in misspecification.
42Bills which went to both post-passage venues were coded as going to conferencing only for the outcome model for
two reasons. Conferencing is almost always the first venue used and most of the legislation which went to both were
appropriations bills which go to amendment trading only because of the need to resolve disagreement over monetary
values.
43Approximately 25 bills from the 106th Congress are excluded because of missing values on two independent
variables. A comment about the estimation process is warranted. Because the selection models have a difficult time
converging, depending on the specification, the number of iterations of maximizing the likelihood was limited once
Stata stopped reporting changes in the log-likelihood. I experimented with alternative specifications and allowing
more iterations, and the substantive results and significance change very little.
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Table 2: Independent Variables and Anticipated Effects
Variable Anticipated Effect Anticipated Effect
on Bargaining on Venue
(Bargaining=1) (Conference=1)
Coalition Characteristics
Total Yeas (Logged) + 0
in the House (Hypotheses 1)
Majority Party Yeas + +
(Logged) in the Senate (Hypothesis 3 and 5)
Majority Party Yeas x Congress + 0
in the House (Hypotheses 2)
Majority Party Yeas x Congress + +
in the Senate (Hypotheses 4 and 6)
Bill Characteristics
Chamber of Origin (House=0) - -
Committee Member Sponsored + +
Multiple Referral + +
Lines in CQ + +
Passage Month - -
Appropriations Bill + +
Congress Characteristics
Divided Government + +
DW-Nominate Distance + +
Between Chamber Medians
Divided Chambers + +
Policy Mood + +
House Median DW-Nominate - -
Senate Median DW-Nominate - -
passage out of all votes cast. The model also includes an interaction term where total “yea” votes
are multiplied by Congress. Hypotheses 1 suggests the size of the coalition, measured by the total
number of “yea” votes on final passage will increase the probability of post-passage bargaining, while
Hypothesis 2 claims there should be a similar effect for majority party votes in more recent Congresses
because of increasing ideological and policy divergence between the parties. Both variables have a
positive, statistically significant effect at the .05 level (two-tailed test). The interaction term of total
“yeas” multiplied by Congress is significant and negative, suggesting the effect of total votes on
post-passage bargaining has decreased in more recent Congresses.44
44The models were also tested using “fixed effects” for Congress, where a variable is included for every Congress. The
substantive results for the non-interacted terms hold, though this approach does not allow me to test an interaction
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The second model for the House includes an interaction term where the proportion of majority
party “yea” votes out of all votes cast on final passage is interacted with Congress. The interaction
term is not significant, while the effect of majority party yea votes is significant and substantively
strong. The combined results from both models show that while total votes on final passage were
a predictor of post-passage bargaining, increasing disagreement between the parties is making post-
passage bargaining less a consensual process between the two parties, and one that is more dependent
on having sufficient support from one’s party. As the interaction term demonstrates, the effect of
total “yea” votes on post-passage bargaining is decreasing across Congresses.
between Congress and vote characteristics - a key component of my causal story.
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Table 3: Sartori Model of Bargaining and Conferencing with Conferencing Costs
Selection Model: Bargaining=1
House House Senate
Coalition Characteristics
Number of Total Yeas on Passage (Logged) 1.02∗∗ -.403∗ .331
(.464) (.237) (.872)
Number of Majority Party Yeas on Passage (Logged) .743∗∗ 1.14∗∗ 1.00∗∗
(.295) (.485) (.399)
Total Yeas x Congress -.128∗∗ – -.066
(.036) (.080)
Majority Party Yeas x Congress – -.01 –
(.043)
Bill Characteristics
Chamber of Origin (House=0) -.353∗∗ -.326∗∗ -.289∗∗
(.122) (.122) (.148)
Committee Member Sponsored .190∗∗ .173∗∗ .130
(.090) (.084) (.138)
Multiple Referral -.234 -.197∗ -.416∗∗
(.116) (.115) (.174)
Lines in CQ (Logged) .176∗∗ .184∗∗ .101∗∗
(.017) (.016) (.025)
Passage Month .004 .004 .033∗∗
(.006) (.006) (.010)
Appropriations Bill .733∗∗ .776∗∗ .956∗∗
(.135) (.133) (.157)
Congress Characteristics
Divided Government .033 .046 -.362
(.124) (.120) (.259)
DW-Nominate Distance Between Chamber Medians -.935 -1.10 -.303
(1.02) (.875) (1.82)
Divided Chambers .291∗ .341∗∗ .753∗∗
(.164) (.156) (.295)
Policy Mood -.024 -.020 -.062∗
(.021) (.020) (.037)
House Median DW-Nominate -.935∗∗ -.889∗∗ -1.48∗∗
(.431) (.430) (.839)
Senate Median DW-Nominate 1.21 1.37∗ -2.20
(.773) (.730) (1.47)
Congress -.043∗∗ -.028 .060
(.018) (.030) (.041)
Constant 2.43∗∗ 2.15∗ 3.70∗
(1.12) (1.1) (1.92)
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Outcome Model: Conferencing=1
House House Senate
Coalition Characteristics
Number of Total Yeas on Passage (Logged) .965∗ -.890∗∗ -1.34
(.547) (.235) (.85)
Number of Majority Party Yeas on Passage (Logged) -1.05∗∗ .21 .803∗
(.512) (.657) (.413)
Total Yeas (Logged) x Congress -.161∗∗ – .066
(.042) (.077)
Majority Party Yeas x Congress – -.086 –
(.066)
Bill Characteristics
Chamber of Origin (House=0) -.447∗∗ -.468∗∗ -.086
(.162) (.163) (.132)
Committee Member Sponsored .020 -.008 -.133
(.098) (.09) (.128)
Multiple Referral -.214∗ -.175 -.363∗∗
(.122) (.122) (.166)
Lines in CQ (Logged) .176∗∗ .184∗∗ .142∗∗
(.016) (.015) (.021)
Passage Month -.010 -.009 -.003
(.007) (.006) (.009)
Appropriations Bill 1.05∗∗ 1.08∗∗ 1.05∗∗
(.119) (.118) (.137)
Congress Characteristics
Divided Government .003 .037 .147
(.13) (.128) (.225)
DW-Nominate Distance Between Chamber Medians -.265 -.016 -.102
(1.07) (.921) (1.55)
Divided Chambers .389∗∗ .389∗∗ .773∗∗
(.161) (.153) (.254)
Policy Mood .036 .044 -.049
(.021) (.020) (.033)
House Median DW-Nominate .686 .599 1.02
(.528) (.532) (.732)
Senate Median DW-Nominate -1.05 -.652 -5.52∗∗
(.810) (.770) (1.32)
Congress -.136∗∗ -.166∗∗ .032
(.021) (.044) (.035)
Constant -1.90 -1.90∗) 2.11
(1.18) (1.11) (1.67)
(N) 1500 1500 688
(Log Likelihood) -1162.35 -1170.77 -511.29
Wald χ2; Prob> χ2 433.69; 0.00 533.26; 0.00 151.82; 0.00
**p<.05, *p<.1
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The theory also predicts that an increase in total “yeas” and majority party “yeas” will have no
effect on conferencing because of the rules of the House. After achieving passage, going to a conference
in the House is a low-cost procedural action. The results in the outcome model, which measure the
effect of a variable on conferencing given post-passage bargaining, generally support this. In the
first model with the interaction term, the result is similar to the selection model where the effect of
total “yea” votes on passage is reduced in more recent Congresses. In the second model, without
the interaction term, the total number of “yeas” has a negative effect on conferencing. Interestingly,
the number of majority party votes has a negative effect on the likelihood of conferencing in the first
model. Clearly, in the House, more votes for a bill does not make it easier to use a conference.
To summarize the theory and results, post-passage bargaining and conferencing is most likely
when the majority party is sufficiently unified to bear the costs of bargaining. Hypothesis 2, which
states an increase in majority party votes on final passage will have an independent effect on post-
passage bargaining, is supported by the evidence, and while Hypothesis 1 was true in previous
Congresses, an increase in total “yea” votes no longer increases the probability of post-passage
bargaining. Figure 2 shows the marginal effect of Congresses on total “yea” votes for post-passage
bargaining and conferencing. By the 104th Congress, an increase in the size of the winning coalition
actually has a negative effect on the probability of the chambers engaging in post-passage bargaining,
and by the 102nd Congress, an increase in the size of the winning coalition has a negative effect on
the probability of the chambers using a conference.
A number of bill characteristics have an important effect on post-passage bargaining and con-
ferencing. The first two models for the House also demonstrate the importance of bill complexity
on post-passage bargaining and conferencing. In both models, the more complex a bill is, as mea-
sured by the number of articles written about it in Congressional Quarterly, the more likely it is the
chambers will engage in post-passage bargaining and use a conference committee. If a bill originates
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Figure 5: The Marginal Effect of Yea Votes on Post-Passage Bargaining and Conferencing, 93rd-
110th Congresses
from the House, it is less likely to be bargained on, and less likely to go to a conference committee.
Bills sponsored by a member of the reporting committee are slightly more likely to be bargained
on, though this variable has no effect on the likelihood of conferencing. Bills referred to multiple
committees are less likely to go to post-passage bargaining, contrary to expectations. Finally, ap-
propriations bills are much more likely than other bills to be bargained on after initial passage, and
much more likely to go to a conference.
The variables measuring characteristics of the Congress perform fairly well in the two models.
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The effect of divided chamber control (when different parties control the House and Senate) is
as expected. If the chambers are controlled by different parties, the more likely they are to use
post-passage bargaining and conferencing to resolve their differences. Also note that post-passage
bargaining and conferencing are less likely in more recent Congresses.
The median nominate scores for both chambers are included to measure the collective ideology
of the House and Senate. The more conservative the House is, the less likely the chambers are to
engage in post-passage bargaining, though neither the House nor Senate ideology has a statistically
significant effect on conferencing. It seems that Republican controlled chambers, in general, engage
in less post-passage bargaining than their more liberal counterparts, though the effects are chamber
specific.
I now turn to the effect of coalition size on post-passage bargaining in the Senate. While the
number of total “yeas” has no statistically significant effect, the number of majority party “yea”
votes increases the probability of going to post-passage bargaining and going to conference (the
variable is significant at the .07 level, two-tailed test), confirming Hypotheses 3 and 5. Also included
in the model is an interaction term where total votes are multiplied by Congress. Like the House, the
effect of majority party votes has not changed over the sample, so an interaction term for majority
party votes multiplied by Congress is not significant (results not shown). There is no evidence which
supports Hypotheses 4 and 6, that the effect of majority party “yea” votes has increased over time.45
Unlike the House, the total number of votes is not a significant predictor of going to post-passage
bargaining, and its effect has not changed over time. In the Senate, the total number of majority
party votes has been, and remains, the primary determinant of post-passage bargaining. Hypothesis
3 claimed this is because the Senate lacks institutional rules which give a majority coalition power
to limit amendments to a bill. Instead, the majority party in the Senate must use inducements and
45If included, the model is poorly specified, and none of the coalition variables are significant.
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goods distributed to party members to maintain small coalitions.
Also unlike the House, the number of majority party members is a significant predictor of whether
a bill goes to conference. As stated by Hypothesis 5, this is because the procedural hurdle of using
a conference is high in the Senate. Majority party members are needed to ensure the coalition can
overcome these institutional barriers because determined minorities can use these rules to thwart a
conference—even when members of the minority party support the bill. Conversely, as the number
of minority coalition votes increase, the easier it is for the minority coalition to prevent or slow down
the use of a conference. As explained above, a strong minority coalition can place holds or attempt
to filibuster each of the three amendments required for conferencing in the Senate. The result that
majority party votes in favor of the bill are important, while the number of total votes supporting
the bill on final passage is unimportant, is consistent with extreme partisan divisions on procedural
votes. Minority party members may vote for the bill on final passage, but if the minority party is
determined to stop the bill and employs procedural tactics in the Senate, such as putting a hold on
the motion to appoint the conferees, the majority party must have sufficient support from within its
party to fight off attempts by the minority to prevent a conference.
Most other results from the Senate model are consistent with the results from the House models.
The measure of importance, the number of lines the legislation received CQ, is substantively large
and statistically significant as expected. If legislation is mentioned in CQ it is more likely to go both
to post-passage bargaining and to a conference committee. The multiple referral of a bill is negative
and statistically significant for both post-passage bargaining and conferencing. For the Senate, the
later a bill is passed by the Senate, the more likely it is to go to post-passage bargaining. And as
before, appropriations bills are more likely to go to a post-passage bargaining venue, and more likely
to go to a conference.
The results for the characteristics of each Congress are also largely consistent with the results in
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the models for the House. Divided party control of the chambers makes both post-passage bargaining
and conferencing more likely. The result for the DW-Nominate distance between the chambers is not
significant, but, like the House, the coefficient is also negative for both the selection and outcome
equations. This is also true for the House DW-Nominate Median’s effect on post-passage bargaining,
though as with the previous models, the Senate’s DW-Nominate score is a statistically significant
predictor of amendment trading (it has a negative effect on conferencing).
The substantive effect of the number of majority party “yea” votes on post-passage bargaining for
the House and on bargaining and conferencing for the Senate is shown in Figure 3. All variables were
held at their mean except for dichotomous variables: the chamber of origin was held constant at the
chamber used in the analysis (the House for the first set of predicted probabilities, and the Senate for
the second two sets of probabilities), committee member sponsored was held at 1, multiple referral
at 0, appropriations bill at 0, divided government at 0, divided chambers at 0, and the constant at
1. The graph shows the probability of each outcome at two levels of majority party “yea” votes for
each Congress. The first bar graph shows predicted probabilities across Congresses for an increase in
majority party “yeas” from .51 (slightly more than half of members voting yes are from the majority
party) to 1 (all members voting yes are from the majority party). In the first set of predicted
probabilities, used to model the effect on the first House selection model, the substantive increase in
the mean probability a bill is post-passage bargained on is about .06 to .09.
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Figure 6: Predicted Probabilities of Post-Passage Bargaining and Conferencing Given An Increase
in Votes
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The second two sets of predicted probabilities show the substantive effect of an increase in ma-
jority party “yea” votes in the Senate on post-passage bargaining, and an increase in majority party
yea votes in the Senate on the probability of conferencing. The effect varies over Congresses, and
an increase in majority party votes has a smaller substantive effect in more recent Congresses. This
is due to an overall increase in the predicted probability. For example, in the 93rd Congress, when
majority “yeas” equals .51, the predicted probability of post-passage bargaining was about .6, while
in the 110th Congress, the same level of majority party “yea” votes results in a predicted probability
of .9. The same pattern holds for conferencing, though overall, the predicted probability of going to
a conference is much lower than the predicted probability of engaging in post-passage bargaining, as
one would expect.
To summarize, Hypotheses 3 and 5 are confirmed. In the Senate, the size of the coalition on final
passage is relatively unimportant once a majority is achieved, while the size of the majority party
coalition is very important. And while there is no statistical evidence the effect of majority party
votes has gotten stronger over time, the same number of majority party votes is much more likely
to induce bargaining and conferencing in recent Congresses. In the House, the absolute number of
“yea” votes was important in predicting post-passage bargaining (Hypothesis 1), but the relation-
ship is mitigated by time. The House is looking more like the Senate in that a coalition made up
of majority party members seems to be more important than the absolute coalition size. Therefore,
Hypothesis 2 is partially confirmed, but the effect is due more to the reduction in importance of total
votes, rather than an increase in the importance of majority party votes. Further, in the House,
once bargaining is possible through a sufficient coalition size, there are no additional costs to going
to conference, as predicted by the theory.
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Discussion
Post-passage bargaining is important because the process produces important substantive changes
to legislation. The legislative compromise sent back to each chamber may have little resemblance to
the original bill passed by the chamber. Not only does post-passage bargaining change legislation,
but conferences or amendment trading may serve as a roadblock to passage. About 4% of all
legislation passed by both chambers fails during the post-passage bargaining process. Because of the
importance of conferences in particular, it is critical scholars understand the conditions which make
each of the post-passage bargaining venues more or less likely.
This paper informs our understanding of conference committees by empirically examining the
conditions under which they occur. This examination moves beyond an explanation of conferences
which focuses on importance or complexity, and instead develops a deductive, theoretical explanation
based on chamber rules and coalition sizes. The results show that the ability to engage in post-passage
bargaining and conferencing, even for important legislation, is largely dependent on the ability of
the winning coalition to maintain its cohesiveness and repel attempts by the minority to delay or
obstruct the legislation.
Conference committees are an effective way of reconciling differences—their relative efficiency
and their unique operation offers some real practical and logistic advantages. The winning coalition
within each chamber may even prefer to use them rather than have to use amendment trading. But,
despite its attractiveness, conferencing is not always possible.
The effect of coalition size varies by chamber. In the House, the total number of majority party
members in favor of the bill increases the probability of engaging on post-passage bargaining on
that bill, while it has no effect on the probability of conferencing because the House rules pose no
additional constraints on using a conference. The results also suggest that the risk of defection,
from the party rank-and-file, has undermining effects on the coalition and damages the prospects of
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post-passage bargaining.
In the Senate, the passage of the bill may be the easy party. Those who support the bill may not
necessarily support the procedural machinations required to conference. A large number of majority
party members allows the coalition to go to conference more quickly and easily than it would if the
coalition included many minority party members, members who may not be as willing to fight other
members of their own party on the procedural votes required to go to conference.
The results also provide an explanation for the decrease of conference frequency. Narrow coali-
tions have become more common recently because of the increasingly partisan nature of Congress.
Polarization suggests the parties are more homogenous than they used to be and they are growing
apart on the policy spectrum (Poole & Rosenthal 1997), reducing the number of bipartisan votes.
In the House, these votes matter, and their reduction makes post-passage bargaining less dependent
on the number of total “yea” votes. In the Senate, the minority can use the procedural rules to force
amendment trading, as holds, filibusters, or objections to unanimous consent agreements become
more common. The majority can expect little support from minority party members to overcome
these procedural devices, even if members of the minority agree with the legislation. If the high
level of polarization in Congress continues, one should expect a continued decrease in the number of
conferences.
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Chapter 4: Familiarity Breeds Success: The Temporal
Dynamics of Legislative Bargaining Between the House and
Senate
Abstract
Differences between the House and Senate may create legislative gridlock, especially if the cham-
bers have divergent preferences. However, members of Congress have incentives to produce new
policies in order to satisfy constituent demand. Are there strategies the chambers can use to ensure
legislative productivity even when they are ideologically divided? This chapter claims the cham-
bers use past success to pursue future legislative activity within a policy area. They are able to
update their beliefs about the difficulty of reconciliation, and can use this new information to pursue
legislation in areas where they are most likely to agree. The results suggest time and bargaining
success mitigate the constraining effects ideological or policy differences have on the likelihood of
passage—the chambers return to policy areas where legislative success is likely, and ignore those
areas where it is not. Chamber differences reduce legislative productivity in some areas, but increase
it in others.
Introduction
At the start of the 112th Congress the Republican controlled House and Democratic controlled
Senate seemed to share few policy goals. Most assumed their ideological differences would make it
difficult to pass any meaningful legislation, resulting in legislative gridlock which frustrates both par-
ties and members in both chambers because neither can effectively pursue their policy preferences.
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Making changes to existing policy and enacting new policy is the very essence of what Congress
does; understanding the relative productivity of a given Congress has important implications for
democratic theory. Besides compulsory legislation, which must be addressed within a congressional
term, voters expect Congress to create new legislation consistent with their policy demands. Be-
cause of these important implications, the ability of Congress to overcome chamber differences is an
important area of focus for congressional scholars.
This chapter examines how the dynamics of chamber conflict change over time, how the House and
Senate respond to the other’s legislative activity, and how members of Congress within each chamber
adapt their behavior to the ideological and institutional situation in which they find themselves. The
theory and results suggest that the chambers learn which issues they will be able to agree on, and
about the attendant difficulty of reaching agreement on those issues. The theoretical implication is
that ideological differences between the chambers may limit the policy areas on which the chambers
can agree, but the majority coalitions within each chamber can also engage in strategies to pass other
types of legislation. In short, chambers use past success as a mechanism for deciding which policy
areas to address in the future. This strategy reduces the effect of chamber divergence on legislative
gridlock.
The following section discusses how interchamber and interbranch differences may affect the
ability of Congress to make policy. I argue that although there is a substantial body of literature
on the role of preferences and ideology in promoting gridlock, little research has explicitly accounted
for timing considerations inherent in congressional policymaking and the direct relationship between
the two chambers’ legislative action. The subsequent section explains the theory and empirical
expectations by developing four hypotheses which describe the expected effects of interchamber
dynamics on future policymaking. An error correction model examines how different institutional
factors and chamber updating, both in the present and past periods, affect legislative activity within
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a policy area. The results also address how past success and updating affects the relative importance
of future bills. The paper closes with a discussion of the substantive results, their implications, and
a conclusion.
Chamber Differences and Legislative Productivity
Scholars originally focused on differences between the president and Congress as an explanation
of legislative gridlock due to its prominence in popular accounts and the media (Mayhew 1991,
Edwards III, Barrett & Peake 1997, Howell et al. 2000). Conflicting evidence on the effects of
divided government has encouraged an increasingly rigorous theoretical examination of the factors
which encourage policy stasis, what Baumgartner & Jones (1993) call “institutional friction.” Most
prominent among these alternative explanations are the effects of bicameralism—generally agreed to
be a legislative institution that makes bill passage more difficult compared to a unicameral system
(Tsebelis & Money 1997).
Two-chambered legislatures reduce the likelihood of passage not just because of ideological differ-
ences in the majority coalitions within each chamber, but also because of the different institutional
rules within each chamber. In many of the world’s legislatures, these institutional rules promote the
rights of the minority coalition in one chamber but not the other, which often creates ideological or
preference disparities between each chamber’s winning coalition (Heller 2007). In the United States
Senate, Krehbiel (1998) shows how the filibuster rule promotes policy stasis because the 60th member
is more likely to favor the status quo or be opposed to drastic policy change. While this work is not
intended to address the strategic interaction between chambers, Krehbiel’s insight is important in
that it clarifies how Congress may be its own worst enemy when it comes to enacting policy change.
Institutional rules interact with coalition ideology in each chamber. If the chambers and their
members are ideologically distinct from each other, it will be more difficult to pass important legis-
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lation (Binder 1999, Binder 2003). Binder claims, “...as the preferences of the two chambers diverge,
policy stability increases, and change in the status quo becomes less likely” (Binder 1999, 522). She
also points out that this was one of the major justifications of bicameralism offered by Madison in
Federalist 62, and subsequently by political scientists (Hammond & Miller 1987, Riker 1992).
Ideological diversity among members between chambers limits what can pass, but parties may
be able to mitigate these effects through the distribution of party benefits (Aldrich 1995). Empirical
work has shown that increased levels of party unity, conditional on the ideology of the president
and the ideological differences between the House and Senate, can reduce the size of the gridlock
interval (Chiou & Rothenberg 2006). Chiou & Rothenberg (2003) also claim that the party unity
model outperforms a party agenda-setting model (Cox & McCubbins 2005) or a pure preference
based model (Krehbiel 1998) in explaining the size of the gridlock interval.46
If parties can influence member vote choices and increase party unity, then the ideology of indi-
vidual members should be less important. In fact, Chiou & Rothenberg (2008) show that Binder’s
use of W-NOMINATE scores (Poole & Rosenthal 1997) are inappropriate and that when the same
data are analyzed using Poole and Rosenthal’s common space scores (Poole & Rosenthal 1997, Poole
& Rosenthal 2007), the institutional factors Binder cites, such as the difference between the chamber
medians, produce null results.
The mixed findings from previous research suggests that the size of the gridlock interval is highly
conditional. I claim its size depends not only on party unity, member preferences, or member
ideology, but also on the type of policies members (or parties) are attempting to pass. That is,
given a distribution of member preferences or a level of party unity, under what other conditions will
bicameralism cause legislative gridlock within a policy area, and are there strategies Congress can
use to mitigate the constraining effects of member preferences or party unity? If one takes ideological
46Chiou & Rothenberg’s (2003) model assumes the parties are completely unified such that every member of the
party votes the same as the party median.
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differences as a given, can members of Congress still find ways to be productive? Members should
be able to synthesize their beliefs about the policy preferences of the other chamber and their past
experiences to pass bills which have a chance of being approved by both chambers. In the following
sections, I discuss the incentives to be productive, and the effects of learning and time on legislative
productivity.
Incentives and Costs of Legislative Action
Even during periods of divided government or divided chamber control, members of Congress
and parties have an incentive to pursue policy change. At the individual level, members of Congress,
as reelection seekers, want to credit claim and take positions on policy issues (Mayhew 1974), and
voters will punish members who have pursued policies they disagree with (Canes-Wrone, Brady &
Cogan 2002). Parties also want to achieve policy goals (Rohde 1991, Aldrich 1995), and they seek to
promote their “brand” while limiting the policy accomplishments of their opposition (Aldrich 1995,
Cox & McCubbins 1993, Cox & McCubbins 2005). In short, both the individual member and the
party must have some record of legislative accomplishments on which to run. Ideological differences
between the chambers does not mean legislators abdicate their governing responsibilities.
The problem, from a chamber’s perspective, is that passing a particular bill may be futile if
the other chamber is also unwilling to act or if the chambers have opposing preferences (i.e. the
House prefers a more conservative policy and the Senate prefers a more liberal policy). Additionally,
chambers take a risk by passing a bill—legislative action is costly and each chamber pays these costs
without being certain the other chamber will pass the bill or, if the other chamber has already passed
it, without being certain post-passage bargaining resolution will be achieved.47
Costs are a very real constraint on legislative action because the majority coalitions within each
47Coalitions may pass bills for symbolic purposes, allowing members of the majority coalition to position-take for
example, but this does not mitigate their desire to actually make new policy.
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chamber have limited resources and must manage their agenda carefully. These costs include coalition
building or the distribution of goods to members (Snyder & Groseclose 2000)48, and the opportunity
costs due to the limitations time impose (Adler & Wilkerson 2007, Cox 2006). A winning coalition
must balance the costs inherent in bill passage with its potential benefits if the bill successfully passes
the other chamber, the two chambers agree on the bill, and it is signed by the president.
Therefore, majority coalitions should pursue strategies that maximize their payoffs from successful
legislating while also minimizing their sunk costs. Unfortunately, each chamber is uncertain about
what types of bills are most likely to be adopted by the other chamber and which bills are most likely
to be resolved during the post-passage bargaining process, a necessary and often difficult step that
must be reached if the bill is to be sent to the president. Each winning coalition, as strategic actors
engaged in a non-cooperative bargaining game have incentives not to reveal private information
about their policy preferences (Reiter 2004).49 Each chamber knows that during the negotiation
process over a bill, it can receive a greater share of the benefits from bargaining by projecting false
resolve. Conversely, each chamber is aware of its own incentives as well as those of its counterpart,
so neither has a reason to believe information revealed by the other party (Powell 2006).
Statements of false resolve or commitment to a policy position by members of Congress are
common. Senators and Representatives commonly describe their own chambers’ inability to meet
the other side’s demands and they often try to claim that legislation will only be accepted if the
other chamber acquiesces in its policy demands. For example, Mary Landrieu said about climate
change legislation on June 23rd, 2009, “People are trying to remain open for negotiation, but I don’t
really know how we ever reconcile where the House is and where the Senate is.”50
48Also see Schickler & Rich (1997a), Schickler & Rich (1997b) and Cox & McCubbins (1997)).
49Fearon (1995) describes two other reasons why two actors may fail to reach a bargain. These are commitment
problems and issue indivisibility. Powell (2006) downplays the importance of issue indivisibility, claiming it is a type
of commitment problem. Commitment problems occur because actors can unilaterally renege on the bargain at some
point in the future once capabilities change. This is probably not an issue in Congress because both chambers have
to consent to revisit the bargain.
50This legislation offers an illustrative case. The House passed climate legislation which seemed to be very costly
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Mitigating Uncertainty Through Repeated Bargaining
Though the chambers do not reveal information about their preferences because of their incentives
to misrepresent their position, interchamber bargaining and resolution is not a static process. Within
a given congressional term, the same actors play the bargaining game multiple times. Incentives to
misrepresent are present for both majority coalitions, so neither purposely reveals its preferences, but
the bargaining iterations which occur during the normal course of a Congress allow each chamber’s
coalition to update its beliefs about the types of policies the two chambers can agree on. Chambers
can use this information to pass legislation in policy areas where interchamber resolution is likely
and to avoid policy areas where agreement will be difficult or impossible.
The revelation of information depends on repeated interactions within a single policy area. Infor-
mation about each chamber’s preferences is not revealed across all policy areas at all times because
learning depends on observing preferences specific to that policy. Instead, it occurs within those
issues on which the chambers accrue bargaining experience.
When the House passes legislation within a particular policy area, it sends a signal to the Senate
that the House believes its legislative preferences will be congruent with the Senate’s. The Senate
should respond by also passing legislation within the same policy area after observing the House’s
action. Alternatively, if the House avoids a policy area, then the Senate will also avoid that policy
area because each chamber seems to believe there is little chance for bicameral resolution. This
suggests that when the House or Senate observe bill passage in a policy area by the other chamber,
it too should pass a bill in the same policy area.
Hypothesis 1: Within a Congress, successful passage of legislation in one policy area by one
chamber at time t will increase the amount of legislation passed by the other chamber in that policy
to the majority Democratic coalition. Had the House known the Senate was never going to act on the legislation, it
is unlikely the House would have spent so much time and energy achieving passage.
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area at time t+1, ceteris paribus.
The same dynamics exist with respect to successful post-passage bargaining. It may actually be a
more powerful predictor because it sends a clear signal to both chambers that their policy differences
are reconcilable. When both chambers pass a bill which deals with a similar policy issue, it is only
the first step in the legislative process. The chambers must also reconcile their differences, often
a significant hurdle toward enactment.51 If the chambers successfully resolve their differences on a
policy issue, then the theory predicts the members from each chamber will update their beliefs about
the preferences of the actors in the other chamber and pass future legislation in that policy area if
each believes the two majority coalitions have reconcilable differences. Again, learning and updating
over time occurs within a policy area. For example, if the chambers bargain on energy policy once,
they acquire information about the other chamber’s preferences on energy issues, but bargaining in
this area does not reveal information about the other chamber’s preferences on non-related issues
(e.g. immigration). Therefore, if the House and Senate pass legislation and successfully resolve their
differences at time t, this should increase legislative activity in both chambers at time t+ 1.
Hypothesis 2: Within a Congress, an increase in the number of successful bicameral resolutions
within a policy area at time t will increase the amount of legislation passed by both chambers in that
policy area at time t+1, ceteris paribus.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are counterintuitive in that they predict the chambers repeat legislative
action within policy areas. We often think of Congress as addressing one policy issue at a time, and
having addressed an issue, as moving onto the next issue. I have claimed that due to the constraints
imposed by ideological or policy differences, chambers are often not able to address all policy areas
that may be on the public agenda. Instead of passing legislation in non-reconcilable areas, which
is costly and has little payoff, the chambers will focus their attention within the same policy issue
51About 4% of all legislation passed by both chambers fails during the post-passage bargaining process.
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repeatedly if it has proven to be an area on which the chambers can agree.
Repeated Bargaining and Important Legislation
Much of the focus in the legislative productivity literature has been on important or significant
legislation. These are bills that have a significant impact on policy and are often salient to the
general public or controversial (Mayhew 1991). It is not enough to only understand the amount
of legislation produced under different institutional conditions (i.e. divided government or divided
chambers); understanding the relative importance or salience of legislation being passed by the
chambers is also a critical component of the theoretical question.
There are two implications which are consistent with the theory, for the passage of important
legislation and overall legislative productivity. It is possible that passing a significant bill within a
policy area will reduce the likelihood of future passage within that policy area. This could occur
because the area has been sufficiently legislated, or because public demand for a change in the status
quo has been met. Alternatively, if chambers pass significant legislation with relatively low costs,
it could encourage them to pass additional bills within that policy area because even significant
legislation will be relatively easy to pass. These two possible relationships are stated in Hypotheses
3 and 4.
Hypothesis 3: Within a Congress, an increase in the number of successful and important bicameral
resolutions within a policy area at time t will increase the amount of legislation the chambers pass
in that policy area at time t+1, ceteris paribus.
Hypothesis 4: Within a Congress, an increase in the number of successful and important bicameral
resolutions within a policy area at time t will decrease the amount of legislation the chambers pass
in that policy area at time t+1, ceteris paribus.
To summarize the theory and hypotheses, the initial passage and post-passage bargaining pro-
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cesses are always costly. However, the chambers will be able to consistently pass bills and engage
in successful bargaining over legislation within a particular policy area as they learn about the
preferences of the other chamber. This reduces uncertainty about the passage of legislation, and
encourages both chambers to return to that policy area in the future. By behaving this way, the
majority coalitions within each chamber can focus on the issues on which they will agree on, and
avoid those on which no compromise is possible. This institutional dynamic mitigates the effects of
ideological differences between the chambers.
Alternative Explanations of Congressional Action
I have claimed that the ability to update and institutional incentives will encourage congressional
policymaking on certain issues. However, congressional policy action in each of the chambers could be
driven solely by agenda concerns rather than learning and incentives. Observed similarities between
policy action in each of the chambers may not be driven by action in the other chamber, but instead
by a shared agenda in the chambers. Chambers may simultaneously or sequentially pass bills in a
certain policy area because of public opinion demands (Page & Shapiro 1983). National issues or
exogenous shocks could generate voter demand for congressional action. The chambers may also
repeatedly address a policy area because of agenda-setting by the president or the media. This
relationship is likely multi-directional as the Congress can also influence the president and both are
likely to be influenced by the media (Edwards III & Wood 1999).
A related point is made by Binder (2003). She points out that the amount of legislation passed
within a Congress is a function of the demand for new legislation by the public. A Congress should
not be considered unproductive if the American public has little appetite for drastic policy change.
Issues that have been on the public agenda recently and have been addressed by the relevant political
actors may be less likely to reappear in the next Congress because public demand for action in a
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policy area has been satisfied.
Congressional action may also be determined by the necessities of compulsory legislation. These
types of bills must be addressed within a congressional term because they contain expiring provisions
which, if not reauthorized, cause a reversion to an extreme status quo (Adler & Wilkerson 2009, Hall
2004). Appropriations bills are the most well-known types of compulsory bills. Every year, Congress
must renew funding for federal programs by passing new appropriations bills. Other types of bills
often contain expiring provisions; Congress may choose to renew these provisions or let the program’s
funding or statutory authority expire.
Of course, the congressional agenda is likely determined by all of the factors discussed above.
Agendas are complex feedback mechanisms between multiple actors and policy change occurs both
incrementally and suddenly (Baumgartner & Jones 1991, Baumgartner & Jones 1993). The chambers
often have the same agenda because of issue saliency, but the question asked here is whether the
effects of rational updating and each chamber’s incentives to avoid costs and maximize payoffs have
an independent effect on the type of legislation the chambers address.
Methodological Strategy
Legislative activity within a policy area by a chamber is defined as the passage of a bill by a
chamber; the sample used in the analysis consists of all public, non-commemorative bills passed by
one or both chambers between the 93rd and 109th Congresses. Some characteristics of the bills
are taken from both the Congressional Bills Project Data and the Policy Agendas Project (Adler
& Wilkerson 2008, Baumgartner & Jones N.d.). Other data used was collected by the author and
includes the final passage date of every bill passed by at least one chamber, and the post-passage
bargaining venue it was reconciled in, if any.
The 19 discrete categories (e.g. agriculture, foreign trade) coded by the Policy Agendas Project
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for individual bills was used to classify the type of legislative action completed by the chambers.
Table 4 lists the policy areas, the total number of bills passed within each policy area, the total
number of bills sent to the president within each policy area (classified as “successful bills”). It also
shows the percent of bills sent to the president out of all bills passed within a policy area, and the
percent of bills passed within a policy area out of all bills passed, for the 17 Congresses used in the
analysis. The frequency of bills by policy area are roughly evenly distributed across Congresses.
Table 4: Distribution of Bills by Policy Areas
Policy Area Number of Number of Percent of Percent of
Successful Bills Bills Passed Successful Bills in all Bills
Policy Area
1. Macroeconomics 139 281 49.5 1.91
2. Civil Rights, Minority Issues 100 199 50.25 1.35
and Civil Liberties
3. Health 333 696 47.84 4.72
4. Agriculture 240 399 60.15 2.71
5. Labor, Employment and Immigration 199 399 49.87 2.71
6. Education 191 382 50 2.59
7. Environment 357 737 48.44 5.0
8. Energy 233 513 45.42 3.48
10. Transportation 365 824 44.3 5.59
12. Law, Crime, and Family Issues 345 812 42.86 5.51
13. Social Welfare 152 271 56.09 1.84
14. Community Development & 85 209 40.67 1.42
Housing Issues
15. Banking, Finance, & 428 1,021 41.92 6.93
Domestic Commerce
16. Defense 523 1,000 52.3 6.78
17. Space, Science, Technology 163 363 44.9 2.46
and Communications
18. Foreign Trade 186 391 63.92 2.65
19. International Affairs and Foreign Aid 295 551 47.01 3.74
20. Government Operations 1,589 2,568 61.88 17.43
21. Public Lands & Water Management 1,693 3,121 54.25 21.18
Total 7,625 14,739 51.73 100
Note that the Policy Agendas numbering system is used. There are no categories nine or 11.
The theory predicts previous bill passage and past success within a policy area will influence
future policymaking in the same area so the data was ordered by the final passage date within a
chamber, within a Congress. The unit of analysis is policy area-month and the data consists of 19
policy area panels measured across 384 months (1974-2005, 93rd to 109th Congresses) for a total
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of 7,296 observations (19 policy areas x 384 months).52 The value of the time-dependent variables,
including the dependent variable, are specific to the policy-area month and are calculated within a
congressional term unless otherwise noted. A month was chosen as the unit of time for two reasons.
First, it sets a reasonable time period over which members or chambers can update their beliefs
and respond to the dynamics of the other chamber. Second, it produces a sufficient number of
observations so as to ensure the models have statistical power.
The dependent variable, conceptualized as the amount of legislating by the chambers within a
particular policy area, is measured by the ratio of the number of bills passed at time t specific to
policy area j out of all bills passed by one chamber in all policy areas. For example, if at time t the
House passes ten bills and five dealt with energy, then the value of the dependent variable for the
energy policy area is equal to .5. A count of the number of bills passed by the other chamber is also
used in each model to predict the proportion of passage, the relationship stated by Hypothesis 1.
One of the key independent variables is the number of successful bills passed in any month, which
should increase bill passage in a policy area (Hypothesis 2). Successful legislation is defined as a
bill passed by both chambers, and successfully reconciled during post-passage bargaining so that the
legislation is sent to the president. The month the bill was successful, meaning the month it was
sent to the president, is the coded policy area-month. In this context, unsuccessful bills are those
which failed during the bicameral bargaining process either because one chamber did not pass the
legislation or because both chambers passed the bill but were unable to reconcile their differences.53
Unsuccessful bills are passed by one or both chambers, but the bill is never sent to the president for
his approval. The number of successful bills, and the percentage of successful bills out of all bills
passed is shown in columns one and three of Table 4. About 51.73% of all bills passed by at least
52Slightly fewer observations are actually used in the empirical models. A differenced and lagged value are included
which means the observation in a policy area for month 1 of each year is not used because it has no lag.
53Put differently, successful bills are all those which became law, plus those which were passed by the chambers in
the same form and sent to the president, but were vetoed. A separate variable is included for vetoed bills.
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one chamber are sent to the president.
The average number of lines written in Congressional Quarterly within a policy area is used as
the measure of legislative importance, a variable necessary to test Hypotheses 3 and 4. The variable
is calculated by taking the total number of lines written about bills within a policy area divided by
the number of bills passed and is a direct measure of the importance of legislation passed within a
policy area. Rather than addressing a general issue area, the variable measures how important a
specific bill was, and the average importance of previous bills in the same policy area, at the time of
debate and passage.
As described above, public demand may also drive policy action in each chamber. Two variables
measure the relationship between policy demanded by voters and the amount of legislation within a
policy area passed by the chambers. The first is the Policy Agendas Project’s measure of “Gallup’s
Most Important Problem,” measured annually as the percent of Americans naming an issue in the
policy area as the most important problem facing the country on a Gallup survey. The second
variable measures issue salience and agenda-setting by the media and is the monthly proportion of
articles in a sample of the New York Times which relate to a specific policy area.54
Each of the two variables captures public demand and salience or awareness of issues within a
policy area, reflecting how much legislative activity Congress is likely to engage in due to public
concerns or exogenous agenda-setting affects. Also included is a variable which measures agenda-
setting by the president and is equal to the number of statements specific to a policy area made
by the president during his State of the Union speech. The number of vetoes in a policy area is
also used in the models to measure presidential preferences and the willingness of Congress to pass
legislation in a policy area if its preferences are divergent from the president’s.
Two other variables are used to address Binder’s challenge (2003) to measure the amount of de-
54The sample used in the analysis includes only national issues–observations dealing with regional or metro news
were excluded from the analysis.
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Table 5: Summary Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
House
Chamber Activity in Policy Area .049 .086 0 1
Legislative Success in Policy Area .984 2.8 0 95
Appropriations .241 .79 0 18
Omnibus .02 .158 0 3
Lines in CQ (Logged) 204.794 899.566 0 51,448
Vetoed Bills .029 .182 0 2
Percent Naming Issue .047 .101 0 .788
Most Important Problem
Percent of New York Times Articles .053 .08 0 .724
Senate
Chamber Activity in Policy Area .036 .074 0 1
Legislative Success in Policy Area .984 2.8 0 95
Appropriations .294 .927 0 23
Omnibus .014 .125 0 3
Lines in CQ (Logged) 164.767 990.569 0 52,700
Vetoed Bills .029 .187 0 5
Percent Naming Issue .047 .101 0 .788
Most Important Problem
Percent of New York Times Articles .053 .08 0 .724
Chamber activity in policy area is the proportion of bills in that policy area divided by all bills passed by chamber.
Legislative success in policy area is the number of bills passed by the chamber sent to the president for signature.
All other bill related variables are counts of bills exhibiting that characteristic, except for CQ Lines, which is the
average number of lines about bills in that policy area. N=7,296 and the unit of analysis is policy-area month and
all variables are calculated within a Congress.
mand for new policy. Significant legislating in a policy area likely decreases future activity as public
demand is reduced. Included in the models are a lagged dependent variable which captures the past
proportion of legislating in a policy area. The second variables is the number of omnibus bills passed
within a congressional month. Omnibus legislation are large, complicated bills that are usually a
combination of other bills. Omnibus appropriations bills are common, though in recent Congresses
omnibus bills are an increasingly used policymaking mechanism as a way for party leaders to exert
agenda control (Shipan 2006). Krutz (2000, 545) finds omnibus bills increases legislative produc-
tivity and “contribute to an overall push toward constancy in lawmaking.” Finally, the number of
appropriations bills within a policy area is a measure of those bills which are non-discretionary or
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“urgent” (Adler & Wilkerson 2009). Table 10 shows summary statistics for each of the variables
used in the analysis.
Error-correction models, which estimate the effect a variable has on a long-run, theoretical equi-
librium, are used to estimate the hypothesized relationships. This type of model is commonly used
because it allows for specification flexibility, is relatively easy to interpret, and provides researchers
with both the immediate and long-term effects of a variable. The ability to disentangle short-term
and long-term effects is an important advantage of the model as these effects have been shown to be
quite different in other studies of the dynamics of congressional institutions (Krause 2002). Error-
correction models may be used whether or not the data is cointegrated (De Boef & Keele 2008), and
its use protects against spurious results driven by non-stationarity (Kelly & Enns 2010). Following
the advice of De Boef & Keele (2008), I include a first-order lag for each of the independent variables
and the dependent variable. The lagged dependent variable is necessary to control for past legislative
action, and not including the lagged dependent or independent variables restricts the coefficient for
the first-order lag terms to zero, an assumption that generally should not be made a priori.55
The models were estimated with the variables noted above and an interaction between the av-
erage number of CQ Lines and the number of successful bills necessary to test Hypotheses 3 and 4
such that the model estimated for policy area j at time t is:
55As De Boef & Keele (2008, 186) say, “Theories about politics typically tell us only generally how inputs relate
to processes we care about. They are nearly always silent on which lags matter, whether levels or changes drive Yt,
what characterizes equilibrium behavior, or what effects are likely to be biggest in the long run.”
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∆Proportion of Legislative activity in chamberjt = α0 + α
∗
1Proportion of Legislative activityjt−1
+B∗0∆Number of Successful Bills in Chamberjt +B
∗
1Number of Successful Bills in Chamberjt−1
+B∗2∆Number of Bills Passed in Other Chamberjt +B
∗
3Number of Bills Passed in Other Chamberjt−1
+B∗4∆Number of Appropriations Billsjt +B
∗
5∆Number of Appropriations Billsjt
+B∗6∆Number of Omnibus Billsjt +B
∗
7∆Number of Omnibus Billsjt
+B∗8∆Average number of CQ Lines in Policy Areajt +B
∗
9Average number of CQ Lines in Policy Areajt−1
+B∗10∆Number of Vetoed Billsjt +B
∗
11Number of Vetoed Billsjt−1
+B∗12∆Percent of Americans Naming Policy Area as Most Important Problemjt
+B∗13Percent of Americans Naming Policy Area as Most Important Problemjt−1
+B∗14∆Proportion of Presidential State of the Union Comments in Policy Areajt
+B∗15Proportion of Presidential State of the Union Comments in Policy Areajt−1
+B∗16∆Proportion of New York Times Articles in Policy Areajt
+B∗17Proportion of New York Times Articles in Policy Areajt−1 +B
∗
18∆CQ Lines x Number of Successful Billsjt
+B∗19CQ Lines x Number of Successful Billsjt−1
(3)
Predicting Legislative Activity in the House and Senate by Policy Area
The two models in Table 6 show the OLS results for all policy areas across all months in the
sample. The primary concern with OLS in time-series analysis is the possibility of autocorrelated er-
rors. Traditional test of autocorrelation (e.g. Breush-Godfrey, white-noise test) cannot be conducted
with panel data so I attempted to detect autocorrelation by examining scatterplots of the residuals
and correlating the residuals and lagged residuals. There is some evidence of a small amount of
negative autocorrelation (the correlation coefficient for the residuals and lagged residuals is about
-.06) but this is not particularly concerning for two reasons. First, error correction models typi-
cally remove most autocorrelation because the dependent variable and the independent variables
are differenced, and second, negative autocorrelation increases the size of the standard errors and
biases the t-statistics downward. However, in the models shown in Table 6, nearly every variable is
statistically significant. Additionally, following other studies which use error correction models with
time-series cross-sectional data (e.g. Best (2010), Frye (2010)), panel-corrected standard errors are
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used to correct for any residual autocorrelation and panel heteroskedasticity (Beck & Katz 1995).56
Before turning to the error correction model results, it should be noted there is descriptive
evidence the House and Senate tend to work in the same policy area at the same time. Recall that
the dependent variable is the proportion of bills passed within a policy area out of all bills passed,
at time t. This proportion in the Senate in any given month correlates to the proportion passed
in the House at .42. Further, a count of the number of bills passed within a policy area in any
given month in the House correlates to the number passed in the Senate at .712. If the House and
Senate worked independently of each other, one might expect these correlations to be much lower
(or even negative). Additionally, the lagged value of policy activity is strongly correlated with future
action in a policy area for both chambers (about .38 in the House and about .26 in the Senate).
Congress tends to address the same types of issues over and over again; the chambers do not move
quickly from legislating in one area to the next area. This is an important insight because it suggests
that congressional action is regular and predictable; Congress should be characterized as engaging
in regular “maintenance” and is not an institution where policy agendas change rapidly or where
members aggressively move from policy area to policy area. I now turn to the empirical analysis to
help draw out some of the causes of legislative activity within each policy area.
56Fixed effects for policy area are not appropriate because of the construction of the dependent variable. Recall
that the dependent variable is a proportion of legislative activity in that policy area. By definition, the proportion
at time t adds to 1. Including policy fixed effects controls for any unexplained variance within each policy area, but
the inclusion of a variable for all policy areas except one nearly perfectly predicts the dependent variable. Time fixed
effects for year or Congress do not significantly change the results.
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Table 6: Model of ∆House and ∆Senate Bill Activity Within a Policy Area, 94th-109th Congresses
House Senate
∆House Long-Term ∆Senate Long-Term
Policy Activity Effect Policy Activity Effect
Chamber Activityt−1 -.858∗ -.878∗
(.018) (.019)
∆Passage in Other Chamber (x 100) .003 -.22∗
(.087) (.062)
Passage in Other Chambert−1 (x 100) .163 .19∗ -.047 -.054
(.122) (.087) (.09) (.059)
∆Success In Chamber (x 100) .376∗ .606∗
(.126) (.092)
Success In Chambert−1 (x 100) .552∗ .643∗ .819∗ .933∗
(.182) (.122) (.141) (.086)
∆Appropriations .028∗ .02∗
(.002) (.002)
Appropriationst−1 .035∗ .041∗ .02∗ .023∗
(.003) (.002) (.002) (.002)
∆Omnibus .008 .001
(.006) (.007)
Omnibust−1 .011 .013 .005 .006
(.009) (.008) (.011) (.009)
∆CQ Lines (Logged) (x 100) 1.24∗ .679∗
(.087) (.043)
CQ Lines (Logged)t−1 (x 100) .89∗ 1.04∗ .468∗ .533∗
(.087) (.091) (.061) (.06)
∆ Vetoed .018∗ .009
(.007) (.006)
Vetoedt−1 .018∗ .021∗ .018∗ .021∗
(.009) (.007) (.008) (.006)
∆Percent Most Important Problem .083 -.028
(.088) (.068)
Percent Most Important Problemt−24 -.022∗ -.025∗ -.022∗ -.025∗
(.006) (.011) (.005) (.009)
∆State of the Union Comments (Logged) (x 100) -.364 -2.83
(.284) (.241)
State of the Union Comments (Logged)t−24 (x 100) -.039 -.045 .034 -.039
(.066) (.056) (.056) (.063)
∆NY Times Articles .028 -.003
(.018) (.015)
NY Times Articlest−1 .054∗ .063∗ .025∗ .029∗
(.012) (.013) (.009) (.011)
∆ CQ Lines (Logged) x Success (x 100) -.128∗ -.064∗
(.04) (.025)
CQ Lines (Logged) x Success t−1 (x 100) -.21∗ -.239∗ -.082∗ -.094∗
(.057) (.038) (.034) (.021)
Constant .018∗ .013∗
(.002) (.001)
Adj. R2 .534 .539
N 7106 7106
*p<.05. OLS with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. Units are policy-area months from 1974-2005 and
19 policy areas per month.
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First, bill activity in both chambers has a long-term equilibrium, though perturbations are cor-
rected very quickly, as seen by the value of the lagged dependent variable. When the House model is
out of equilibrium, about 85.8% of the errors are corrected in the first time period. The remaining
14.2% are corrected in the next time period so a change in the proportion of bills passed within a
policy area caused by an increase in one of the independent variables has an effect that lasts slightly
more than 4 weeks (one time period in the analysis), all else equal. The effect is nearly identical in
the Senate, though equilibrium returns slightly faster.
The first and third columns of Table 6 show the pooled results for the House and Senate, while the
second and fourth columns show the long-run effect of each of the lagged variables. The dependent
variable in each model is the differenced proportion of bills in a policy area which ranges from 0
to 1 and is equal to the change in the number of bills from the previous month to the present
month. The coefficient on an independent variable can be interpreted as the proportion change
in differenced chamber activity for a one unit change in the independent variable and represents
the immediate effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable.57 The long-term or
total effect is the effect of a lagged independent variable on the differenced dependent variable and
can be found by dividing the coefficient on the lagged independent variable by the coefficient on
the lagged dependent variable. The second and fourth columns of the table give this value and,
because the lagged variable may not be significant in one time period but may be significant across
many time periods, the table also show the standard error of the long-term effect found using the
Bewley Transformation (Bewley 1979, De Boef & Keele 2008). Most of the independent variables
are counts of bills, while the dependent variable is a proportion. To clarify the interpretation of the
substantive effects, I generally discuss the results using standard deviations of each of the variables.
Each variables’ summary statistics, including its standard deviation, can be found in Table 10.
57Note some coefficients are multiplied by 100 because the coefficient or standard error is small due to scaling or a
small substantive effect. This is indicated in the Table.
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Passage of a bill in the same policy area in the Senate has a statistically significant lagged effect
on House action, but not an immediate effect. However, the effect in the House is fairly weak,
especially when compared to the effect of bill success (discussed shortly). In the House, a one
standard deviation in the number of bills passed by the Senate increases the proportion of House
activity in a policy area only by .09 of a standard deviation. This is a .19% increase in House activity
for every one additional bill passed by the Senate. The results in the Senate are very different. The
immediate effect of passage in the House on Senate activity is statistically significant, but negative,
while the lagged effect is not statistically significant. As with the House, the immediate negative,
significant effect is very small.
The Senate does not respond to the House’s legislative activity, but the House will pass slightly
more bills within a policy area after receiving a signal from the Senate. The results match our
general notions of how the House and Senate relate to each other in the modern Congress—the
House generally passes a greater amount of legislation more easily. It makes sense that if the Senate
is the more difficult institutional hurdle for a bill, the House should respond more directly to Senate
action than the Senate should to House action. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is partially, though weakly,
supported.
The theory also claims that both chambers should respond to legislative success within a policy
area by passing more bills in the future within that same policy area (Hypothesis 2). In the House
and Senate, both the immediate and lagged effect of successful bill resolution has a positive and
statistically significant effect on the proportion of policy activity.58 While the coefficient and standard
errors are small due to scaling, the substantive effects are theoretically interesting. The immediate
effect of legislative success on policy activity in both chambers is as follows. In the House, when the
average number of CQ Lines is equal to zero, a one standard deviation in the number of successful
58The variable is also included in an interaction model so the results are conditional on the value of the “CQ Lines”
variable.
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bills (equal to about 2.79 bills) results in a 1.01% increase in the dependent variable, equal to about
.117 of a standard deviation. In the Senate, conditional on the “CQ Lines” variable equaling zero,
the immediate effect of a standard deviation increase in the independent variable is an increase in
the proportion of Senate activity of about 2.08%, or .286 of a standard deviation. The lagged effect
in both chambers is even greater. In the House, the lagged effect of a one standard deviation in
the number of successful bills is equal to an increase in policy activity of about 1.79% or .21 of a
standard deviation, while in the Senate, the effect is about 2.6% or .441 of a standard deviation.
The results from the immediate and lagged variables support Hypothesis 2. Chambers respond
to legislative success by passing more bills in the same policy area. Additionally, the substantive
effect is non-trivial. Interestingly, the immediate and long term effect is stronger in the Senate than
in the House, meaning the Senate will respond to successfully passed and negotiated legislation more
than the House does. It is possible the Senate is more sensitive to successfully resolved bills for the
same reason it does not respond to House action. It is more difficult to pass legislation in the Senate
so the chamber passes relatively fewer bills. This increases the Senate’s incentives to ensure that
passage of a bill will be beneficial to the members of the majority coalition—they may be unwilling
to pay the costs associated with passage without ensuring the bill will eventually be sent to the
president. In sum, the Senate ignores House action but uses a successful bill as a strong signal that
it should pass additional bills within that policy area.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 provide competing explanations of the relationship between important or
significant legislation and chamber learning. Chambers may either use the information they’ve
learned to pass additional significant legislation, or the chambers may achieve their legislative goals
within a policy area and pass fewer bills. Table 6 also includes both a differenced and lagged
interaction term where the number of successful bills is multiplied by the average number of CQ lines
within a policy area at time t. For both the House and Senate, the coefficients on the differenced
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and lagged terms are negative. To determine the substantive effect of the lagged interaction terms
on the proportion of legislative activity, I constructed marginal effects plots shown in Figure 7.
In the House, the increasing importance of legislation reduces the effect of bill success on legislative
activity within a policy area. However, bill success does not have a negative effect until the average
number of lines written in a policy area is about three standard deviations above the mean. This
translates to an average importance of more than 407 lines. Only 12.35% of the policy-area months
have an average importance this high.
The marginal effect is also negative in the Senate, but it is never statistically different from zero
(at the p<.05 confidence level). Just like the House, the increasing importance of legislation reduces
the effect of bill success on legislative activity within a policy area, but the effect never becomes
negative at a statistically significant level. That is, conditional on bill importance, the number of
bill successes never actually reduces the amount of legislating within a policy area. Only the size of
the positive effect is reduced.
The relationship between bargaining success and future policymaking is conditional. In the House,
the passage of important bills mitigates the positive effect between bill success and the amount of
activity within a policy area. Importantly, though the effect is mitigated, it is still positive until
the average importance of legislation is much greater than the mean. Even up to three standard
deviations above the mean, the marginal effect is zero, meaning that the importance of legislation
has no effect on the relationship between bill success and policy activity.
The chambers work together within policy areas that they believe they will have success in,
but when very important legislation is passed, demand for large-scale policy changes within a given
policy area is met and the chambers pass fewer bills only in cases when the most important types of
bills have been passed, and then, only in the House. Both Hypotheses 3 and 4 are partially correct.
In most cases, important and successful legislation increases policy activity. In the few cases where
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Figure 7: The Marginal Effect of Bill Importance on the Change in Legislative Activity within Policy
Areas for the House and Senate
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it does not, the legislation is extremely important, more than three standard deviations above the
average bill importance, measured as the average number of lines written in Congressional Quarterly
about legislation in a policy area.
A number of other variables also affect the relative amount of bills the House and Senate pass
during a congressional term. The proportion of appropriations bills is included in the model because
appropriations are one form of mandatory legislation–bills which must be passed by Congress or a
highly unfavorable status quo results (i.e. funding for federal programs ceases). In both chambers,
an increase in the number of appropriations bills increases total legislative activity in that area, in
both the present and future periods. A one standard deviation increase in the number of appropri-
ations bills results in an immediate increase of about .25 of a standard deviation in both the House
and Senate. Consistent with other results, the lagged effect is greater. In the House, the lagged
effect is about .375 of a standard deviation for a one standard deviation increase in the number of
appropriations bills passed, and the effect is about .29 of a standard deviation in the Senate.
Interestingly, the number of presidential vetoes in a policy area increases the number of bills
passed in that area, though the effect is very small. This is contrary to theoretical expectations
and perhaps reflects the chambers’ attempts to pass additional compromise bills after a veto. The
immediate effect in the House is only .038 of a standard deviation, while in the Senate the immediate
effect is not statistically significant. The lagged effects are only slightly greater, about .044 of a
standard deviation in the House, and .054 of a standard deviation in the Senate. While the number
of vetoes does have a statistically significant, positive effect on the number of bills passed, the effect
is very small, less than one-tenth of a standard deviation in both chambers.
As the percent of Americans naming an issue in the policy area the most important problem,
the lagged effect reduces the amount of legislative activity. Keep in mind, the poll is measured at
yearly intervals rather than monthly, so the variable measures what Americans said was the most
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important issue in the previous year. It seems reasonable to suggest that policymaking is reduced
in the current year because Americans felt it was an important problem last year and Congress
addressed the issue the previous year. There is no statistically significant immediate effect of the
“Most Important Problem” variable in the current year.
While the American attitude variable does not have the expected effect, the lagged effect of the
New York Times article variable is positive and statistically significant (though there is no immediate
effect). As proportionally more articles are written in the New York Times, the more bills are passed
by Congress in that policy area. This is more true in the House, just as one would expect, but the
substantive effects are small in both. A one standard deviation increase in the number of New York
Times articles increases the proportion of bills passed in that policy area in the House increases by
about .058 of a standard deviation. The results are less impressive in the Senate—a one standard
deviation increase in that chamber leads to only a .032 standard deviation increase in the Senate.
The number of omnibus bills and presidential comments made in the State of the Union do not
have a significant immediate or lagged effect. Like the “Most Important Problem” variable, the
presidential comments variable is measured only yearly. This may be limiting its statistical power.
It is possible the results are driven largely by the periods when the congressional chamber is
controlled by the same party. Perhaps, when the chambers are controlled by different parties,
ideological differences create a roadblock to learning. The theory actually suggests that learning
should occur regardless of the ideological makeup of the chambers, but in order to disentangle the
effect divided party chamber control has on the hypothesized relationships, I split the sample and use
the same models as above. If the results do not hold when the chambers are controlled by different
parties, then institutional incentives and rational updating by members in each chamber may not be
enough to overcome ideological divisions between the chambers which encourage legislative gridlock.
Unfortunately for modeling purposes, there are relatively few instances of divided chambers in
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recent Congresses. It occurs only for 90 total months, from the 97th through 99th Congresses, when
Republicans controlled the Senate and Democrats controlled the House of Representatives, and from
June 6, 2001 through the end of the 107th Congress when Jim Jeffords began caucusing with the
Democrats. After Jeffords’ switch, the party balance in the Senate shifted from Republican controlled
(each party had 50 senators, but the sitting Republican Vice-President, Dick Cheney, broke ties) to
a 51 seat majority for the Democrats, while Republicans still controlled the House. The balance of
the observations are unified chamber control and the results for each are shown in Tables 7 and 8.
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Table 7: Divided Chambers: ∆House and ∆Senate Bill Activity Within a Policy Area
House Senate
∆House Long-Term ∆Senate Long-Term
Policy Activity Effect Policy Activity Effect
Chamber Activityt−1 -.863∗ -.904∗
(.037) (.045)
∆Passage in Other Chamber (x 100) -.079 -.256
(.243) (.153)
Passage in Other Chambert−1 (x 100) .318 .368 -.015 -.017
(.347) (.251) (.220) (.129)
∆Success In Chamber (x 100) .492 .758∗
(.303) (.257)
Success In Chambert−1 (x 100) .539 .625∗ .710 .786∗
(.441) (.314) (.385) (.210)
∆Appropriations .033∗ .023∗
(.005) (.005)
Appropriationst−1 .039∗ .045∗ .025∗ .028∗
(.007) (.005) (.007) (.004)
∆Omnibus -.010 -.001
(.01) (.011)
Omnibust−1 -.008 -.010 -.010 -.012
(.014) (.013) (.017) (.014)
∆CQ Lines (Logged) (x 100) 1.33∗ .760∗
(.137) (.106)
CQ Lines (Logged)t−1 (x 100) 1.04∗ 1.20∗ .589∗ .650∗
(.197) (.207) (.153) (.135)
∆ Vetoed (x 100) 1.35 .023
(1.41) (1.29)
Vetoedt−1 (x 100) 1.97 2.28 1.03 1.34
(1.99) (1.61) (1.79) (1.43)
∆Percent Most Important Problem -.225 -.043
(.244) (.223)
Percent Most Important Problemt−12 -.029∗ -.034 -.022∗ -.025
(.009) (.018) (.008) (.015)
∆State of the Union Comments (Logged) (x 100) -.276 -.318
(.489) (.432)
State of the Union Comments (Logged)t−12 (x 100) -.029 .033 .070 .078
(.143) (.153) (.129) (.130)
∆NY Times Articles .051 .005
(.034) (.031)
NY Times Articlest−1 .029 .033 .032 .035
(.021) (.027) (.018) (.023)
∆ CQ Lines (Logged) x Success (x 100) .051 -.071
(.092) (.075)
CQ Lines (Logged) x Success t−1 (x 100) -.121 -.140 -.016 -.018
(.126) (.099) (.104) (.056)
Constant .018∗ .011∗
(.004) (.003)
Adj. R2 .562 .573
N 1596 1596
*p<.05. OLS with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. Units are policy-area months from 1974-2005 and
19 policy areas per month.
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As before, the models are estimated with panel-corrected standard errors, and the long-term
effect is found using the Bewley Transformation. There are a few things to note about each model.
The divided chambers model (Table 7) is estimated with less precision which is to be expected given
the reduced sample size. However, the substantive effects between the divided and unified chambers
models are remarkably similar.
As with the original models, passage in the other chamber does not have a substantively strong
effect, nor is it significant in any of the models except for the immediate effect in the Senate, where
the coefficient is negative, the opposite sign expected. Though this result is consistent with the
results in the pooled model, like the first results, the negative effect is substantively very small
(about .018 of a standard deviation increase for a one standard deviation increase in the number of
bills passed by the House.)
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Table 8: Unified Chambers: ∆House and ∆Senate Bill Activity Within a Policy Area
House Senate
∆House Long-Term ∆Senate Long-Term
Policy Activity Effect Policy Activity Effect
Chamber Activityt−1 -.859∗ -.870∗
(.022) (.021)
∆Passage in Other Chamber (x 100) .033 -.195∗
(.094) (.067)
Passage in Other Chambert−1 (x 100) .164 .191∗ -.050 -.058
(.132) (.094) (.097) (.066)
∆Success In Chamber (x 100) .345∗ .561∗
(.140) (.098)
Success In Chambert−1 (x 100) .500∗ .582∗ .826∗ .949∗
(.204) (.134) (.150) (.095)
∆Appropriations .027∗ .019∗
(.003) (.002)
Appropriationst−1 .034∗ .040∗ .019∗ .022∗
(.004) (.003) (.002) (.002)
∆Omnibus (x 100) 1.38 -.036
(.797) (1.04)
Omnibust−1 .018 .020 .007 .008
(.011) (.011) (.014) (.011)
∆CQ Lines (Logged) (x 100) 1.20∗ .663∗
(.066) (.047)
CQ Lines (Logged)t−1 (x 100) .835∗ .973∗ .441∗ .506∗
(.097) (.101) (.066) (.067)
∆ Vetoed .017∗ .011
(.007) (.006)
Vetoedt−1 .016 .018∗ .018∗ .021∗
(.01) (.008) (.009) (.007)
∆Percent Most Important Problem .136 -.027
(.089) (.074)
Percent Most Important Problemt−24 -.016∗ -.019∗ -.021∗ -.024∗
(.008) (.013) (.006) (.011)
∆State of the Union Comments (Logged) (x 100) -.783∗ -.259
(.004) (.296)
State of the Union Comments (Logged)t−12 (x 100) -.049 -.057 .018 .021
(.076) (.089) (.063) (.074)
∆NY Times Articles .022 -.004
(.021) (.017)
NY Times Articlest−1 .062∗ .072∗ .024∗ .028∗
(.015) (.015) (.01) (.012)
∆ CQ Lines (Logged) x Success (x 100) -.144∗ -.063∗
(.045) (.026)
CQ Lines (Logged) x Success t−1 (x 100) -.195∗ -.227∗ -.090∗ -.103∗
(.064) (.042) (.036) (.023)
Constant .018∗ .013∗
(.002) (.001)
Adj. R2 .531 .531
N 5510 5510
*p<.05. OLS with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. Units are policy-area months from 1974-2005 and
19 policy areas per month.
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As was true with the pooled models, legislative success is an important predictor in both the
divided and unified chambers models. In the unified chambers model, the immediate and lagged
effects are positive, and statistically significant in both the House and Senate. When the chambers
are controlled by different parties, the lagged effect is statistically significant using the Bewley
transformation for both the House and Senate. It should be noted however, that the lagged effect is
nearly significant in the Senate model (significant at the .1 level). Further, though the results are less
robust in the divided governments model, it is not because the coefficients are smaller, but because
the standard errors are larger. In fact, none of the coefficients on the lagged or differenced variables
from the divided and unified chambers are statistically different from each other. The results clearly
demonstrate the relationship between legislative success and increased activity in a policy area is
not limited to periods of unified party control of the chambers. Even when different parties control
the House and Senate, legislative success promotes learning, and the effect is virtually identical to
that when the same party has a majority in both chambers.
Discussion
There is strong empirical evidence that policy action in the House and Senate varies around a
long-term equilibrium. While the content of legislative action may be driven by exogenous events,
demand from the public, or some other source (Baumgartner & Jones 1993, Kingdon 1984), and
some policy areas may have higher baseline levels of activity than others, the House and Senate
perform regular “maintenance” across all policy areas throughout a congressional term. The results
support the notion that legislators have “governing responsibilities” (Adler & Wilkerson 2007) and
attend to those responsibilities throughout a Congress. Importantly, much of what Congress does is
regular and predictable.
Neither chamber is more sensitive to the legislative dynamics between the chambers and public
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demand. The House passes bills based on passage in the Senate, and while the Senate does not
respond to House passage, the effect of bargaining success is greater in the Senate than in the House.
The institutional rules in the House and Senate accounts for both results. In the modern Congress,
we tend to think of the Senate as the policy gatekeeper. The House passes more bills during a
Congress, and the Senate is usually the chamber which constrains policy change for the reasons that
Krehbiel (1998) cites. Because the Senate can pick and choose from among the bills it wants to
address after the House has passed the bill (about 68% of legislation in the dataset was passed by
the House first), the Senate appears very responsive to success, but unresponsive to bill passage.
The House, on the other hand, passes more bills, but a greater number are unsuccessful. This makes
it sensitive to passage in the Senate and more likely to respond to bill passage in the other chamber.
When the House and Senate pass a bill, the process extracts costs from the members and the
majority coalitions. Unfortunately, both chambers are uncertain about the preferences of the other
and do not know which bills will eventually provide a payoff to the chambers through the enactment
of new policy. But, the chambers can use information gleaned from the actions in the other chamber
to decide which policy areas to address. When the Senate passes a bill within a policy area, the
House interprets that as a signal that the Senate believes resolution between the chambers can be
achieved. When a bill is successfully passed, resolved, and sent to the president, both the House and
Senate increase their legislative output in that policy area.
There is weak evidence that the passage of important legislation mitigates the effect of successful
bills on increasing policy output. A negative effect was only found in the House, and even there,
it occurs only for the most important and salient legislation. For most bills classified as important,
the effect of success on policy output is positive. This means that Congress does not necessarily shy
away from a policy area even after engaging in a substantial amount of important legislation in that
area.
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Could another factor, like public demand be driving the results? The models control for public
demand through the most important problem survey question, the importance or saliency of legisla-
tion, the New York Times articles variable, and the lagged amount of policy activity (which would be
expected to reduce public demand as it increases), but admittedly, none of these are perfect measures
of the month-to-month demands of the voting public. However, the research design provides some
defense against this critique. The most important hypothesized relationships are between bicameral
success and policy activity, previous passage in the chamber and policy activity, and policy activity
in the other chamber and policy activity within a chamber. If the results were entirely driven by
public demand, we might expect a lot of legislative activity in one area, driven by public demand,
to cause more failures than successes—if the chambers respond to public demand by legislating in a
policy area, it seems likely a large amount of legislation will fail because of the salience of the bills
and the controversy surrounding visible legislation. There is no evidence to suggest this is the case.
The theory of the paper focuses on how the House and Senate mitigate ideological or policy
differences. It suggests that the chambers, and the members within them, respond to the dynamics of
interchamber activity. Divided chambers or policy differences between the chambers may constrain
legislative action on certain issues. The House and Senate may realize that their preferences on
policies in issues like energy, or taxes preclude agreement on most bills which deal with these issues.
However, this does not mean that ideological differences always constrain congressional action on
every issue. Instead, the evidence suggests the House and Senate use areas of cooperation as the
basis for future cooperation. Not only do they respond to the policies the other chamber engages in,
but the chambers learn from their mistakes and successes.
This does not mean that they will always be able to pass important legislation in issue areas
on which they agree. Sometimes post-passage bargaining fails, sometimes intra-chamber dynamics
allow the passage of one bill but not another, and sometimes drastic and sudden exogenous events
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may force policy action in other areas. However, the strategy of using past legislative successes
and failures to inform future legislative activity is exactly what we should expect from informed,
rational legislators. Members of Congress have incentives to achieve legislative success and incentives
to use a strategy where they can update their preferences. This implies the effects of ideological
divergence between the chambers on legislative productivity are conditional and can be mitigated
by interchamber interactions.
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Chapter 5: Conferences and Policy Outcomes: When Does
Discretion Exist and How is it Used?
Abstract
Perhaps the most important effect of the post-passage bargaining process is the change in policy
outcomes it often produces. When chambers negotiate over legislation and attempt to protect their
version of the legislation, compromise is necessary and one or both chambers may agree to policy
not originally passed by a chamber. This paper develops a theory which explains how conferencing
affects legislative changes as a result of the conferees from the two chambers coming to agreement.
Chambers can reject a conference bill, but the delegation to a minority of members still provides
an enormous amount of discretion to the conference committee. The theory explains the conditions
under which conferees have the greatest amount of discretion. There is important variation in the
amount of discretion, but it is greatest when the chambers do not receive benefits from the status
quo, and when the costs of rejection is high, due to political ramifications or time constraints. The
empirical results also provide evidence that the conferees tend to moderate policy in both chambers,
attracting more support from members of the minority in both the House and Senate.
Introduction
The post-passage bargaining process in Congress, which occurs after each chamber approves
similar bills with different language or provisions, has profound implications for policy output. The
successful resolution of differences requires the House and Senate to combine their separate versions
of the legislation into one bill. If the chambers are able to reach a compromise, the result can be
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policy which resembles the bills passed in one chamber or the other, or the legislation can contain
entirely new policy provisions which were not passed by either chamber.
The bargaining process includes three institutional tools available to the chambers including a
conference committee, amendment trading, or simple agreement to the other chamber’s amendments
to the legislation. The conference committee is probably the most well-known institutional tool and
has received a commensurate amount of attention in the literature. Another resolution mechanism,
amendment trading, is becoming more common and has replaced the conference as the main way the
chambers resolve their differences, even on important legislation. Regardless of the mechanism used,
any changes made to legislation at this stage must be re-passed by both chambers in order for it be
sent to the president. However, the ways in which policy outcomes change at this final, important
stage of the legislative process are not well understood.
This chapter focuses on the policy implications of post-passage bargaining. Conferees are empow-
ered to change policy, but they must do so with an eye toward their respective chambers. Conference
reports can, and do, occasionally get rejected by one chamber. Most literature focuses on the tension
which exists between the possible changes the conferees can make to promote certain policy goals
(their own or that of some other actor, like the party or Speaker), and the preferences of the major-
ity or median of the chamber. While this tension is apparent in the theory developed here, I focus
more on the strategic interaction between congressional actors at the post-passage bargaining stage.
This interaction produces certain types of policy outcomes under certain conditions—I explain how
conferencing produces can produce policy outcomes which resemble the conferees’ preferences more
than the chambers, conditional on the political situation within each chamber.
The following section broadly explains how policy changes can occur during the post-passage
bargaining process when conferences are used. The current literature emphasizes ex ante control
of the conference committee, but tends to overlook the institutional rules which exist to constrain
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conferees. The following section develops a theory of policy outcomes based on the ability of conferees
to change policy under certain conditions. I show that these conditions depend on how much each
chamber values the status quo, and whether or not either chamber can afford to reject the conference
report. The subsequent sections use empirical models to test the predictions using vote totals on
legislation and conference reports. Another set of models explores how the conferees change policy.
Conference reports receive more support from both the majority and minority in the House and
Senate, supporting the inference that conference committees tend to moderate policy. A conclusion
and discussion follow.
Post-Passage Bargaining Venues and the Potential for Policy Change
The House-Senate differences which cause post-passage bargaining reflect the preferences of mem-
bers and the necessities of coalition-building within each chamber. On most non-trivial legislation,
committee mark-ups, floor debates, amendments, and chamber rules combine to create different
forms of legislation, even when the chambers broadly agree on how to change policy (i.e. the cham-
bers prefer change in a more liberal or conservative direction). The Constitution requires that if the
language in both bills is not identical when passed, the chambers must resolve all their differences if
the bill is to become law.59
In any case where the respective bills passed by the House and Senate are not identical, the
chambers will need to approve a new bill which is different from at least one of the previous bills. In
many cases, the new legislation sent back to the chambers for final passage differs from what both
chambers passed, and represents compromise legislation which matches neither of the chambers’
original bills. Sometimes the new legislation reflects more of one chamber’s policy preferences than
the other’s, and sometimes the bill appears to be an attempt to “split the difference” between
each chamber’s policy preferences. For these reasons, the post-passage bargaining process has an
59Of course, the bill must also be signed by the president.
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important influence on policy outcomes, defined here as the specific set of legislative provisions
included within a particular bill sent to the president.
How can we understand the differences in policy made by the chambers from the first bill passed
by each house to the final legislative compromise bill passed by both, and how well is each chamber’s
majority able to control the process which leads to the compromise bill? Chambers are majoritarian
institutions and the actors within them care about policy outcomes. Legislative outcomes produced
by Congress have direct effects on members’ ability to represent their constituents and on mem-
bers’ reelection prospects (Mayhew 1974). When a compromise bill more closely reflects the House
majority’s policy preferences, members of the House can credit claim and receive the benefits from
enacting legislation closer to their preferences. For these reasons, the chambers can be thought of as
engaging in a competition over potential policy, and the majority coalition in each chamber attempts
to protect their own policy preferences from the other chamber (Diermeier & Myerson 1999).
The competition for policy happens in the bargaining venues the chambers use to construct
compromises. While post-passage bargaining involves more than conferencing, the literature on how
conferences influence policy outcomes is the most prominent. Unlike most areas of interchamber
bargaining, the influence of conference committees on policy outcomes has received a relatively high
amount of attention. Conferencing is also a unique institution in Congress because it is highly anti-
majoritarian. A conference committee is made up of a small group of members usually chosen from
a standing committee who have specific preferences.
The power of conferees to change policy and then submit those changes as a take-it-or-leave-
it offer back to the chambers suggests that standing committees can use the conference as an ex
post veto over legislative changes made on the floor (Shepsle & Weingast 1987). Members of the
conference committee are nearly always members of the standing committee to which the bill is
referred (Oleszek 2007, Sinclair 1983, Smith 1988), thus any attempts to move policy closer to the
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chamber median can be defended by the standing committee using the conference reconciliation
process.
The ex post veto power of conference committees suggests chambers have relatively little say
over the policy provisions included in the final bill. The chambers’ most obvious response to the
standing committee is to reject the conference report if the chamber views it as too unfavorable
to its own preferred policy (Krehbiel, Shepsle & Weingast 1987). Chambers can also recommit a
conference report back to the conferees. This is usually not an outright rejection, but rather, is a
way for the chambers to send the report back to for changes without having to scrap all the policy
changes already agreed upon. Often the motion to recommit includes instructions passed by the
chamber that direct the conferees to pass or reject certain policies or parts of certain provisions,
though these instructions are not binding. Finally, Krehbiel points out the chambers can bypass
conference committees altogether by using the amendment trading process, increasingly common in
the modern Congress, even for important legislation (Ryan 2011).
While all of the options listed above are possible, with the exception of amendment trading,
they are not used very often. Chambers rarely reject conference reports outright, nor are motions
to recommit common. The take-it-or-leave-it nature of the conference makes it very difficult for a
chamber to reject the bill entirely, given how much time, effort, and political costs have been invested
in the legislation. If the chambers have little power to change conference reports, and no choice but
to use a conference, then standing committee members have significant discretion to change policy
outcomes. This could allow committee members to use them to maintain control over policy and, if
necessary, move policy away from the chamber’s preferences toward that of the standing committee’s
preferences. If, on the other hand, the conference alternatives suggested by Krehbiel are viable, then
standing committees have much less discretion because chambers may simply avoid the conference
or more easily reject legislation proposed by the conference.
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More recent research has focused on ex ante control of the conference, especially through the
selection of the conferees. While there are probably other ways to control conferees, (e.g. motions to
instruct) most seem to be of limited effectiveness.60 In both chambers, conferee selection is largely
deferred to party leaders, though the rules of each chamber require that members appointed to the
conference committee favor the bill (Oleszek 2007). As mentioned above, conference committees are
usually made up of members from the appropriate standing committees, but the Speaker or Major-
ity Leader will occasionally include members not from the standing committees or add additional
members.
Members who are appointed by the leadership but are not from the standing committees with
jurisdiction over the legislation have different characteristics than other conferees (McQuillan &
Ortega 1992, Lazarus & Monroe 2007). McQuillan & Ortega (1992) find that these types of conferees
have preferences closer to the party than the standing committee chair, who is typically considered to
be in charge of the conference process for the chamber and has an important say in the appointment
of conference committee members. Likewise, Lazarus & Monroe (2007, 594) show that the Speaker
strategically appoints members who better reflect the interests of the party, which, “...allows the
Speaker to assert the will of the majority party over conference delegations while doing as little as
possible to step on the toes of the jurisdictional committees’ members.” This evidence suggests the
majority parties, through their leadership, exercise ex ante control over the conference committee
by controlling the appointment process which shapes committee preferences. In short, non-standing
committee members are chosen for conference service to ensure that conference legislative outcomes
closely match the party’s preferred outcomes.
60For example, the motion to instruct, occasionally passed in the House, gives directions to conferees about the
sentiment of the chamber body on a particular policy provision. However, as mentioned above, these motions are
non-binding and are generally considered ineffective.
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Policy Change Resulting From Conferencing
Given each chambers’ desire to protect its own policy, and the differences between conferencing
and amendment trading, the following section characterizes the conditions under which 1) conferees
have agency to change policy and 2) conferees use their agency to make a specific type of policy
change. By examining these two outcomes in detail, we can understand how policy outcomes are
changed by the last stage of the resolution process.
In the first part of this section, I characterize the discretion available to conferees under different
conditions, and how the amount of discretion influences the conference outcome. I then explore how
the theoretical implications can be tested empirically. The section develops hypotheses related to
differences in vote totals, which are used as a proxy for policy change, between the first vote on the
bill in the chamber, which I refer to as initial passage, and the last vote on the conference report or
on amendments to the bill, which I refer to as the final passage vote.
As discussed above, much of the recent literature has focused on ways the majority party or its
leadership can bring the conference committee’s preferences in line with the majority party so that
the committee has no interest in changing policy. While the strategic appointment of conferees is
one tool used by the chamber majority to modify the preferences of the conference, I focus here on
the formal, institutional constraints which limit conferee discretion, and the conditions under which
these constraints are most effective.
When conferencing is used as the resolution mechanism, each chamber will reject an offer made
by the conferees if the bill distributes benefits less than the status quo minus the costs of rejection.
The rejection of the conference report is costly because of the political ramifications incurred from
the failure of the bill, and the transaction costs associated with the attempt to pass the bill on the
floor. Making rejection costly means it is inefficient ex post, and ensures the chambers have a credible
choice to both accept and rejection legislation.
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The conference committee is free to make an offer that changes each chamber’s existing policy,
but the amount of discretion it has varies with the willingness of the chambers to reject a conference
report. A chamber’s willingness to reject is a function of the utility it receives from the status quo
and its costs of rejection. If the benefits a chamber receives from the conference report are less than
the sum of these two values, the chamber will reject the conference report and the legislation will
fail.
This is an important insight—the conferees must be conscious not just of the position of the
status quo relative to the chamber’s ideal point when constructing a conference report, but also of
each chamber’s relative costs of rejecting the legislation. The less costly rejection becomes, the less
freedom the conferees have because a chamber becomes more willing to reject the conference report.
It should be noted that high costs of rejection or highly valuing the status quo can be true for
one or both chambers at the same time, but the relevant binding constraint is for the chamber most
willing to reject the conference bill; both chambers accept a conference report independently and
each has a veto over the bill. Recall that because the total benefits from the compromise are divided
up between the chambers, as one chamber receives more benefits, the other receives less (though by
definition, neither chamber is strictly worse off if it accepts the conference report). The conferees
are constrained because when one chamber receives a very high value for the status quo and/or has
very low costs of rejection, it will demand a larger share of the benefits, which reduces the share of
the benefits the other chamber may receive. If the other chamber is willing to accept this type of
agreement, then by definition it must not highly value the status quo, nor will it have high costs
of rejection. However, when both are true, a chamber is less likely to accept the conference report.
In these situations, where at least one chamber demands a large share of the benefits, the conferees
have less discretion. Aggressive attempts to change policy from the preferences of the constrained
chamber will lead to rejection by at least one chamber.
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Conversely, when both chambers receive little benefit from the status quo and/or have very low
costs of rejection, each will be relatively unwilling to reject the conference report and will accept a
relatively smaller share of the surplus. In these situations, each chamber is relatively unwilling to
reject the conference report, so the conferees will have discretion to change policy. If the conferees
wish to aggressively move policy toward one chamber’s preferences or the other’s, they have relatively
more policy “room” to work with. Assuming the conference report meets both chambers’ basic
requirements, in that its share of the surplus is still greater than each chamber’s value of the status
quo minus its costs of rejection, both chambers will accept the offer. The conferees’ discretion, then,
is to develop a policy which divides the surplus between the chambers and still gives each chamber a
sufficient share. This is easier when each chamber is willing to accept a smaller share of the surplus.
As Table 9 shows, for the conferees to have a relatively high amount of discretion, both chambers
must have small payoffs if they reject the conference report. It should be noted that discretion varies
continuously as a chamber’s value for the status quo and costs of rejection vary, but for ease of
interpretation, the table dichotomizes potential levels of discretion.
Table 9: Conferee Discretion Under When Conference Payoff for Rejection Varies
Chamber 2
Status Quo minus Costs
High Low
Chamber 1 Status Quo minus High Low Discretion Low Discretion
Costs Low Low Discretion High Discretion
A number of observable implications are suggested by the theory. First, I identify situations
where a majority within a chamber does not value the status quo highly, meaning it has policy
preferences which are very different from the current policy. Previous research has shown that a
chamber receives little utility when it has been out of power for a number of years. As Binder (1999,
521) says, “The longer a new majority was not in control of Congress, the more dissatisfied it is likely
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to be with the status quo, and the greater is its incentive to make changes.” Hypothesis 1 states the
relationship between conferee discretion and each chambers’ value for the status quo.
H1: The longer the majority has been out of power, the more discretion the conferees have, ceteris
paribus.
It is also the case that when there is a large majority in a chamber, the pivotal voter moves
away from the center and toward the ideological edges. This means the pivotal member is more
likely to receive less utility from the status quo and therefore less likely to reject an offer made
by the conferees, even if the conferees move policy away from the median member of the coalition
(toward the status quo). Again, in these cases, the conferees have a large amount of policy space to
work with—it is unlikely they will change policy in such a way that leads to rejection by one of the
chambers.
H2: As the size of the majority increases in each chamber, the more discretion the conferees have,
ceteris paribus.
The theory also suggests that conferees have more discretion when the chambers have high costs
of rejection. Political costs are one possible reason chambers may be reluctant to reject a conference
committee report. There are a number of possible ways to measure the costs of rejection for a chamber
using changes in the political conditions or variation in the types of bills addressed by Congress. For
example, political costs may be highest when rejection is most visible and voters are most aware
of the actions of Congress. This condition is likely to be met as an election approaches because
the public becomes increasingly engaged during the campaign cycle (Arceneaux 2005, Gelman &
King 1993).
H3: The sooner a congressional election, the more discretion the conferees have, ceteris paribus.
The costs of rejection may also be greater if the legislation has received a lot of attention in the
press or deals with a particularly salient issue. In these types of cases, the conferees should have
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more discretion because the chamber will be unwilling to reject a well-known piece of legislation.
One would expect the costs of rejection to increase as the salience of a bill increases.
H4: As the salience of a bill increases, the more discretion the conferees have, ceteris paribus.
Appropriations bills are a good measure of costs for a number of reasons. First appropriations
bills are non-discretionary legislation which usually need to be passed in order to fund government
activities. Second, legislators do not want to defund particular programs or favored activities because
the consequences to their district constituents are often obvious. Conferees are expected to have more
discretion on appropriations bills because legislators will be reluctant to reject them.
H5: Appropriations bills will allow the conferees more discretion than other types of bills, ceteris
paribus
Finally, I test whether control of the chambers by two different parties raises the costs of rejection
for either chamber. There are a number of reasons to suspect this may be the case. First, it is more
difficult to reach agreement when the chambers are divided on partisan lines, and rejection may be
a very bad option for chambers which have worked hard to come to an agreement. This will increase
the discretion of the conferees.
It is also the case that because each chamber has a veto over a conference report, the chamber
which is more likely to reject the offer exercises the binding constraint on the conference report.
This implies that when the chambers are controlled by two different parties, the conferees have less
discretion because one chamber is much more likely to receive a relatively larger amount of benefits
from the status quo and have much lower costs of rejection. To test both of these possible theories,
a variable measuring divided government is interacted with both measures of costs.
Taken together, the hypotheses imply that paradoxically, the conferees have more discretion and
can enact greater policy change if each chamber is very opposed to the status quo and if each chamber
has high costs of rejecting the proposed compromise legislation. The more difficult it is to reject the
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conference report, the more the conferees can use their power to change the policy from what the
chambers originally wanted. When an election is closer or when a bill is more salient, the conferees
will have greater discretion. Similarly, when the majority has been out of power for a long time, and
when the majority is very large, the conferees will be able to change policy more dramatically than
when the converse is true.
Control variables included in the models are whether or not the legislation was referred to more
than one committee in the House or Senate, and the chamber of origin for a bill. Multiple referrals
are a sign that the conference committee will have a lot of members, especially from the House,
and that the Speaker will appoint members with preferences in line with the party leadership. This
may reduce the amount of discretion the conferees have not because of the threat of rejection by a
chamber, but instead because the conference is composed of members who agree with the party’s
position. This variable is expected to have a negative effect on conferee discretion.
Finally, a variable is included for the chamber which initially passed the bill. The House tends
to initiate most legislation and because the Senate acts second, it works from the basis provided by
the House (Taylor 2008). This may give the House an advantage in conferences because it is able to
set the bargaining range. This may result in the House being a stronger bargainer and not having
as large a vote change between initial and final passage.
Measurement of the Dependent Variable
The dependent variable, policy change, cannot be measured directly because we are not able
to measure how liberal or conservative a particular bill is, and thus cannot measure how much a
bill changed from its initial passage in the chamber to its final passage in both chambers after the
resolution process. Instead, an indirect measure of policy change must be used. Here, I argue that
policy change can be measured in two ways. By examining the amount and type of support each
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bill receives at initial passage and at final passage, we can understand how support among members
changed as a reflection of the policy changes which occurred during the conference.
Assume that a bill satisfies a certain group of legislators when they vote for it because they
receive benefits greater than their payoff from not voting for the bill. Said differently, legislators
vote for a bill because it includes policy provisions they approve of. If a bill is changed by the
conferees, some members who supported the bill may now reject the legislation, while others who
opposed the bill now support it. Vote reversals occur because the legislation changed during the
conference. For example, if a bill was made more conservative, it may lead some Democrats who
previously supported the bill to oppose it and some Republicans to now approve. It may also be the
case that members change their minds because a particular provision which was very important to
them was removed or changed by the conferees. The amount of policy change made by the conferees,
the dependent variable, is a measure which finds the number of votes which changed from initial
passage to final passage.
Two refinements are made to this basic measure. First, because conferee discretion does not
imply direction (i.e. more conservative or liberal), the absolute amount of change is used, rather
than a directional measure of liberal or conservative. Additionally, rather than measuring a vote
change by each member, the change in party votes is used. For example, if on initial passage 100
Democrats and 50 Republicans votes in favor of the legislation, and on final passage 50 Democrats
and 100 Republicans voted in favor, the dependent variable would equal 100 for that variable (the
absolute value of 100-50 plus 50-100). This measure captures the dynamics of policy change better
than a count of the total amount of change would. To understand why a count would not work,
assume a bill receives 200 Democratic votes in favor on initial passage and 0 Republican votes, then
on final passage receives 200 Republican votes and 0 Democratic votes. The total change in votes is
zero, but it would be incorrect to say that no policy change was made by the conference committee.
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The vote totals data are drawn from passage votes in both the House and Senate. between 1991
to 2009 (102nd through 110th Congresses). Party vote totals on final passage votes, amendment
trading votes, and conference reports was collected by the author. Other data are taken from the
Policy Agendas Project and the Congressional Bills Project. The relevant difference measured in
vote totals is between the vote on initial passage of the bill in each chamber and the subsequent
passage of the conference report in the same chamber. Identical empirical models are estimated
separately for both the House and Senate.
Interestingly, there is substantial variation in the amount of vote change. Because of the strength
of parties in the modern Congress, observers tend to believe that party influence overwhelms any
other basis on which legislators vote and that every vote is almost entirely along party lines. Ac-
cording to this claim, there should be almost no change from initial to final passage vote because
all the members of one party vote for the bill on both votes, and all the members of the other party
do not. While this is certainly the case occasionally, parties do not suppress vote variation on all
legislation.
The data on vote differences between initial and final passage reflect this. In the sample, there are
436 instances in the House where a vote was taken on initial passage and on a conference report.61
The average amount of vote change between the two parties is nearly 61 members, or about 14%
of the size of the chamber. Most of this change is a result of greater numbers of minority party
members supporting the legislation. In the Senate, there are 305 instances of both an initial and
conference vote. The average change between the two votes is approximately 11 votes equal to 11%
of the size of the chamber. The data demonstrate that there is a sizable amount of variation in both
chambers.
61The data also include instances of unanimous consent votes, where it is assumed all 435 members of the House
and all 100 members of the Senate approve the legislation.
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Table 10: Summary Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
House
Total Vote Difference (Dependent Variable) 60.73 71.72 0 399
CQ Lines 3.59 2.91 0 8.61
Number of Majority Seats 227.14 34.90 0 258
NOMINATE Difference Between Chambers .132 .081 .032 .252
Length of Time Out of Power 40.83 23.41 0 56
Senate
Total Vote Difference (Dependent Variable) 11.20 14.70 0 96
CQ Lines 4.68 2.50 0 8.61
Number of Majority Seats 53.29 6.54 0 57
NOMINATE Difference Between Chambers .121 .081 .032 .252
Length of Time Out of Power 8.05 3.03 0 10
Policy Outcomes in Conferencing
Table 11 shows the results for the House and Senate for vote differences when a conference
committee has been used. As explained above, the dependent variable is the change in party votes
from initial passage in the chamber to passage of the bill after it has been received from the conference
committee. The other variables included in the analysis are also expected to have an affect on
the dependent variable as discussed in the previous sections. Vote changes, which reflect conferee
discretion, should be greater when the costs of rejection are high and when the chamber receives little
value from the status quo. The results largely support the theory, though the number of majority
party seats variable has a relationship opposite from the theoretical expectations.
Appropriations bills increase the amount of vote change from the initial to final vote in both the
House and Senate. Appropriations bills are often semi-mandatory legislation that needs to be passed
in order to avoid the cancelation or defunding of a federal program. This class of bills creates high
costs of rejection for the chambers, resulting in more conferee discretion. The positive effect of the
coefficient is consistent with expectations and the substantive difference between appropriations and
non-appropriations bills is meaningful. In the House, an appropriations bill results in nearly a 13 vote
change between initial and conference passage as compared to a non-appropriations bill. There is
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Table 11: OLS Regression of Party Vote Change from Initial to Final Passage After Conferencing
House Senate
Election Year 2.84 -2.34
(6.70) (1.56)
Appropriations Bill 12.84∗ 1.40∗∗
(7.58) (1.80)
CQ Lines 2.45∗∗ -.606∗
(Logged) (1.12) (.331)
Majority Party Seats -1.00∗∗ -1.09∗∗
(.123) (.281)
Multiple Referral 16.87∗ 2.61
(9.60) (2.22)
NOMINATE Difference -171.09∗∗ -15.83
Between Chambers (36.64) (13.47)
Chamber of Origin -1.10 -3.59
(Senate=1) (8.61) (2.41)
Length of Time .076 .816∗∗
Out of Power (.172) (.372)
Constant 295.44∗∗ 71.23∗∗
(30.95) (15.94)
R2 .304 .250
Root MSE 60.40 12.91
N 436 305
*p<.1, **p<.05, with robust standard errors.
nearly a 1.5 vote change in the Senate. These results imply the conferees change appropriations bills
enough that members of both the House and Senate rethink their initial votes. As the theory suggests,
conferees have a relatively large amount of discretion on appropriations bills because chambers will
be very reluctant to reject the conference report. The conferees can use this discretion to modify
legislation and members from each of the parties change their votes as a result.
The theory also claims that the salience of legislation will raise the costs of rejection and increase
the discretion of the conferees. The measure of salience, “CQ Lines” supports this conclusion for
House votes. A one unit (logged) increase in the number of article lines written about the bill results
in a 2.45 vote change. A one unit increase is equal to about 2.72 additional lines in Congressional
Quarterly. The substantive effect is not as large as for appropriations bills, but it is still substantively
meaningful. A one standard deviation increase in the salience of legislation, about 2.67 logged lines
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or about 14.4 lines, results in an increase of 6.54 vote changes. Again, this is a substantive effect and
supports the claim that paradoxically, the more important the legislation is, the more discretion the
conferees have. Despite the incentives members of Congress have to pass important legislation, and
the incentives parties have to exert their influence on important or salient legislation, more volatility
is observed on passage votes for more important bills.
The CQ Lines variable is significant but negative in the Senate. This a somewhat surprising
result, and contrary to expectations, though the substantive effect is much smaller than in the
House. For a one standard deviation increase in the number of CQ lines written about a bill, the
change in votes in the Senate decreases by 1.5.
One possible reason for the conflicting result has to do with the type of bills addressed by the
chambers. The Senate deals with less legislation than the House and the bills it does take up tend
to be more important than those in the House. It is possible that because the Senate is the second
moving actor and its issues are more salient, the salience of legislation is not as important because
nearly all floor action is on salient legislation. The data provide some support for this. The average
number of CQ Lines for bills passed in the Senate is 4.67, while in the House it is only 3.6.
The ideological difference between the chambers reduces the amount of discretion the conferees
have. This result is true in both chambers and appears to be very large, though it is important
to remember the scale of the variable. NOMINATE scores range from -1 to 1—in the sample, the
minimum and maximum of the difference in NOMINATE scores is .032 and .252 respectively, while
the mean is .131. An increase from the minimum to the mean is .099, which when multiplied by the
coefficient, results in a substantive negative effect of 17 votes in the House (about 3.9% of the chamber
total). In the Senate, the results are similar, though the variable is not statistically significant. As the
chambers become more dissimilar in their ideological views, the less policy discretion the conferees
have, especially with respect to the House. On any particular vote, the chamber which is more
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constrained, meaning it has less votes and a receives a higher value from the status quo will be
more willing to reject the conference report. As one chamber becomes more ideologically extreme,
as measured by the difference in NOMINATE scores, it reduces the amount of “policy space” within
which the conferees to exercise discretion.
The effect of the variable which measures how long a majority in each chamber has been out of
power is inconsistent. In the House, the relationship is not statistically significant, indicating that
the longer the majority has been out of power has no effect on the vote change between the initial
and final passage votes. In the sample, there are only three times majority power changed hands,
and one was the “Republican Revolution” of 1995 when Republicans seized control after 56 years of
being the out-party. The lack of variation could be driving the null results.
In the Senate, the effect is in the predicted direction and significant at the .05 level. There is
significantly more variation in the time a majority has been out of power in the Senate because there
has been more majority party switching over the sample. The Republicans took over the Senate
in 1995, but the Democrats took it back briefly in 2001 after James Jeffords of Vermont switched
parties. The Republicans then retook the Senate until a Democratic wave in the 110th Congress.
The substantive effect in the Senate is equal to a 6.5 vote change at the mean of eight years out of
power.
Variables included in the model to control for other effects have mixed results. The multiple
referrals variable controls for the size and disparate preferences of a conference committee. A bill
that goes to more than one committee, besides being more complex, is subject to larger conference
committees with a greater variety of preferences, especially in the House. Multiple referrals are much
rarer in the Senate, though Senate members of the conference often have to bargaining with huge
sets of House conferees, sometimes numbering in the hundreds. Senate conference delegates tend
to be much smaller due to the smaller size of the size of the chamber and because there are fewer
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committees with larger jurisdictions. A bill referred to multiple committees results in a change of
almost 17 votes (significant at the .1 level) in the House, but no statistically significant change in
the Senate. The variable may also be picking up the effects of strategic conferee selection by party
leaders, especially the Speaker. These types of bills are subject to additional maneuvering by the
chamber leaders in order to ensure their preferences are represented on the conference committee.
Variables measuring whether or not the bill was initially passed in an election year and the
chamber of origin of the bill are not statistically significant. It was theorized that election year bills
are more salient and thus give the conferees more discretion. The chamber of origin was included
because effects may be different between chambers based on where the bill came from. For example,
we might expect less vote changing from the House if a bill originated there.
The number of majority party seats, meant to measure how much the chamber values the status
quo, shows an effect opposite from the theory’s prediction. An increase in the size of the majority
results in less change between the initial passage of the bill and the passage of the conference report
in both the House and Senate. Larger majorities should increase the level of discretion given to
conferees because the majority median becomes more extreme and the chamber places relatively
little value on the status quo. This makes rejection much less credible by the chamber and should
give the conferees more discretion. This is not the case in the House or the Senate, and I can only
speculate as to why this result occurred.
Majority parties are strong in the modern Congress. Party discipline is enforced vigorously by
party leaders, and ideologies among party members have converged within the party and away from
the other party. It is possible that when large majority parties exist in the House and Senate, the
conferees change policy, but because the minority is smaller and relatively homogenous they are not
inclined to vote for any legislation put forth by the conference committee. Likewise, members of
large majority parties will always support the conference report regardless of how much it changes
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due to the constraining effects of party discipline.
There is interesting variation in Table 11 between the House and the Senate. The strength of
the effects in the House are stronger and more statistically significant. In general, there is more
variation in the difference of House votes between initial and final passage. Despite the supposed
strengths of the party in the House, members in at least one party commonly change their vote as a
result of the conference committee. Additionally, the results in the Senate are more consistent with
expectation. One variable, the length of time a majority has been out of power, has a statistically
significant effect in the Senate, but not in the House. The reasons for this are unclear, though it is
possible the null results in the House are driven largely by the Republican takeover in 1995.
The Direction of Policy Change
In the previous models, an increase in the number of majority party seats reduced the amount
of change between the initial vote and the conference report vote in both chambers of Congress.
This result is contrary to expectations so additional models were used to understand more fully the
relationship between majority party seats and vote changes. With the goal of understanding this
result, and understanding the direction of conferee discretion, four regression results were analyzed.
Table 12 shows these results.
The dependent variable is similar to the one used in the previous analysis; it is the change in votes
between initial passage and passage of the final bill after it has been sent back from conference, but
in this case, the change in votes is only for a specific party coalition within each chamber. The first
column shows the change between the two votes for the majority party in the House, and the second
column shows the same change for the House minority. The same party splits are shown for the
Senate as well. Additionally, the dependent variable is a count rather than the absolute difference.
A positive coefficient indicates the variable increases the number of votes on conference passage as
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Table 12: OLS Regression of Change in Minority and Majority Party Votes after Conferencing
∆ House Votes ∆ Senate Votes
Majority Minority Majority Minority
Majority Party Seats .870∗∗ .588∗∗ .715∗∗ .623∗∗
(.090) (.067) (.218) (.086)
Election Year -3.55 1.76 -.250 -1.75
(2.80) (6.83) (.730) (1.48)
Appropriations Bill -6.60∗∗ 11.07 -2.47∗∗ -4.25∗∗
(2.78) (7.83) (.724) (1.81)
CQ Lines -2.35∗∗ -1.18 -.145 .238
(Logged) (.405) (1.12) (.124) (.370)
Multiple Referral 3.40 15.69 -1.77∗∗ -4.43∗
(3.20) (9.93) (.760) (2.41)
NOMINATE Difference 59.97∗∗ -40.33 12.41∗∗ -4.16
Between Chambers (16.24) (35.68) (5.26) (13.75)
Chamber of Origin -6.96∗ -44.88∗∗ -1.41 -.542
(Senate=1) (4.01) (7.91) (.946) (2.25)
Length of Time -.058 .069 -.332∗∗ -.524
Out of Power (.046) (.183) (.123) (.406)
Constant -187.28∗∗ -59.02∗∗ -34.25∗∗ -26.59∗∗
(22.47) (18.03) (12.11) (6.69)
R2 .642 .156 .416 .108
Root MSE 23.15 60.44 5.64 12.84
N 436 436 305 305
*p<.1, **p<.05, with robust standard errors.
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compared to initial passage, while a negative coefficient indicates the bill received fewer votes after
coming back from the conference committee as compared to initial passage.
The key independent variable is the number of majority party seats. In all four cases, an increase
in the number of majority party seats increases the number of votes received on final passage as
compared to initial passage. This suggests, first, the conferees exercise a significant amount of
discretion when drawing up the conference report, and second, that conferees tend to moderate
policy. The first must be true because there is a significant increase in the number of members
voting for the conference report as compared to the first version of the bill.
The second point is true because more members of both parties vote for the legislation. An
increase in the number of majority party members within each chamber means the chamber can pass
more ideologically extreme legislation. The bill can move farther to the ideological edges because
the pivotal member in each party becomes more averse to the status quo and more willing to vote
for more extreme policy. On the other hand, the increase in both majority party and minority party
votes on final passage means the conference committee moves the legislation back toward the center,
generating more votes for the bill from both moderate members of the majority and minority party.
That is, minority party members and other majority party members vote for legislation because it is
closer to their ideal points after conferencing as compared to final passage because the legislation is
more moderate. The results clearly indicate that conferees moderate policy, attracting more support
from members of both parties who may not have been comfortable voting for the bill on initial
passage.
The substantive effect in both chambers is quite large, especially in the Senate. For every one
seat increase in the number of majority party members in both the House and Senate, the positive
difference in majority party members voting on final passage is a little less than one seat. For the
minority party, a one seat increase in the number of majority party members in the chamber results
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in a positive difference of about .6 of a vote in both the House and Senate. All results are statistically
significant at the .05 level.
Other variables influence the direction of change the conferees enact. Appropriations bills lose
support, especially from the House majority, and the Senate majority and minority. These results
support the claim that conferees use their discretion to change funding policy back to the preferences
of the committee, just as distribution theory would suggest. The ideological distance between the
chambers results in increased support from the majority, though there is no effect on minority party
votes. It may be the case that legislation moderates toward members of the majority party as
ideological differences increase, perhaps because majorities tend to pass less moderate legislation on
initial passage. The resulting moderation may be a way of ensuring bicameral agreement.
One other result is worth mentioning. The “length of time out of power” variable is positive
for the Senate majority. The longer the majority has been out of power, the more votes it gains
from majority party members after the conference. There are no significant results in the House. It
is unclear why the differences between the chambers exist, but this variable has consistently been
significant in the Senate but not in the House. The theoretical meaning of these divergent results
deserves additional study.
Conclusion
Conferee discretion is an important topic of study because the post-passage bargaining process
produces policy changes not originally approved by the House or Senate. These changes can signifi-
cantly impact legislation and produce very different policy outcomes than those originally envisioned
by members in either chamber. In the modern Congress, the post-passage bargaining process has
become even more important due to the strong partisan preferences in each chamber and their desire
to protect their own policy, as well as the increasing difficulty the House and Senate are having
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resolving their differences.
This chapter contributes to our understanding of how and when conferees have the ability to
change policy within the limits of each chamber’s preferences. The theory developed explains how
rejection of a conference report is most likely to occur under two conditions: one of the chambers
values the status quo, or one of the chambers has low costs of rejection. In either of these cases, the
conferees have less discretion.
The empirical analysis measures the policy differences between the original bill and the bill
proposed by the conference committee using the change in party votes from the first vote (initial
passage) to the second (passage of the conference report). The results show that there is a great
deal of variation in who votes for each version of the bill, suggesting that the conferees often create
significant policy change when they bargain over policy within a conference committee. The types of
legislation and chamber characteristics predicted by the theory as most likely to provide discretion
are largely confirmed. Greater costs, which occur when the bill appropriates federal funding or when
the legislation is salient, increase the amount of change the conferees can make. When the chambers
are very different from each other, or during election years, the conferees also make relatively large
amounts of new policy in the conference committee.
The counterintuitive result to emerge from the theory is that conferees have discretion to change
policy under conditions that would seem to lend more power to the chambers. The more the chambers
agree with each other, the more the conferees can implement their own preferences. This is interesting
because it might seem that when the chambers agree they can force the conferees to adhere to their
own policy. This is an incorrect interpretation however, because the take-it-or-leave-it nature of the
conference report does not allow the chambers to credibly threaten rejection.
Broadly speaking, the more chambers want to change current policy, the more discretion the
conferees have. Again, this result is counterintuitive because strong preferences imply that the
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chambers must be strong bargainers and will protect their preferences. The logic of post-passage
bargaining demonstrates why this is not the case. Again, it is exactly the chambers’ strong desire
to replace the status quo which works against them when it comes to dealing with the conferees.
Chambers can misrepresent their position by trying to make it seem like it has low costs of rejection
or that it values the status quo highly, but the vote totals in each chamber likely prevent this from
swaying the conferees. Chambers cannot hide their policy preferences; the passage vote in each
chamber represents a credible signal about its intentions.
Members of the conference committee are in a very powerful position. The chambers are highly
constrained when they are forced to accept a conference report. The conferees have a substantial
amount of discretion, and they have more discretion when the chambers would like them to have
the least. Previous research which demonstrates that the Speaker strategically appoints conferees is
consistent with this research. The results here explain why the majority party attempts to manipulate
the preference structure of the conference committee. The formal rules of the institution provide
the chambers only the barest amount of control over the conferees. The majority’s response it to
attempt to control the conference by strategically selecting its members.
Majorities may be somewhat successful in shaping conferee preferences, but as the last set of
results demonstrated, parties do not always get their way when it comes to policymaking. The
results demonstrate that discretion may allow the conferees to make the legislation more moderate
and appealing to a broader group of legislators, despite the ideological goals of the majority party.
Party leaders, such as the Speaker, may not only disapprove of the conferees’ level of discretion,
but also of how the conference committee uses its power. The reason why conference committees
moderate legislation is unclear and deserves further study. It could be that moderating legislation
simply makes it easier for the conference to come to an agreement, allowing the individual members
to achieve their stated goal of reaching agreement while putting in the least amount of effort.
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Conference committees may play an even more important role than originally thought. Despite
the strong partisan preferences of both chambers in the modern Congress, implementation of those
preferences is not always straightforward. Conference committees expedite resolution in an efficient
way, but they also cool the passions of both chambers and produce policy which reflects the necessary
compromise. This gives majorities the ability to pass ideological bills which satisfy their members and
constituents, but it also gives them a way to resolve their differences under conditions of ideological
division.
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Chapter 6: Interchamber Bargaining and Resolution:
Conclusion
The Importance of Understanding Post-Passage Bargaining
Interchamber post-passage bargaining has been a long neglected area of research in spite of
its importance. Most congressional research, including literature on party effects, the distribution
of particularized goods, and the information solving capacities of Congress ignore the interaction
between the two chambers. In fact, a vast majority of the congressional literature focuses almost
exclusively on the House of Representatives. The little work which does examine interchamber
bargaining largely focuses on the conference committee, even though, as Chapter 3 demonstrated,
they are a small component of the post-passage bargaining and resolution process. This narrow
focus limits the type and quality of inferences that could be drawn from a richer and more detailed
examination of the post-passage resolution process. Finally, there has been little attempt to place
conference committees within a larger bargaining framework.
Understanding interchamber bargaining is important because bargaining affects legislative out-
comes. The process is relevant to questions about policy content and legislative productivity and has
implications for other important, substantive research areas in political science. These areas include
divided government, legislative organization, the effects of bicameralism, committee jurisdiction, and
representation. The effect of bicameralism, broadly construed, and post-passage bargaining more
narrowly construed, are not limited to periods when the same party controls both chambers or when
the majorities in each chamber have similar preferences. The existence of a second chamber with its
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own proposal and veto powers, will almost always have an independent effect on policy outcomes.
While political scientists may not yet fully appreciate the importance of the bicameral resolution
process, members of Congress certainly do. A former member of Congress said that most of his
colleagues view post-passage reconciliation as one of the most important lawmaking steps because
the final result can be much different than the versions of the legislation originally reported by each
of the two chambers.62 One cannot fully understand the American Congress and its interactions
with other institutions and actors without also understanding how the two chambers interact with
each other.
The research question which motivated this project is a simple one: How do chambers resolve
their differences and what factors affect the substance of their agreement? A number of empirical
puzzles motivate the research. The chambers almost always resolve their differences, despite the
method of resolution (conference committee or amendment trading), or the ideological makeup of
each chamber. A second empirical puzzle involves the use of conference committees and amendment
trading. Why do the chambers sometimes prefer one bargaining venue over the other, and why are
conferences less commonly used? Finally, what happens to policy after a conference committee? Is
the legislation substantially different than that passed by the chambers?
There are also consequences of bicameral bargaining that cannot be observed. For example, it is
unclear how the resolution process promotes legislative productivity or reduces the number of bills
that will be successful enacted by Congress, or how the strategic interaction between the chambers
changes the policy provisions of the legislation which emerges from initial passage.
The Goal of the Dissertation
The dissertation provides a theoretical framework upon which to build future studies of inter-
chamber bargaining. A non-cooperative bargaining game is used to model the post-passage reso-
62Personal conversation with the author, May 22, 2009, Boulder, CO.
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lution process because the House and Senate are engaged in a strategic exchange of offers in order
to maximize their share of the benefits derived from a successful resolution. There are a number of
advantages to this theoretical setup. First, the theory is able to incorporate both conferencing and
amendment trading as two possible resolution mechanisms. This is an important step, especially
given the new role of amendment trading. The modern Congress is characterized by strong and
determined minorities, and it is likely that amendment trading will play an increasingly prominent
role due to the difficulty of using a conference committee.
The second advantage the non-cooperative bargaining framework has over previous approaches
is its ability to subsume all types of legislation which may be considered by the chambers. Previous
research had primarily been limited to an arbitrary classification of important or “major” legisla-
tion. While excluding minor legislation may not seem to be problematic, it reduces the amount of
variation across bills, creates a selection problem for empirical research, and forces researchers to use
a subjective measure based on an arbitrary definition of what counts as important legislation. The
importance or size of legislation is endogenous to the bargaining procedure used and the amount of
conflict generated, so excluding an entire class of bills may not produce valid inferences. There is no
need to differentiate between types of legislation using the non-cooperative bargaining framework.
The final advantage of the theoretical approach used in the dissertation is its ability to incorporate
multiple dimensions of policy as well as relevant, exogenous factors besides preference or ideological
distributions on the chambers’ ability to reach an agreement. Specifically, the model relies on costs
and time to determine strategic behavior and bargaining outcomes. Too many studies of Congress
depend on spatial models to draw inferences, and many scholars use spatial models to make inferences
about causal relationships across time or in the presence of other factors. Spatial models are one
dimensional and cannot account for a continuous range of benefits and offers and they do not allow
researchers to draw inferences across time or include factors like costs. Rather the inferences from
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spatial models are based entirely on the distributions of preferences. This is problematic when
studying a strategic interaction like a bargaining situation because coalitions and members may be
able to anticipate new preferences, and they may change their behavior given their updated beliefs.
Spatial modeling is not equipped to provide valid inferences in these situations.
Substantive Conclusions
The dissertation is structured around the theory stated at the outset: chambers are strategic
actors engaging in a bargaining game where there goal is to maximize their share of benefits. The
first substantive chapter models this strategic game. From the game, a number of conclusions can be
drawn. Generally speaking, conferences are used when they are less costly, and when the chambers
believe the conferees will produce an acceptable offer.
In the empirical test, I start with the assumption that conferences, all else equal, should be
preferred by the chambers as long as the conferees remain true to the preferences of the chambers.
The chapter uses the model to address an empirical puzzle—why are conferences being used with
less frequency in the modern Congress, especially because they seem to be an attractive option (and
have been the preferred resolution mechanism since the first Congress). Recall that the formal model
suggested the costs of conferencing were also an important consideration. The empirical results show
that minorities realize how efficient conferences are at reaching agreement on the legislation. Though
minorities cannot control the likelihood the conferees make an acceptable offer back to the chambers,
they do have some influence over the costs of conferencing.
Large, willing majorities are now needed to ensure the chambers can use a conference. This has
historically been true in the Senate (over the span of the data, beginning in 1973), but it is also
becoming more true in the House. If either chamber cannot agree to use a conference committee, then
the chambers will have to use amendment trading. The chapter implies that while both conferencing
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and amendment trading are relatively successful at reaching agreement, the long-term effects of
increased amendment trading may be less obvious. As suggested in the chapter, the opportunity
costs of having to resolve differences on the floor may be reducing the number of bills that can be
passed within a session. Further, because the chambers anticipate that amendment trading will be
used, the content of legislation may be changing in order to avoid fights on the floor of each chamber
during the amendment trading process.
The first empirical chapter is somewhat pessimistic about the ability of majority coalitions to
enact important policy change. The second chapter however, shows that majority coalitions may
not always be constrained by ideology and preferences, and the chapter should leave readers more
optimistic about the ability of Congress to solve important national problems.
Chapter 3 uses two of the implications from the formal model, patience and incomplete infor-
mation, to explore the effects of interchamber bargaining on legislative productivity. One of the
major questions facing congressional researchers is whether or not divided control of the government
affects what gets down and how much lawmaking is accomplished. Most of the research convincingly
suggests that when two different parties control the House and Senate, there is a negative effect on
productivity.
I demonstrate that while this is almost certainly true in some policy areas, the majority in
each chamber does not simply give up on legislating when confronted with disparate preferences.
The relationship between party control and legislative productivity is more conditional than many
suspect, and legislators are able to achieve policy change even in the most difficult of ideological
circumstances. In short, the chambers look for policy they can agree on, and work within that
policy area. This relationship is robust over a wide variety of conditions, including periods when the
chambers are controlled by different parties.
The chapter makes the case that members of Congress have strong incentives to accomplish policy
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change during their time in office. And, despite difficult ideological conditions, they will find ways to
legislate. The negotiation process between the two chambers is not static, nor do the relevant actors
change significantly. This means the chambers learn about each other, what policies are likely to be
accepted, and which policy areas are a lost cause. Where agreement is likely, the chambers will be
able to pass legislation, come to agreement, and be productive. Where agreement is unlikely, the
chambers will not waste valuable time and energy attempting to come to an agreement.
The final empirical chapter explores the ways in which political circumstances provide conferees
discretion to change policy. Ultimately, policy outcomes are the most important implication of
post-passage bargaining. I focus on conference committees exclusively because their institutional
design allows a small group of legislators to drastically change policy. The process is uniquely
anti-majoritarian, especially with respect to the rules of the House of Representatives.
Conferees have a significant amount of discretion, but they mostly use this discretion to consensus
build rather than push the party’s, standing committee’s, or conference committee’s preferences.
Most bills gain votes after coming back from a conference, especially as the number of majority party
seats increases. This suggests that the more ideological extreme large majorities make legislation, the
more the conference pulls the legislation back to the center. Conference committees use their non-
majoritarian setup to encourage bipartisanship and consensus-making. This is a remarkable finding,
and similar to the other empirical work in the dissertation, suggests that the interaction between
institutional rules and institutional bodies creates strong incentives for successful lawmaking.
Context of the Dissertation in the Congressional Literature
This dissertation is a starting point for taking the bicameral nature of Congress seriously. The
next step for congressional researchers is to integrate the results here with studies of other institu-
tions, and with intrachamber negotiations and outcomes. Research on Congress often treats it as a
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unicameral institution, or focuses exclusively on one institution. The dissertation has demonstrated
how action within one chamber is strategic with respect to important actors within that chamber
and with respect to the other chamber. The strategic interaction between the chambers must be
addressed.
I take congressional institutions as exogenous—their development nor permanence is explained,
though this is a likely area for future extensions. I find that institutions impose constraints on be-
havior, but members, coalitions, and parties are fairly adaptable. Actors calculate outcomes based
on their incentives to make policy, which leads to reelection. The minority calculates how to slow
down or stop policy.
The dissertation is placed squarely within the realm of rational choice institutionalism (March
& Olson 1984, Hall & Taylor 1996). Members of Congress engage in strategic purpose behavior
in pursuit of a goal, and attempt to anticipate the actions and strategies of other actors. Despite
the criticism often leveled at this method of inquiry, this does not assume members are perfectly
informed or perfectly strategic. Critics often misinterpret outcomes like bargaining breakdown as
the failure of rational choice institutionalism. However, it is important to remember that uncertainty
and strategy exist.
Between chambers, the dissertation has explored how uncertainty and the incentives to misrepre-
sent one’s preferences lead to bargaining delay and failure. These “inefficient” outcomes often occur
not because there are no policies on which the chambers can agree, a theme that is too prominent in
the Congress literature. This theme is especially common when scholars focus on the role of parties.
Rather, these outcomes are not end themselves, but instead the product of a bargaining game played
by constrained and uncertain actors.
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Implications for Lawmaking
There are a number of conclusions to draw about the behavior of members of Congress and the
effect of institutional rules within the context of bicameral bargaining. The chambers are highly
successful at resolving their differences due to a few things. The republican system of government
established by the Framers creates strong incentives to reach agreement, but the force of these
incentives are mitigated by the constraints the bicameral system places on majorities. This, combined
with the use of institutional rules by the minority, creates a difficult environment for policy change.
Even with these hurdles, Congress has developed remarkably efficient and productive strategies
to respond to public demand. Members learn about each other, they use conference committees
whenever possible, they manipulate rules to produce favored outcomes, and they use the power of
the majority to generate accomplishments and claim legislative successes.
We often think of members of Congress and majorities as being beholden to the limiting conditions
they occasionally find themselves in during a Congress, whether those conditions be rules limiting
action, or the size of the majority. If the ideological preferences of chambers are not perfectly aligned,
if the majority is small, or if they have high political costs of failure or very little time in which to
achieve a policy goal, we often assume legislative action will not be accomplished. There is strong
evidence that minority coalitions anticipate these things and try to maximize their impact. The
minority, because they disagree with the actions of the majority, wants to prevent policy change
for electoral and policy reasons. But members of Congress, like all rational actors pursuing their
goals within an institutional environment, learn, anticipate, construct coalitions that will allow them
to achieve policy success, and make tradeoffs between their energy and time constraints, and the
opportunity costs of achieving policy success. The post-passage resolution process is another step
in this struggle. The minority has the institutional rules, and time and energy constraints on their
side—that the majority is able to ever accomplish anything can seem astounding.
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Without a doubt, bicameralism produces additional barriers to lawmaking. It would be much
easier for one chamber to enact policies without needing the approval of the other. However, it
is important to remember that our system of government was not defined for maximum efficiency,
nor to produce the greatest amount of legislation. The two-chambered legislature represents an
attempt to balance two different models of representation and to ensure that members from both
chambers have a say in the creation of new legislation. In the modern Congress, the House, with
its majoritarian rules and more politicized members, is usually, though not always, more willing to
pursue aggressive policy change. The Senate, with its emphasis on consensus, tempers the passions
of the House through the post-passage resolution process.
Of course, this is clearly what the Framers had in mind when designing the structure of Congress.
More importantly though, is that perhaps the post-passage resolution process is the means by which
the benefits of republican government are realized. A majority in both chambers must agree on
legislation, and failure to do so will result in the death of legislation and the maintenance of the
status quo. By engaging in post-passage bargaining, a public majority has the opportunity to
present its case for policy change, work out the details, and ensure the policy has broad support.
The minority, on the other hand, has additional opportunities to shape, delay, or defeat legislative
action. From a normative perspective, this process likely produces better, more considered, and
more conciliatory bills than would otherwise be the case.
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